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Disclaimer 
The material included in this Legal and Accounting Almanac is produced by The Australian 
Centre for Philanthropy and Nonprofit Studies, Queensland University of Technology, with 
contribution from some authors outside QUT.  It is designed and intended to provide general 
information in summary form on legal topics, current at 31 December 2011, for general 
informational purposes only. The material may not apply to all jurisdictions. 
The contents do not constitute legal advice, are not intended to be a substitute for legal advice 
and should not be relied upon as such.  
You should seek legal advice or other professional advice in relation to any particular matters 
you or your organisation may have. 
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FOREWORD 
 
I am very pleased to welcome you to this year’s Nonprofit Sector Legal and Accounting 
Almanac by the Australian Centre for Philanthropy and Nonprofit Studies.  
The Government recognises the invaluable role that not-for-profit organisations play in 
enriching Australian communities.  The Government announced in the May 2011 Budget a 
significant program of reform in the not-for-profit sector, which will help ensure its 
sustainability, integrity and viability into the future.  
The reforms aim to strengthen the sector, reduce red-tape, improve transparency and 
accountability, and provide a sustainable and modern framework within which the sector can 
continue to grow.  
The first stage of reforms includes the establishment of a regulator for the sector, the 
Australian Charities and Not-for-profits Commission (ACNC).  The Government’s vision is that 
the ACNC will become a ‘one stop shop’ regulator for the not-for-profit sector and will 
implement a ‘report-once use-often’ reporting framework for charities with a public 
information portal coming on line in July 2013.  
A further component of the reform agenda is to introduce a statutory definition of ‘charity’ 
applicable across all Commonwealth laws from 1 July 2013. We are also working towards a 
new nationally consistent approach to the regulation of charitable fundraising.  
These reforms are consistent with the vision of the National Compact: working together, which 
is helping to drive better partnerships and relationships between Government and the sector, 
based on collaboration and respect. Such a partnership is critical to the development of a 
strong, productive and innovative sector working effectively in the interests of Australians, 
particularly the most vulnerable and disadvantaged.  
The Almanac will assist those involved in the operation of organisations to follow the 
developments in case and statute law, accounting standards and the current reform process.  I 
congratulate those involved in its preparation.  
The Hon Mark Butler MP  
Minister for Mental Health and Ageing  
Minister for Social Inclusion  
Minister Assisting the Prime Minister on Mental Health Reform  
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1.0 INTRODUCTION 
 
This is the fourth year that we have summarised annual developments in the law for nonprofit 
staff, boards and volunteers. We were encouraged by the interest shown in last year’s 
publication and the use made of the digital copy on our website. The Australian Charity Law 
Association and PilchConnect (Victoria) have again agreed to contribute to and promote the 
publication. These two organisations are beginning to fill the void of professional legal 
development and assistance to small nonprofit organisations that has characterised Australia 
for too many years. The production of the Almanac is not a costless exercise and the 
sponsorship of NAB is welcomed as the Almanac grows in size, scope and popularity. 
CASES 
For a number of years, Professor Myles McGregor-Lowndes, Frances Hannah and Anne Overell 
have compiled one to two page summaries of cases involving nonprofit organisations and 
published them on The Australian Centre for Philanthropy and Nonprofit Studies, Developing 
Your Organisation (DYO) website.1 You can be alerted of new case summaries as they are 
posted to the DYO website by subscribing to the ACPNS RSS feed or the ACPNS twitter service.2 
A number of cases summarised in this Almanac are working their way through the appeals 
process and care should be taken with their application. In addition, some of the cases 
included are from jurisdictions outside Australia, and readers should exercise caution when 
considering the implications of these cases for Australian law. 
LEGISLATION 
Special thanks must go to Sue Woodward and the PilchConnect team for providing legislative 
updates for Victoria. 
ACCOUNTING AND AUDITING 
This year, the Almanac has expanded its scope to include accounting and auditing issues. In 
future years, we plan to increase the coverage in this area. The moves to require financial 
reporting to the Australian Charities and Not-for-profits Commission (ACNC) may increase the 
attention paid to accounting and reporting protocols. Our thanks go to Julie-Anne Mee and 
Mike Booth of ACPNS, and John McIntosh, of The Charities Tax Advisory Service. 
SPECIAL ISSUES DURING 2011 
A number of legal practitioners have contributed articles on significant legal issues facing 
nonprofit organisations. Issues considered include: recent high profile court cases on directors’ 
duties and lessons for nonprofit boards (Darren Fittler, Gilbert + Tobin ); the pay equity case 
                                                          
1
 https://wiki.qut.edu.au/display/CPNS/Legal+Case+Notes. 
2
 Click on ACPNS RSS feed at https://wiki.qut.edu.au/display/CPNS/ACPNS+Wiki+Home; or go to 
http://twitter.com/CPNSinsides. 
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(Linda Lavarch, ACPNS); the meaning of ‘charitable’ (Anne Robinson, Prolegis); changes to 
Public Ancillary Funds (Alice Macdougall, Freehills); new workplace health and safety laws 
(Anne Overell, ACPNS); and the accelerating impact of social media (Jenny Robertson, Board 
Matters). 
AUSTRALIAN TAXATION OFFICE (ATO) 
The highly regarded ATO ‘Non-Profit New Service’ updates serve nonprofit organisations well 
in providing timely alerts to the ATO’s compliance activities, changes in taxation law and 
procedure, as well as new and revised ATO publications. The full list of ATO nonprofit news 
updates is included here, and can be readily accessed through the ATO website3, while the 
most important developments are outlined in more detail in the chapters on ‘Special issues for 
2011’ and ‘What does 2012 hold’. 
WHAT DOES 2012 HOLD?  
The final section moves from looking in the rear view mirror to peering out the front 
windscreen to discern the reform agenda. The Treasury has released a significant number of 
discussion papers and consultation documents for comment during 2011, relating to 
regulation of charities and the nonprofit sector, particularly the establishment of the ACNC. 
More are due for release in 2012. The government’s deliberations and the co-operation of the 
states and territories will shape the legislative and regulatory agenda for the next decade and 
beyond.  
DOWNLOAD 
This publication is available in PDF format through QUT e-prints http://eprints.qut.edu.au/ 
(search for all of: nonprofit legal almanac 2011).  Earlier editions are also available. 
 
                                                          
3
 http://www.ato.gov.au/nonprofit/. 
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2.0 CASES BY CATEGORY 
 
Cases in this section are presented alphabetically under designated subject headings (with a 
‘Miscellaneous’ heading for cases that do not fit elsewhere.) 
 
2.1 CHARITIES AND CHARITABLE STATUS 
2.1.1  BICYCLE VICTORIA INC V COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION [2011] AATA 444 
(ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL, FORGIE DP, 24 JUNE 2011) 
Bicycle Victoria (BV) began as an unincorporated association in the 1970s, partially prompted 
by environmental concerns, but was 'open to all persons who wish to support cycling'. Its 
earliest incorporated purpose was to 'promote cycling'. The environmental emphasis was still 
evident in marketing material in the 2000s, along with a public health agenda. BV later 
changed its constitutional purpose to align with an application for tax benefits. 
BV applied for several tax concessions and benefits in February 2009: Deductible Gift Recipient 
(DGR) status, and endorsement as an income tax exempt charity; health promotion charity 
status under the Fringe Benefits Tax Assessment Act 1987; and charitable institution status 
under the A New Tax System (Goods and Services Tax) Act 1999. 
The Australian Taxation Office (ATO) refused to grant any of the exemptions and concessions, 
on the basis that it was not a 'charitable institution'. BV sought a merits review of the ATO's 
decision, on the basis that its public health activities made it eligible. 
Eligibility requirements 
To be eligible for DGR status, BV needed to be a 'fund, authority or institution' of a particular 
type listed in the legislation. The 'health' type was relevant to BV's application, specifically: a 
'charitable institution whose principal activity is to promote the prevention or the control of 
diseases in human beings'. BV was eligible for exemption from fringe benefits tax (FBT) if it was 
a health promotion charity: 'a charitable institution whose principal activity is to promote the 
prevention or the control of diseases in human beings'. To be classed as exempt from paying 
income tax and GST, BV needed to be a 'charitable institution'.  
The Tribunal's decision 
In interpreting 'charitable institution', the Tribunal emphasised the need to concentrate on the 
words of the statutes. Deputy President Forgie noted the majority in the Aid/Watch case had 
interpreted 'charitable institution' as analogous to the common law. Following Word 
Investments, this meant applying the formulations from Pemsel’s case and the Statute of 
Charitable Uses 1601, based on purpose. 'Purpose' is to be determined by examining all the 
circumstances, rather than merely relying on what the entity expresses its purposes to be.  
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Deputy President Forgie said that the relevant time to judge 'purpose' is from before the 
applications were made up until the date of the decision. While purpose at incorporation is 
relevant, it must be judged according to how it has evolved since. BV's purpose when started 
in 1976 was promotion of cycling as recreation. Health promotion had become a purpose since 
2004. She was satisfied that BV's purpose in this respect was to benefit the community in 
general, rather than members only, as the law requires. 
Was health promotion in the sporting context 'within the spirit or intendment' of the Statute 
of Elizabeth? 'Mere sport' has never been considered charitable, but there can be broader 
circumstances which bring it within the scope of 'charitable purpose', for example, physical 
education as part of a broader educational purpose or horse riding as part of a wider disability 
assistance objective. BV's overall purpose was promoting cycling and fitness - this has been 
recognised as an acceptably 'charitable' purpose, so BV was eligible to be endorsed as a 
'charitable institution' under the GST Act, and as exempt from income tax under the Income 
Tax Assessment Act 1997 (ITAA).  
However, this did not mean it was 'a charitable institution whose principal activity is to 
promote the prevention or control of diseases in human beings' as required for DGR status and 
FBT exemption.  
BV claimed that the health benefits of cycling and its advocacy activities, together with the 
public health problem of obesity, rendered it such a charity. In fact, most of BV's revenue was 
earned and spent on public riding events, while health behaviour change programs received 8 
per cent of its annual income. Its Medical and Public Health Reference Panel, consisting mostly 
of academics, had never been actively consulted. 
Thus, the Deputy President found that BV's purpose was to promote physical fitness. While 
preventing health problems was the motive behind this purpose, motive is irrelevant: it is the 
purpose that matters. Hence, though it was eligible to exemption from paying GST and income 
tax, BV was not entitled to DGR status or endorsement as a health promotion charity for FBT 
purposes.  
The Deputy President set aside the decision of the ATO as it concerned income tax and GST, 
substituting it with her ruling in favour of BV. She affirmed the ATO's refusal of endorsement 
as a health promotion charity for FBT and DGR status. 
The case can be viewed at: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/aat/2011/444.html  
Implications of this case 
If applying for tax exemptions or concessions, nonprofits should ensure that their activities can 
be tied to a charitable purpose, not simply a charitable motive. Changes in the constitution will 
usually not be enough to bring a nonprofit within the charitable purpose requirements of the 
tax concession Acts. 
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In its Decision Impact Statement,4 the ATO has indicated that it will apply the Tribunal's 
decision to allow entities with a purpose of promoting sporting and recreational activities to be 
classed as 'charitable' for the purposes of tax concessions, as long as 'the facts indicate that 
the activity is a means by which a broader charitable purpose is achieved'.  
 
2.1.2  DRACO FOUNDATION (NZ) CHARITABLE TRUST, RE [2011] NZHC 368 (HIGH 
COURT OF NEW ZEALAND, RONALD YOUNG J, 15 FEBRUARY 2011) 
This was an appeal to the High Court of New Zealand from a decision of the Charities 
Commission of New Zealand (the Commission). The Draco Foundation (NZ) (Draco) described 
itself as a trust which had the aim of raising awareness of and involvement in the democratic 
process amongst citizens, organisations and communities in New Zealand. In 2010, Draco 
applied to the Commission to be registered as a charity. The Commission refused the 
application. This was an appeal from that decision.  
Draco based its appeal on the grounds that: 
1. Its primary purpose was charitable in that it was for the advancement of education and 
was directed to a purpose beneficial to society, namely moral improvement for the 
public benefit; 
2. To the extent that its purposes were political and/or propagandist, those purposes 
were incidental to its primary purposes. 
The appeal was brought under sections 59(1) and 61 of the Charities Act 2005 (NZ) (the Act), 
and was by way of rehearing. 
Sections 5 and 13 of the Act establish the requirements for registration as a charity in New 
Zealand. There must be a charitable purpose. Charitable purpose is defined in the Act as 
relating to the relief of poverty, the advancement of education or religion, or any other matter 
beneficial to the community: section 5(1). This is the same definition as in the common law. 
Sections 5(3) and 5(4) provide that despite the requirement to be exclusively charitable, 
ancillary, non-charitable purposes may be present. Thus, His Honour held that to be accepted 
as a charity, Draco had to show that: 
1. It had a charitable purpose; 
2. It was for the benefit of the public; 
3. It was exclusively charitable (allowing for ancillary purposes). 
The purpose of Draco was described in its trust deed as 'the protection and promotion of 
democracy and natural justice in New Zealand', including by raising 'awareness of and 
involvement in the democratic process'.  
In its reasons for decision, the Commission accepted that some of the purposes set out in 
Draco's trust deed might be charitable, but, looking at Draco's actual activities, determined 
                                                          
4
 http://law.ato.gov.au/atolaw/view.htm?DocID=LIT/ICD/2010/1721/00001. 
  
WORKING PAPER No 55      6 
 
that they were not exclusively charitable. The Commission concluded that Draco was not for 
the public benefit because its main purpose was seeking change in the decision-making of local 
and central government. 
His Honour considered both the clauses of the trust deed and material provided by Draco 
describing its current and proposed activities. He said that the protection of democracy and 
natural justice in New Zealand could be a charitable purpose, but the clauses of the trust deed 
were not drafted as charitable purposes. Rather they suggested that the activities referred to 
(research, public debate, training and education, and support for like organisations) could be 
exclusively carried out as non-charitable activity. 
As to the advancement in education in particular, His Honour concluded that the activities 
Draco had either undertaken or proposed to undertake were 'general, wide and vague'. Draco 
claimed that its activities were educating the public in forms of government and political 
awareness. It maintained two websites which were not particularly educational, and other 
activities relating to research, training and sale of materials had either not taken place, or were 
not of much merit. His Honour found that at best the material provided on the websites was 
for self-study, and hence not for the advancement of education.  
Whilst Draco's organisation of a 'Residents' conference was possibly for a charitable purpose, 
Draco provided a 'paucity of information' about the conference and its merit could therefore 
not be adequately judged. Moreover, it was a single conference, so there was a question 
whether this implied an exclusively charitable purpose charitable over time. 
A trust for political purposes cannot be charitable in New Zealand. The Commission considered 
that a significant amount of the material on the websites was partisan propaganda 'under the 
guise of education'. Publishing one side of a debate is polemical and cannot be for the 
advancement of education. Draco was attempting to influence government officials, and 
engaging in advocacy. However, this would not matter if the political purposes were merely 
ancillary to the main charitable purpose. 
His Honour referred to the recent decision of the High Court of Australia in Aid/Watch Inc v 
The Commissioner of Taxation [2010] HCA 42 where the High Court held that there was no 
general doctrine which excluded political objects from charitable purposes in Australia. His 
Honour said that in this respect the law of Australia and New Zealand differed, and declined to 
follow the decision in Aid/Watch. 
His Honour agreed that the law in New Zealand had been established in Bowman v Secular 
Society Ltd [1917] AC 406 and Molloy v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [1981] 1 NZLR 688 
(CA). His Honour said that the Aid/Watch decision was based on constitutional principles not 
applicable in New Zealand and that the decision 'cannot have application in the High Court of 
New Zealand'. 
Therefore, it was held that Draco's partisan advocacy was a non-charitable purpose, and that 
the non-charitable purposes in Draco's trust deed were not incidental to charitable purposes. 
Draco was therefore not a charity, and the appeal was dismissed. 
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This decision may be found at http://www.nzlii.org/nz/cases/NZHC/2011/368.html  
Implications of this case 
His Honour referred to constitutional differences between Australia and New Zealand, which 
meant the outcome in this case would be different from that in Aid/Watch, despite similar 
facts. The High Court of Australia was upholding implied rights of free speech in Australia’s 
Constitution. Engaging in political debate, or even advocacy, did not mean that Aid/Watch 
could not be charitable in Australia. However, in New Zealand, with a different Constitutional 
background, having partisan or political objects meant that an organisation could never be 
charitable as the law stands. 
 
2.1.3  GREENPEACE OF NEW ZEALAND INCORPORATED, RE [2011] NZHC 77 (HIGH 
COURT OF NEW ZEALAND, HEATH J, 6 MAY 2011) 
This was an appeal from a decision of the Charities Commission to refuse to grant registration 
of Greenpeace of New Zealand Incorporated (Greenpeace) as a charitable entity under New 
Zealand's Charities Act 2005. The Charities Commission's decision was based on a view that 
Greenpeace's objects contained a political purpose in 'promotion of ...disarmament and peace' 
and political advocacy, constituting non-independent non-charitable purposes.  
Greenpeace argued that all its purposes were charitable, or in the alternative, that any non-
charitable purposes were ancillary or capable of correction. It also claimed that, because it did 
not aim to change specific laws, its promotion of peace was not political, and furthermore 
'advocacy' should be considered an appropriate charitable activity in the modern era. The 
Court upheld the Commission's reasoning and its decision, but did not award costs given the 
public significance of the case. Two major issues discussed in the case were that of charitable 
purpose and purposes that are ancillary.  
Charitable purpose? 
Justice Heath considered that the Charities Act had not altered the common law definition of 
'charitable purpose'. Accordingly, purely political objects were not charitable. His Honour 
referred to Bowman v Secular Society Ltd 1917 [AC] 406 (HL), which established that 'the Court 
has no means of judging whether a proposed change in the law will or will not be for the public 
benefit'. He also cited Chadwick LJ in Southwood v Attorney-General [2000] EWCA Civ 204, who 
said that promoting peace as better than war is clearly beneficial and thus charitable, but 
particular methods of doing so suffer the same uncertainty as political purposes, and thus 
cannot be considered charitable. 
His Honour went on to discuss a series of New Zealand authorities and the Australian case of 
Aid/Watch, concluding that while he found the Aid/Watch reasoning attractive, he was 
constrained to follow the Bowman case by the 1981 NZ Court of Appeal decision in Molloy v 
Commissioner of Inland Revenue.  
Applying Molloy and Southwood cases, the Commission was correct to hold that 'promoting 
disarmament and peace' is a non-charitable purpose, despite its being a 'worthy object'. 
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'Disarmament' constituted a specific avenue of seeking peace, and as such could not be 
charitable.  
Ancillary purpose? 
A non-charitable purpose which is merely ancillary to a charitable purpose, and not an 
independent purpose in its own right, is permissible under the Charities Act 2005. Following 
Simon France J's reasoning in Re the Grand Lodge of Antient Free and Accepted Masons in New 
Zealand, His Honour said that both a qualitative (whether the function is capable of standing 
alone) and quantitative (extent to which one purpose might have greater or lesser significance) 
assessment must be done. 
Evidence taken from Greenpeace's website indicated that Greenpeace 'sees itself as an 
advocate rather than an educator', campaigning for outcomes on specific issues rather than 
general discussion of issues in the public sphere (cf Aid/Watch). In His Honour's view, the 
'extent to which Greenpeace relies on its political activities to advance its causes means that 
the political element cannot be regarded as "merely ancillary" to Greenpeace's charitable 
purposes'. (pp 28–29). 
In addition, it was an independent purpose, because political activities were not required to 
fulfil the aim of educating the public. As such, the Commission was right to hold that this 
disqualified Greenpeace from registration as a charitable entity, especially given that 'the 
charitable purposes of Greenpeace could be met without resort to the type of political 
activities that deny its right to registration’. 
Obiter: illegal activity 
His Honour felt it unnecessary to decide a separate issue of illegal activity which had also 
played a part in the Commission’s decision. However, he expressed the view that the evidence 
before the Commission could be interpreted as illegal member activity rather than illegal 
activity by the entity itself.  
This case can be found at http://www.nzlii.org/nz/cases/NZHC/2011/77.pdf  
Implications of the case 
According to Heath J, the NZ Charities Act does not displace the common law definition of 
charitable purpose, so political purposes of any kind will continue to defeat registration as a 
charitable entity.  
Heath J also confirmed (albeit reluctantly) the earlier Re Draco Foundation (NZ) Charitable 
Trust view that Aid/Watch does not apply in New Zealand. His Honour indicated that if he were 
not bound by precedent, he may have taken a different view. Consequently, it appears that 
Aid/Watch does not apply to New Zealand, unless the Court of Appeal overrules Re Draco 
Foundation. 
Associations seeking registration as a charitable entity in NZ should take care that any political 
activities are kept to an ancillary role, and aim to generate debate rather than seeking 
particular outcomes. However, given that both the Commission and the Court regarded the 
political aspects of Greenpeace's activities fatal to otherwise legitimate charitable purposes, it 
  
WORKING PAPER No 55      9 
 
is arguable that if the society were to remove its political activities to a separate entity, 
Greenpeace of New Zealand Incorporated would be considered charitable and could achieve 
registration.  
 
2.1.4  HELENA PARTNERSHIPS LIMITED V HER MAJESTY'S REVENUE AND CUSTOMS 
[2011] UKUT B12 (UNITED KINGDOM UPPER TRIBUNAL, TAX AND CHANCERY 
CHAMBER, WARREN AND MCKENNA JJ, 6 APRIL 2011) 
This was an appeal from a decision of the Tax Chamber of the First Tier Tribunal on 1 February 
2010. The appellant, Helena Partnerships Limited was formerly known as Helena Housing Ltd 
(and referred to throughout the appeal as HHL). The question for decision was whether HHL 
was a charity. This question was answered in the negative. 
HHL was incorporated in 2001, and had objects which embraced the provision of housing and 
accommodation 'for the benefit of the community' in line with its role as a company registered 
as a social landlord (an RSL) with the Housing Corporation (a corporation of the St Helens 
Metropolitan Borough Council (the Council)). HHL had been registered as a charity from 1 
December 2004. 
In July 2002, the Council transferred some of its social housing stock to HHL under a 
government program established in 1988, the Large Scale Voluntary Transfer Programme 
(LSVT). There were two operative documents between HHL and the Council: the Development 
Works Agreement (DWA) and the Transfer Agreement (TA).  
Under the DWA, in consideration of the payment to HHL of £104,000,000 plus VAT (Value 
Added Tax), HHL undertook to carry out, or to procure the carrying out, of certain 'Qualifying 
Works' set out in the schedule to the DWA. These works were repairs and refurbishments to 
the housing stock. 
The TA between the Council and HHL stated that the price of the transfer to HHL was 
£133,058,361. The main part of this payment (£104,000,000) represented the value of the 
Council's covenant contained in the TA to carry out the 'Qualifying Works', and provided that 
payment of the amount from HHL to the Council under the TA might be set off against the 
payment due from the Council to HHL under the DWA. The amounts thus cancelled each other 
out. 
HHL duly issued a VAT invoice to the Council for £104,000,000 plus VAT 'for the supply of 
services in accordance with the Schedule of Works set out in the development agreement'. 
Since the two amounts of £104,000,000 were offset against each other, all the Council actually 
paid to HHL was the amount of the VAT payable on the invoice. 
The question at first instance was whether Corporation Tax was payable by HHL for the periods 
1 July 2002 to 31 March 2003 and 1 April 2003 to 31 March 2004 (periods before HHL's 
registration as a charity). The assessment was for £6 million plus interest. The Revenue and 
Customs (HMRC) had ruled that HHL was in fact running two businesses at the relevant times, 
the provision of housing, and the provision of works to the Council under the terms of the 
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DWA. This meant that HHL could not offset the refurbishment costs against the profits from 
the provision of housing and that those profits were therefore liable to Corporation Tax during 
the relevant periods, which predated HHL's registration as a charity. 
The following issues were raised on appeal: 
1. whether the expenditure incurred by HHL on the refurbishment of the properties was 
a deductible expense for the purpose of HHL's Schedule A business (refurbishment of 
its housing stock) or whether it was expenditure incurred in the course of providing 
building services to the Council under the DWA; 
2. whether HHL was entitled to an exemption from Corporation Tax pursuant to sections 
505 and 506 of the Taxes Act 1988: HHL argued that it was, because even though not 
registered as a charity at the relevant times, in fact it had charitable status and the 
profits in question were applied for charitable purposes only.  
As to the first issue, it was held at first instance that HHL had two sources of income, its rental 
business and its sub-contracting business. The expenditure incurred on refurbishment arose 
from HHL's obligations under the DWA, thus the refurbishment expenditure was incurred for 
the purposes of its refurbishment obligations and not its provision of housing. There was no 
appeal from this decision. 
On the issue of charitable status and the application of funds to charitable purposes, it was 
held at first instance that HHL was not established for purposes that were exclusively 
charitable under the fourth head of charity in Pemsel's case. Therefore, there was no 
exemption available to HHL under the Taxes Act 1988. 
HHL appealed to the Upper Tribunal on the charity issue only. This had to be considered on the 
basis of the law as it stood before the commencement of the Charities Act 2006, which meant 
that the common law applied to the meaning of the word 'charitable'.  
Were the objects and purposes of HHL exclusively charitable? Their Honours found that each 
of the objects of HHL was an independent object, and if it were not for the addition of the 
words 'for the benefit of the community' in the Memorandum, the objects could not even be 
considered as exclusively charitable. However, it was held that HHL was not established for 
exclusively charitable purposes since it is not enough to qualify as charitable that the objects of 
an organisation are said to be for the benefit of the community. Some of the objects of HHL 
(such as advice on forming housing associations) conferred private benefits, and had nothing 
to do with charity. 
Therefore the appeal was dismissed, and HHL was liable for the corporate taxes assessed by 
HMRC. 
The case may be viewed at: http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKUT/TCC/2011/B12.html  
Implications of this case 
Helena Partnerships Ltd was registered as a charity in December 2004 after it had amended its 
objects. This case shows that prior to that registration, it was not operating as a charity as it 
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conferred private benefits on tenants, some of whom were found not to be in need. This was 
because although the provision of housing and housing assistance might seem charitable, not 
all parts of St Helens were uniformly in poverty. Note this is a case from the UK Jurisdiction. 
 
2.1.5  INDEPENDENT SCHOOLS COUNCIL V THE CHARITY COMMISSION [2011] UKUT 
421 (UNITED KINGDOM UPPER TRIBUNAL, TAX AND CHANCERY CHAMBER, 13 
OCTOBER 2011)  
This case concerns the meaning of ‘public benefit’ for the purposes of deciding the charitable 
status of private schools in England and Wales. Two separate proceedings were combined into 
a single proceeding. One was to quash certain parts of ‘Guidance’ about public benefit issued 
by the Charity Commission of England and Wales; the other was a reference by the Attorney 
General to determine a question of law in relation to charities and public benefit. 
At common law the definition of charity has developed over centuries and the concept of 
public benefit was inherent in the concept although it was not expressly mentioned in the 
Preamble to the Statute of Elizabeth which listed charitable objects. No English case has 
attempted to define public benefit comprehensively, but after considering various cases, the 
court made an attempt, stating: 
The first aspect is that the nature of the purpose itself must be such as to be a benefit 
to the community: this is public benefit in the first sense. In that sense, the 
advancement of education, referred to in the Preamble under the guise of ‘schools of 
learning, free schools and scholars in universities’, has the necessary element of 
benefit to the community (although that needs to be qualified as we will see). The 
second aspect is that those who may benefit from the carrying out of the purpose 
must be sufficiently numerous, and identified in such manner as to constitute what is 
described in the authorities as ‘a section of the public’: this is public benefit in the 
second sense. (para [44]) 
Since the case of National Anti-vivisection Society v Inland Revenue Commissioners [1948] AC 
31 commentators and regulators have referred to certain charities having a ‘presumption of 
public benefit’; Some judges have adopted this language as well. It came to be regarded that 
there was a legal presumption of public benefit, prima facie, in the charitable heads of relief of 
poverty, advancement of education and advancement of religion. Those purposes falling under 
the head of other purposes beneficial to the community were required expressly to 
demonstrate public benefit. 
The court remarked that a close reading of the National Anti-vivisection Society case reveals 
that it is more of an ‘assumption’ than a ‘presumption’: 
We think that Lord Wright’s approach was simply a recognition of how a judge would 
deal practically with a particular case before him. He would start with a predisposition 
that an educational gift was for the benefit of the community; but he would look at the 
terms of the trust critically and if it appeared to him that the trust might not have the 
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requisite element, his predisposition would be displaced so that evidence would be 
needed to establish public benefit. But if there was nothing to cause the judge to 
doubt his predisposition, he would be satisfied that the public element was present. 
This would not, however, be because of a presumption as that word is ordinarily 
understood; rather, it would be because the terms of the trust would speak for 
themselves, enabling the judge to conclude, as a matter of fact, that the purpose was 
for the public benefit. (para [67]) 
The Charities Act 2006 (Eng&W) reformed large sections of the law of charity, including 
provisions about its definition. Section 3 deals with the ‘public benefit’ test, referred to in 
section 2(1)(b) as part of the definition of a charitable purpose. Section 3 provides:  
(1) This section applies in connection with the requirement in section 2(1)(b) that a 
purpose falling within section 2(2) must be for the public benefit if it is to be a 
charitable purpose.  
(2)  In determining whether that requirement is satisfied in relation to any such 
purpose, it is not to be presumed that a purpose of a particular description is for 
the public benefit.  
(3)  In this Part any reference to the public benefit is a reference to the public benefit 
as that term is understood for the purposes of the law relating to charities in 
England and Wales.  
(4)  Subsection (3) applies subject to subsection (2).  
Most took this to mean that, from that time on, all charities would have to prove public 
benefit, not merely rely on the presumption.  The Act directed the Charity Commission to issue 
guidance on public benefit and monitor it. Some legal opinion during the reform debate prior 
to the Act was that the presumption of public benefit made no difference to the law, however 
the Charity Commission and the Home Office signed a concordat to say that it did. The 
Commission issued a Guidance and began to monitor selected test cases as to whether they 
could show sufficient public benefit. 
The Charity Commission’s final Guidance focused on two stated principles of public benefit, 
with a number of sub-principles. These are:  
Principle 1: There must be an identifiable benefit or benefits.  
1a It must be clear what those benefits are;  
1b The benefits must be related to the aims;  
1c Benefits must be balanced against any detriment or harm.  
Principle 2: Benefit must be to the public or a section of the public.  
2a The beneficiaries must be appropriate to the aims;  
2b Where benefit is to a section of the public, the 
opportunity to benefit must not be unreasonably 
restricted  
 by geographical or other restrictions; or  
 by ability to pay any fees charged.  
2c People in poverty must not be excluded from the 
opportunity to benefit. 
2d Any private benefits must be incidental. 
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After an exhaustive review of previous cases and a consideration of the 2006 Act, the court 
found that: 
the 2006 Act itself really makes little, if any, difference to the legal position of the 
independent schools sector. But what the 2006 Act has done is to bring into focus 
what it is that the pre-existing law already required, and what the law now requires by 
way of the provision of benefit and to whom it must be provided. (para [88]) 
The court found that where the sole object of a school is the advancement of the education of 
children whose families can afford to pay fees representing the cost of the provision of their 
education, it does not have purposes which provide that element of public benefit necessary 
to qualify as a charity. This would be all the stronger if the school charged fees which were 
significantly in excess of the cost of education in order to build resources for appropriate 
further development of the school’s facilities. Although there was no direct case authority 
cited, this was based on the view that a trust which excludes the poor from benefit cannot be a 
charity.  
In relation to the Charity Commission’s Guidance it found sub-principles 2b and 2c and the 
accompanying explanatory materials were erroneous (para [228]). This was because: 
 The material confused ‘aims with activities’; 
 What is ‘reasonable’ is for individual trustees to decide in the particular circumstances 
and acting within the minimum bounds of proper conduct; and 
 Once provision for the poor is more than token, then wider benefits can be taken into 
account for the purposes of public benefit. 
Some of the court’s other comments are worth noting: 
 This case is confined to public benefit requirements of educational charity and should 
not be merely transposed to other heads of charity; 
 ‘[T]he extent of the fiscal advantages enjoyed by independent schools has had no 
bearing on this decision’; (para [34]) 
 ‘Poor’ does not mean destitute in the context of trust for the relief of poverty, but 
broadly speaking a poor person is a person who cannot reasonably afford to meet a 
particular need by purchasing at full cost price the service which is the charity’s 
purpose to provide and again this may vary across the different heads of charity; 
 The court expressed disappointment that it is not possible to make the requirements 
of the law in this area ‘clear, not least so that they may be properly understood by the 
many volunteers who act as trustees for many charities’; (para [224])  
 ‘Our Decision will not, we know, give the parties the clarity for which they were 
hoping. It will satisfy neither side of the political debate. But political debates must 
have political conclusions, and it should not be expected of the judicial process that it 
should resolve the conflict between deeply held views. We venture to think, however, 
that the political issue is not really about whether private schools should be charities 
as understood in legal terms but whether they should have the benefit of the fiscal 
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advantages which Parliament has seen right to grant to charities. It is for Parliament to 
grapple with this issue’. (para [260]) 
The case is available at: http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKUT/TCC/2011/421.html 
Implications of this case 
This case may have a significant impact in Australia with its detailed and scholarly analysis of 
the concept of ‘public benefit’ in relation to the common law definition of charity. Specifically, 
its treatment of the concept of poverty and charging of fees challenges some notions currently 
appearing in ATO material on these issues. The case also firmly rests on the basis that each 
charity case must be addressed separately; objectives should not be confused with activities; 
the starting point in any inquiry is to examine the written constitution of the body to assess its 
charitable intent; and the motives and intentions of the founders are otherwise irrelevant to 
the examination of charitable status. This appears not to be the case in Australia. 
 
2.1.6  JAMES COOK UNIVERSITY V TOWNSVILLE CITY COUNCIL AND ATTORNEY-
GENERAL AND MINISTER FOR INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS [2011] QSC 209 
(SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND, PHILIPPIDES J, 23 JUNE 2011) 
This case was brought to establish that the land gifted by deed (the land) to what was to 
become the James Cook University (JCU) by the Council of the City of Townsville in 1963, was 
not merely an absolute gift, but created a charitable trust conditional upon the land being used 
for an identified purpose. Her Honour agreed with this submission, saying: 
In submitting that the deed establishes a trust, JCU pointed to the operative part of 
the Deed which states that the Land was gifted to [University of Queensland] ‘to be 
held on trust’ for a specific purpose: ‘the establishment and conduct of an educational 
institution at university level and purposes fairly incidental thereto’. This submission 
was said to be fortified by the use of the words, ‘if a separate autonomous University 
body be at any time established, the said land may be transferred to such body upon 
the like trusts as far as applicable to these presents’. It was submitted that the Deed 
created a trust for a purpose...Moreover, the purpose for which the Land was gifted 
came within the description of charitable purposes that was identified in the preamble 
to the Statute of Charitable Uses (43 Eliz I, cap 4) and, in particular, the second 
category of charitable purposes identified in Commissioners for Special Purposes of 
Income Tax v Pemsel...namely ‘trusts for the advancement of education’. I accept 
these submissions and find that on its true construction the Deed establishes a 
charitable trust. 
JCU had commenced life as a university college of the University of Queensland in 1961, and 
became a separate university in 1970.  It is now governed by the James Cook University Act 
1997 (Qld) (the Act). Section 69(1)(b) of the Act provides that the land gifted and held in trust 
since 1963 was passed to the new corporate form of JCU. JCU now wished to redevelop the 
campus which included the land in question. Part of the redevelopment involved giving 
commercial and retail leases over the land to third parties. The purpose of these leases was 
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said to be for service to students, staff and others connected to the university, and to raise 
revenue for traditional university activities.  
Trustees have the power to give leases under section 32(1)(e) of the Trusts Act 1973 (Qld) (the 
Trusts Act). Were the activities envisioned under the leases incidental to the charitable 
purposes of the trust?  Or were they collateral or additional?  Her Honour found that the fact 
that JCU might receive rents from lessees for parts of the land or of buildings constructed on 
the land did ‘not of itself detract from the charitable purpose of the trust, where the receipt of 
rent is merely an incident of the use of the site for the provision of appropriate facilities to 
staff, students and those associated with the functioning of JCU’. 
The contention by JCU that the purpose of raising revenue from the land was ‘relevantly 
incidental to the modern conceptions of conducting a university’ was described by Her Honour 
as ‘more robust’. It was submitted that, if the Court found that current conceptions concerning 
the operation of a university did not extend to the leasing of university land on commercial 
terms, there was nevertheless authority recognising a general power of the trustee to sell, 
lease or mortgage charity land, even where the land was gifted to the trust on condition that it 
be used for a specific charitable purpose. It was said that a distinction was to be made 
between a gift to a charity for its general purposes and a gift of property on condition that it 
be used for a specific purpose. In this respect, land could be given to be held for investment 
(referred to in some cases as ‘investment land’), rather than for use for the purposes of the 
charity’s activities (often referred to as ‘functional land’). Her Honour said that the essential 
question was whether the Townsville City Council made it clear that the land which it gave to 
the university in trust was the land on which it intended the charitable purposes of the gift to 
be carried out and that retention of that land was part of the ‘purposes’ of the gift.  
JCU contended that the High Court’s decision in Commissioner of Taxation v Word Investments 
Ltd in 2008 suggested that the court could now take a more liberal approach as to what 
constituted charitable activities. The majority in the Word case took the view that activities of 
an entity may be characterised as charitable even if the entity aimed to make a profit from the 
activities, provided the activities were carried out in furtherance of a charitable purpose.  
However, Her Honour ultimately concluded: 
I am not persuaded that the leasing of the Land generally by JCU on commercial terms, 
and as part of a commercial venture per se, so as to raise funds that would ultimately 
be applied to conduct an educational institution at university level may be considered 
sufficient to result in compliance with the terms of the charitable trust. 
The proposed redevelopment was extensive and ambitious. Both existing and new buildings 
were to be in use on the land. Several leases were in an advanced state of negotiation, and 
included leases to the CSIRO, the Queensland Department of Employment, Economic 
Development and Innovation, and for buildings for clinical practice, and student 
accommodation. There were also proposals for a mixed use building which included a 
university staff club, and retail shops and offices, a school building (to be leased to the 
Queensland Department of Education), a data centre and a hotel, conference and studio 
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apartment building. There was also a proposal for a residential community to be established 
on the land. All of these ventures required long-term leases of 40, 50 and up to 99 years. 
JCU was precluded from entering into long-term leases by sections 31 and 32(1)(e) of the 
Trusts Act. It sought an order from the court to allow long-term leases of up to 99 years under 
section 94(1) of the Trusts Act. Section 94 of the Trusts Act can only be exercised if: 
(a) the long-term lease cannot be entered into ‘by reason of the absence of any power 
for that purpose vested in the trustee by the trust instrument (if any) or by law’.  
(b) the Court considers that it is ‘expedient in the management or administration of 
any property vested in’ JCU that the order be made.  
Her Honour held that only the lease to the CSIRO accorded with the purposes of the trust, and 
could extend to 50 years.  The other leases were more difficult to assess in the absence of 
detailed information about the lease terms, and Her Honour declined to make any findings 
about them. 
The overall findings were that the deed granting the land to JCU established a charitable trust, 
the proposed activities on the land were incidental to the trust, but that only the land leased 
to the CSIRO for a period of 50 years for a research centre was appropriate for a long-term 
lease. The condition was that JCU applied ‘the rents and profits from the [CSIRO] lease to 
conduct an educational institution at University level conformably to conceptions from time to 
time currently adopted as fit and proper for a university education’. 
The case may be viewed at: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/qld/QSC/2011/209.html  
Implications of this case 
The trust established by the deed of grant in this case was definitely charitable, and the 
activities proposed for the use of the land were incidental to the trust, but the power to grant 
long-term leases for the activities proposed was found to be problematical.  Note also that the 
purpose of raising revenue for the university was not incidental to the charitable purposes of 
the trust. 
 
2.1.7   KRISHNAMURTI AUSTRALIA INC AND COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION [2011] 
AATA 512 (ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL, 25 JULY 2011) 
Krishnamurti Australia Inc (KA) was accepted as a 'tax concession charity' by the Commissioner 
of Taxation, but was refused deductible gift recipient status as a 'health promotion charity'. KA 
sought review of that decision.  
To be a health promotion charity within the meaning of Income Tax Assessment Act 1997, an 
entity must come within item 1.1.6 of section 30-20 and also satisfy sub-section 30-125(1). 
Item 1.1.6 is met if a 'charitable institution' has a 'principal activity to promote the prevention 
or control of diseases in human beings'. Disease is defined by Taxation Ruling TR2004/8 to 
include 'any mental or physical ailment [or] disorder'. 
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The main issue in the case was whether promotion of the control or prevention of mental 
illness was KA's principal activity.  
In supporting this contention, KA submitted that Krishnamurti's teaching promotes enquiry 
into and understanding of human thought processes, thereby reducing disorder in thinking and 
helping to eliminate psychological conflict. Although the technique was said to benefit all who 
follow it, KA argued that the fact that it could also benefit those who suffer mental illness was 
sufficient to bring KA's activity within item 1.1.6. 
The Commissioner argued that the evidence showed that prevention or control of mental 
illness was not KA's principal activity; at most, it was a very minor component overall. 
The Tribunal adopted the approach of Deputy President Block in Healthy Cities Illawarra Inc 
and Commissioner of Taxation (2006) AATA 522: 'in deciding whether an activity can be termed 
'principal', one may evaluate activities in terms of measures, including but not limited to time 
or number of persons [devoted to it]; level of expenditure; and income generated'. (para [15]) 
The Tribunal looked at the objects of KA as set out in its constitution, but found nothing to 
indicate any emphasis on mental illness. The financial statements showed income derived 
from gatherings, sales of books etc on the general teachings of Krishnamurti, but only a small 
portion of the products had any relation to the topic of mental illness and none appeared to be 
directed towards prevention or control. KA's evidence and submissions contained no material 
related specifically to mental illness or detailing particular activities or resources allocated to 
that purpose. 
The Tribunal concluded that KA's principal activity was dissemination of the philosophical 
teachings of Krishnamurti to the general public. Nothing on the evidence showed that control 
or prevention of mental illness was a principal activity or even a subsidiary activity of any 
significance. 
The decision of the Taxation Commissioner was affirmed.  
This case can be found at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/AATA/2011/512.html  
Implications of this case  
This case indicates some of the measures that will be used by the courts to establish what 
amounts to ‘principal activity’. 
 
2.1.8   LIBERTY TRUST V CHARITIES COMMISSION [2011] NZHC 577 (HIGH COURT OF 
NEW ZEALAND, MALLON J, 2 JUNE 2011)  
This was an appeal against the removal of Liberty Trust (LT) from the register of charities in 
New Zealand. LT had been registered as a charitable entity under the Charities Act 2005 (NZ) 
on 8 October 2007. The Charities Commission (the Commission) had subsequently determined 
that LT was not exclusively for charitable purposes. 
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LT operated a mortgage lending scheme funded largely by donations. It made interest-free 
loans to its donors and others, on the basis of financial principles derived from the bible. It 
submitted that this operation advanced religion, and was thus charitable. The Commission 
took the view that teaching financial principles derived from the bible was at best conducive to 
religion, but did not advance religion. The case thus turned on the meaning of the 
‘advancement of religion’ as a charitable purpose, and whether LT met the public benefit test. 
The background to the establishment of LT was that the pastor of the Whakatane Christian 
Fellowship, after praying about the matter, became convinced that debt and interest were not 
in accordance with God's word. A fund was established to form a pool for lending. Donations 
are made to the fund and, after 5 to 10 years, donors are eligible for an interest-free loan. 
Loans are offered in the order of joining the fund. The standard contribution rate is 20 per cent 
of the loan application for 10 years. The loan offered is then a 7 year interest-free loan of five 
times the contribution balance. All of these parameters are variable: for example, to receive a 
longer loan period, the donor can wait longer to take a loan, or contribute more than 20 per 
cent per year. Loans are offered for up to 100 per cent of the valuation of the property and are 
secured by a standard mortgage. All repayment amounts are paid into the pool for re-lending. 
Obviously, with an interest-free loan, amounts can be repaid fairly rapidly. This is described by 
LT as the 'bible's "Sowing and reaping" blessing in practice'.  
Loans are not restricted to members of the church, or even Christians. LT states that it exists 
'to serve all people regardless of their beliefs'. The fund has been operating for 20 years, and 
has transacted $NZ18 million of loans. The current equity of the fund is $NZ5,398,394.07. 
The mortgage business is conducted through Ark Resources Ltd which lends the money and 
takes the securities. All loans are stated to be 'subject to normal bank lending conditions', 
though this is not specified further. The original action in deregistering LT as a charity was 
sparked by a complaint to the New Zealand Securities Commission. Crown Law raised the 
possibility that the lending scheme operated by LT was an illegal pyramid scheme with the 
Commerce Commission (NZCC) but NZCC did not commit to pursue the matter. The question 
then became: was making loans to donors a charitable activity? 
LT submitted that its lending scheme taught the bible's financial principles 'through action', 
and that it was 'a storehouse into which people can donate for the promotion of God's 
purpose'. LT also conducts other teaching activities, public meetings and seminars and 
publishes newsletters and books through its website.  
The Commission gave its decision on deregistration on 15 April 2010. The Commission 
considered that the loan scheme was not for the relief of poverty, since a person did not have 
to be poor to apply for a loan under the scheme. The scheme was also not for the 
advancement of education since this was not a stated purpose of LT. As to advancement of 
religion, the Commission decided that there was no public benefit. The benefits arising under 
the scheme were purely private. 
This appeal was brought on the basis that the scheme did advance religion. Her Honour 
considered the relevant law on charitable purposes and the advancement of religion, including 
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the controversy on whether the advancement of religion should be a charitable purpose at all. 
Accepting that it was, there must be an element of public benefit involved.  
There were no New Zealand decisions brought forward dealing with the meaning of 
advancement of religion. English case law saw the advancement of religion as meaning 
promoting religion, spreading its message, and taking positive steps to sustain and increase 
religious belief. This had to be done in a 'pastoral' or 'missionary' way. The Commission 
submitted that LT could not be described as either pastoral or missionary, and that its teaching 
about 'saving, wise spending and charitable giving' were at best conducive to religion only. LT 
responded that its lending scheme taught biblical principles through action, and thus fitted the 
notion of pastoral and missionary 'as a whole'. 
Her Honour found that the three reasons given by the Commission for rejecting LT's charitable 
status were unconvincing. Firstly, it was clearly operating in a religious context as an 
organisation. Secondly, advancement of religion does not have to take place within a church 
building. Thirdly, educating people about biblical financial principles was clearly propagating 
Christian doctrine.  
In particular, LT was not engaging in a secular activity in promoting budgeting and financial 
advice, since it presented its information about these matters as part of 'the Word of God'. Its 
teachings were biblical teachings. Its loan scheme was a practical outworking of the Christian 
faith.  
The Commission contended that LT was not a church, did not have a congregation, eligibility to 
join the loan scheme was not based on religious belief or need, and there was no religious 
instruction to contributors nor supervision to ensure that contributors remained active and 
constant in their religious belief. Her Honour remained unmoved. Whilst a mortgage scheme 
was not of itself 'an obvious candidate for the "advancement of religion" category of charitable 
purposes', and aspects of the scheme's promotion had 'a commercial flavour to them', these 
were not determinative factors. 
The scheme was intended to teach by example. There was no question of any personal gain by 
its promoters. Her Honour held that the scheme fitted: 
...within the existing bounds of this category. To find otherwise would be to confine 
advancement of religion back to church services, the building of churches and the 
like... 
On the issue of public benefit, a necessary component of this charitable purpose, Her Honour 
noted that public benefit is presumed unless the contrary is proven: 
As a trust which has as its purpose the advancement of religion, the starting 
assumption is that it has a public benefit. The activities are not contended to be 
subversive to morality or a sham. It is not for the Court to impose its own view as to 
the religious beliefs that are advanced through the scheme. The benefits of the 
scheme are not focused too narrowly on its adherents. It is open to anyone and the 
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money donated is 'recycled' for the benefit of others. Overall, the scheme is about 
'giving' in order to lead a Christian life free of the burdens of debt. 
Therefore, Her Honour allowed the appeal, and set the Commission's decision to deregister LT 
aside. LT was ordered to be reinstated on the Charities Register of New Zealand. 
This case can be found at http://www.nzlii.org/nz/cases/NZHC/2011/577.html  
Implications of this case 
The judge in this appeal decided that a wide view of the meaning of advancement of religion 
as a charitable purpose was appropriate. Spreading the bible's message through action was 
within the meaning of advancement of religion. She was also strongly of the view that public 
benefit must be assumed where there is such a purpose, unless there is strong evidence to the 
contrary. This case is a contrast to the subsequent New Zealand case involving the 
Queenstown Lakes Community Housing Trust (see case note 2.1.11, below). 
 
2.1.9  NEW ZEALAND COMPUTER SOCIETY INC, RE [2011] NZHC 161 (HIGH COURT OF 
NEW ZEALAND, MACKENZIE J, 28 FEBRUARY 2011) 
This was an appeal from a decision of the Charities Commission of New Zealand (the 
Commission) to remove the New Zealand Computer Society Inc. (the Society) from the register 
of charitable entities New Zealand (the register). The Society was removed from the register 
because it was the Commission's view that it was not maintained for exclusively charitable 
purposes and so was not a charitable entity under the Charities Act 2005 (NZ) (the Act). 
The Society appealed on the basis that its non-charitable purposes were merely ancillary to its 
main charitable purposes. The Society is a nonprofit incorporated society which works to 
advance computer-related education and professional development in New Zealand, and has 
objects that embrace training, education, granting of qualifications, providing research and 
publications, holding conferences and setting ethical standards for the discipline of computing.  
In order to be registered as a charity under section 13(1)(b) of the Act, an organisation must 
satisfy three conditions:  
1. the purpose of the organisation must have a charitable character; 
2. the organisation must exist for the benefit of the public; and 
3. it must be exclusively charitable. 
A charitable purpose is defined in section 5 of the Act: [emphasis added] 
(1) In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires, charitable purpose includes every 
charitable purpose, whether it relates to the relief of poverty, the advancement of 
education or religion, or any other matter beneficial to the community.  
...  
(3) To avoid doubt, if the purposes of a trust, society, or an institution include a non-
charitable purpose (for example, advocacy) that is merely ancillary to a charitable 
  
WORKING PAPER No 55      21 
 
purpose of the trust, society, or institution, the presence of that non-charitable 
purpose does not prevent the trustees of the trust, the society, or the institution from 
qualifying for registration as a charitable entity.  
(4) For the purposes of subsection (3), a non-charitable purpose is ancillary to a 
charitable purpose of the trust, society, or institution if the non-charitable purpose is. 
(a) ancillary, secondary, subordinate, or incidental to a charitable purpose of the trust, 
society, or institution; and  
(b) not an independent purpose of the trust, society, or institution. 
Thus, the definition of a charitable purpose is the common law definition in New Zealand. In 
this case, the second and fourth heads of charity (respectively, advancement of education and 
other purposes beneficial to the community) were relevant. Public benefit is presumed for the 
second head of charity, but for the fourth head, it must be expressly shown. 
The Commission had ruled that the non-charitable purposes of the Society were separate and 
distinct purposes, and not merely ancillary purposes. In general, professional societies are not 
charitable, since they exist to benefit their own members. However, case law in New Zealand 
suggested that if the main purpose of a professional organisation was charitable, the fact that 
the organisation also carries out objects which incidentally benefit members should not affect 
its charitable status. 
His Honour considered the Society's objects and activities in detail. The Society's website listed 
its activities as including an events programme, advocacy and representation, educational 
activities, professional certification, degree and diploma accreditation, mentoring, providing 
scholarships, and various other professionally-related activities. The Society claimed that its 
position differed from that of other professional bodies in that its focus was on growing 
information technology (IT) education for the New Zealand public, as opposed to providing 
services predominantly or exclusively for its own members. The Society stated that it would 
continue to provide these services to the public with or without a membership base, subject to 
adequate funding from elsewhere. Its position was that any benefit to members was ancillary 
to its charitable purpose of advancing IT education, or of providing other matters beneficial to 
the community. 
His Honour did not agree: 
Having regard to the Society's objects, its activities and the material on its website, I 
consider that the Society's non-charitable purposes that are aimed at benefiting the 
profession, or members of that profession, are purposes that are not ancillary to the 
purpose of advancing information technology as a discipline. In other words, the 
professional society functions constitute an independent purpose of the Society, and 
are not ancillary to the learned society functions.  
Since the Society did not have exclusively charitable purposes as defined in the Act, and it did 
not benefit the public as required, it was held that it was in the public interest to remove the 
Society from the register of charitable entities in New Zealand. 
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This case may be viewed at: http://www.nzlii.org/nz/cases/NZHC/2011/161.html   
Implications of this case 
This case again illustrates a divide between the jurisprudence of Australia and New Zealand on 
the issue of including advocacy in the objects of a charity. The case also dealt with the public 
benefit requirement for charitable status. In New Zealand, the public benefit criterion 
necessarily requires that any private benefits arising from the activities of an organisation must 
be a means of achieving an ultimate public benefit and therefore be ancillary or incidental to 
it. There is no public benefit if the private benefits are an end in themselves. Proof of public 
benefit must be shown to flow from each stated object, rather than a mere belief that there 
will be public benefit involved. 
 
2.1.10  NORTHERN NSW FOOTBALL LTD V CHIEF COMMISSIONER OF STATE REVENUE 
[2011] NSWCA 51 (NEW SOUTH WALES COURT OF APPEAL, ALLSOP P, 
HANDLEY AJA AND GZELL J, 15 MARCH 2011) 
The appellant, Northern NSW Football Ltd (NNF) is involved with the sport of soccer. It had 
claimed that a portion of its payroll was exempt from payroll tax under section 48 of the 
Payroll Tax Act 2007 (NSW) (the Act). Section 48(1) of the Act relates to nonprofit 
organisations and allows an exemption from payroll tax where the organisation is: 
(a) a religious institution; 
(b) a public benevolent institution; or 
(c) a nonprofit organisation having as its sole or dominant purpose a charitable, 
benevolent, philanthropic or patriotic purpose (but excluding schools, educational 
institutions, education companies or an instrumentality of the state). 
It had been common ground that NNF was a nonprofit organisation within section 48(1)(c), but 
contention arose as to its sole or dominant purpose. The NNF claimed that its sole or dominant 
purpose was charitable or benevolent. The Administrative Decisions Tribunal Appeal Panel 
rejected that claim. This was the appeal from that decision. 
The objects of the NNF were stated in its constitution as: 
(a) to be the member of FFA [Football Federation of Australia] in respect of the State and 
to comply with the constitution and by-laws of FFA;  
(b) to govern Football throughout the State and protect Football from abuse;  
(c) to provide and promote Football as an undertaking which benefits communities within 
the State through enhancement of and improvement in, the health and general well-
being of participants;  
(d) to provide and promote education of Football players, coaches, referees and 
administrators;  
(e) to provide and promote a healthy lifestyle in schools, and communities generally, 
through Football education;  
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(f) prevent infringement of the constitution and by-laws of FFA to the extent that it is able 
to do so;  
(g) to foster friendly relations among the officials and players of Football by encouraging 
Football games in the State;  
(h) to take all reasonable steps to ensure that discrimination or distinction does not occur 
among Football participants on any grounds regulated under any Equal Opportunity 
Law;  
(i) to promote, provide for, regulate and manage Football tournaments and games in the 
State;  
(j) to promote, provide for, regulate and manage Football players representing the State;  
(k) to co-operate with FFA, other members of FFA and other bodies in the promotion and 
development of, or otherwise in relation to, Football, the Statutes and Regulations and 
the Laws of the Game;  
(l) to facilitate the provision and maintenance of grounds, playing fields, materials, 
equipment and other facilities for Football in the State so that Registered Participants 
and communities, in general, enjoy safe environments; and  
(m) to carry on any business, enterprise or undertaking in any sphere or activity which is 
permitted by law.  
The NNF contended that its dominant purpose should be ascertained by reference only to its 
constitutional objects rather than to its activities. However, their Honours held that this 
contention was inconsistent with the High Court's finding in Commissioner of Taxation v Word 
Investments Ltd [2008] HCA 55. In that case it was held that: 
...it is necessary to examine the objects, and the purported effectuation of those 
objects in the activities, of the institution in question.... To avoid doubt in future, it 
should be noted that it would not be enough that the purpose or main purpose of an 
institution were charitable if in fact it ceased to carry out that purpose. 
In supporting the decision in Word Investments, their Honours said: 
...if attention is directed solely to the stated objects in a constitution, it would allow an 
employer to claim that its wages were exempt wages simply because it stated 
charitable objects in its constitution. And it would allow an organisation to maintain its 
exempt status after it had ceased to carry out its charitable objects. 
Their Honours could see no reason to distinguish the meaning of 'charitable' in this case from 
that in Word Investments. It was accepted that 'charitable' in section 48(1)(c) bears its 
technical legal meaning of being within the spirit and intendment of the preamble to the 
Statute of Charitable Uses 1601 and within the four divisions defined by Lord Macnaghten in 
Pemsel's case. NNF submitted that it came within the fourth category of Pemsel's case, i.e. 
purposes beneficial to the community. However, their Honours held that the dominant 
purpose of the NNF was the promotion and management of football. Any benefit to the 
community (such as health etc) from playing football was a result of the purpose, and not a 
purpose in itself. 
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Nor did the purposes of the NNF fall into any 'benevolent' category. Their Honours said: 
But, at the very least, the word 'benevolent' connotes the provision of [aid] to those in 
need of that aid. That is not a characteristic of the Appellant. It promotes games of 
football generally and the recipients of its largesse are not in need in any sense that 
would characterise its activities as benevolent. 
Therefore, the purposes of the NNF were neither charitable nor benevolent, and it was not 
exempt from payroll tax under section 48(1) of the Act. The appeal was dismissed with costs.  
The case may be viewed at: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/nsw/NSWCA/2011/51.html  
Implications of this case 
This case decided that the promotion of a sport such as soccer, though healthy and beneficial 
to the individuals engaged in it, was not a charitable purpose. Nor was it a benevolent 
purpose, since its participants were not in need. The NNF submitted that its dominant purpose 
should be ascertained by reference only to its objects without any reference to is activities, 
because the relevant inquiry should be limited to the purpose of the organisation and not its 
actions. However, this was not the decision in the Word Investments case, and their case 
presented no grounds for distinguishing that decision.  
 
2.1.11  QUEENSTOWN LAKES COMMUNITY HOUSING TRUST [2011] NZHC 617 (HIGH 
COURT OF NEW ZEALAND, MACKENZIE J, 24 JUNE 2011) 
This was an appeal from a decision of New Zealand's Charities Commission to remove 
Queenstown Lakes Community Housing Trust from the register of charities. The Trust had 
been registered as a charity in January 2008, but following a review, the Charities Commission 
decided to revoke its registration in September 2010. The Court in this case dismissed the 
Trust's appeal against that decision. The following outlines the reasons. 
The Trust was governed by a Deed which provided that the objects of the Trust are primarily to 
provide housing 'for households that contributed or will contribute to the social, cultural, 
economic and environmental well-being of those living within the District of the Queenstown 
Lakes Council ... at a cost within their means'. The Deed also required that on winding up, all 
funds were to be applied exclusively for charitable purposes. The Trust was set up in an 
attempt to address the problem of housing affordability in the area, which the Council had 
identified as one reason why people did not remain in the district.  
The Trust operated a 'shared ownership programme' which assisted successful applicants to 
buy a house: the 'owner' contributing a certain proportion of the cost, depending on how 
much they could afford, and taking that proportion of the interest; with the Trust contributing 
the remainder and taking that proportion of the interest. The basic criteria for successful 
applications were:  
 the property had to be the primary residence; 
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 the household income must be no more than $86,000 for a single person household, 
up to $122,000 for a four person household; 
 applicants had to raise a minimum deposit of 5 per cent of the price; 
 at least one person in the household must be a citizen or permanent resident of New 
Zealand; and 
 at least one person in the household must be employed full time in the district. 
The Trust also had a subsidiary company which engaged in some property development, 
building houses to be sold through the shared ownership programme. Funds for the Trust 
came chiefly from Housing New Zealand grants, and contributions from private land 
developers in the area. The 2009 Annual Report described the Trust as a 'beyond profit 
organisation with a simple purpose – to ensure that residents committed to the district and in 
regular employment have access to housing of no greater cost than elsewhere in the country'. 
This was expected to contribute to 'a more inclusive and balanced community' and support 
'the local economy by ensuring householders are not spending excess disposable income on 
their housing obligations'. 
The Trust had originally been accepted for registration as charitable on the basis of relief of 
poverty: making housing more affordable in a market that was too expensive for many. In the 
decision to remove it from the register, the Commission said that while it was providing 
assistance to beneficiaries who may struggle with the cost of buying a house with a large 
mortgage, many of these people would be able to rent or purchase a house in an alternative 
location within commuting distance. Neither did it consider the Trust to be charitable under 
the fourth head of charity, other purposes beneficial to the community. 
The Court's decision 
On the question of 'relief of poverty' the Court pointed out that, while poverty did not mean 
destitution, and relief of poverty was a purpose which did not have to demonstrate public 
benefit – because assistance to the poor is inherently a public good – an ‘inherent public good 
of that nature will not be present if too liberal a view is taken of what may constitute poverty’. 
The Trust assisted eligible applicants for the shared ownership programme who were ‘not, 
even in the relative sense, poor. .... Their inability (if it be such) to meet their housing needs 
relates to a particular form of housing in a particular location. While housing is a basic need, 
and right, home ownership is not. .... Nor is housing in a particular location a basic need, if 
there are reasonably available alternatives’. 
On the question of 'purposes beneficial to the community' the Court set out two questions to 
be addressed: (a) do these perceived benefits fall within the scope of 'any other matter 
beneficial to the community'; and (b) are those benefits achieved in such a way as to be 
beneficial in a way that the law regards as charitable?  
The Court considered that the Trust was for a specific purpose, therefore it was not a case 
where it could be for the general benefit of a particular locality; the focus had to be on 
whether that purpose was charitable. In line with Canterbury Development Corp v Charities 
Commission [2010] 2 NZLR 707, the Court considered that private benefit conferred in the 
hope of benefiting a community was not a charitable purpose. While assisting business and 
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industry could provide a public benefit and thereby be charitable, it was 'not the case that 
every assistance to business and industry which does provide a public benefit will be 
charitable. The question is whether the particular form in which that assistance is provided 
falls within the fourth head of charity.' In Canterbury Development, individual businesses were 
developed 'in the hope and belief that their economic success would be reflected in the 
economic wellbeing' of the region, and the purpose was not found to be charitable. This was 
an example of the principle that 'public benefit which is capable of being charitable will not 
generally be charitable if the public benefit is achieved by means of assistance provided to 
individuals'.  
In this case, the Trust supported people to buy homes in order to encourage 'useful members 
of society' to remain in the locality, in the expectation that it would benefit the community. 
This was capable of falling within the fourth head of charity, but considering the means by 
which the public benefit was delivered, the Court found that the public benefit was indirect: 
the means involved 'conferring a private benefit ... on private individuals'. The individual 
benefits were such as to preclude finding that the purpose was charitable. 
The Trust's principal purpose is to provide housing to selected householders. That 
purpose involves the provision of a private benefit to the householders who are 
assisted. The fact that those householders are selected because they do or will 
contribute to the social, cultural, economic and environmental wellbeing of those 
living within the Council's district does not in my view confer on the community a 
sufficiently tangible and clearly defined benefit so as to bring within the fourth head of 
charity the means by which the claimed public benefit is sought to be achieved. 
The case is available at http://www.nzlii.org/nz/cases/NZHC/2011/617.html 
Implications of this case 
The case demonstrates that hoping or even expecting to achieve a community benefit by an 
activity designed to confer a private benefit will not be sufficient. The activity or method of 
carrying out the purpose will be scrutinised very closely to ascertain whether it is for public 
benefit. 
There was an important additional consequence to the Court's decision because this was a 
purpose trust, not limited as to time: if not charitable, it breaches the rule against perpetuity. 
Without certainty of beneficiaries it will therefore fail as a trust and will have to adopt a 
different legal form if it is to continue. The Trust was expected to appeal the decision. Note 
this is a New Zealand case. 
 
2.1.12  WARLEY HOSPITAL INC V ATTORNEY-GENERAL (VIC) [2011] VSC 145 (SUPREME 
COURT OF VICTORIA, HABERSBERGER J, 14 APRIL 2011) 
This case dealt with the costs arising from a case involving an application for a cy près scheme. 
A deed of trust had been made on 19 November 1923 to establish a hospital on land at Cowes 
on Phillip Island, Victoria. If a hospital ceased to exist, then by clause 5 of the deed the trust 
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proceeds were to go to the Central Council of the Victorian Bush Nursing Association without 
restriction. The Central Council of the Victorian Bush Nursing Association ceased to exist in 
1998. 
The hospital at Cowes was originally run by the Victorian Bush Nursing Association (VBNA). 
This ultimately became the Warley Hospital Inc (Warley) in 1986 with all the assets then held 
by the trustees vesting in Warley.  A nursing home was also operated on the site. Due to 
financial difficulties, the hospital and nursing home closed in 2008.  In May 2009, the land was 
sold by the receivers and managers, and the proceeds, after all the liabilities were met, were 
held by Warley as trustee.  The amount involved was $1.4 million. 
A dispute then arose between Warley and Aged and Community Care Victoria (ACCV) as to the 
destination of the net proceeds of the sale. ACCV is a nonprofit entity which is the umbrella 
organisation for aged and community care providers in Victoria.  It is also the public 
representative of the Bush Nursing movement and the successor organisation to the Central 
Council of the Victorian Bush Nursing Association. 
The Attorney-General advised that a cy près scheme was necessary for the correct application 
of the surplus funds, and an application for a cy près scheme proceeded.  At that application 
His Honour found that the trust deed was for a general charitable purpose, namely to assist 
the sick and injured of Phillip Island, and to set aside land for a hospital at Cowes.  This purpose 
had become impossible.  Therefore, clause 5 came into operation.  However, there was a 
problem with the ‘trust over’ arising from clause 5 because the Central Council of the VBNA 
had ceased to exist.  Indeed, the VBNA itself had ceased to exist in its original form. 
After some acrimonious debate, a consent order ensued to the effect that the ACCV would 
become the trustee of the Warley Trust moneys, as it was the most appropriate entity to take 
over the trust.  However, a dispute remained about costs. 
Warley claimed only its disbursements since it had solicitors and counsel acting for it pro bono. 
However, the costs for the ACCV were substantial, and risked depleting the funds in the trust. 
These costs included an amount of $20,638.40 for a management consultant and an amount of 
$2,538.06 for a communications company. There was a further complication in that costs were 
being sought by the ACCV in proceedings which had not been concluded because the cy près 
consent order had short-circuited various other proceedings which were on foot. 
Costs are a matter for the court’s discretion. His Honour declined to award costs to the ACCV 
on its other proceedings or for the costs associated with the management consultant and the 
communications company. In the cy près application, His Honour allowed Warley’s 
disbursements to be paid out of the trust funds.  As to the costs of the ACCV and the Attorney-
General, these costs were to be assessed on a solicitor and client basis and paid from the trust 
fund.  His Honour said: 
Whilst it is regrettable if the quantum of the Trust Fund is significantly reduced by the 
payment of the parties’ costs, I consider that this is not a relevant factor to take into 
account in deciding the basis on which the costs are to be assessed.  I therefore 
  
WORKING PAPER No 55      28 
 
conclude that the usual basis, namely solicitor and client, should apply to the orders 
for costs in favour of both the ACCV and the Attorney-General. 
Warley wanted these costs to be those ‘of and necessary to the proceeding’, while the ACCV 
and the Attorney-General wanted the usual costs ‘of and incidental to the proceeding’. The 
costs order made was for those ‘of and incidental to the proceeding’, but excluded those of 
the other proceedings instigated by the ACCV. 
The case may be viewed at: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/vic/VSC/2011/145.html  
Implications of this case 
Costs can be substantial in any court dispute.  In this case, one party had its legal 
representatives, both solicitors and counsel, working for it pro bono (free), and so claimed only 
disbursements such as court fees and photocopying expenses. The other party tried to claim 
costs relating to matters which had not been finalised in court, and His Honour remarked that 
he was not in a position to determine whether the ACCV would have been successful in those 
claims or not, or whether commencing the claims was reasonable or not. To overcome this 
problem, His Honour limited the costs awarded to only those of the cy près application, to 
which Warley, the ACCV and the Attorney-General were all necessary parties. 
 
2.2 DISCRIMINATION 
2.2.1  AUSTRALIAN MACEDONIAN ADVISORY COUNCIL INC V LIVV PTY LIMITED 
TRADING AS AUSTRALIAN MACEDONIAN WEEKLY [2011] VCAT 1647 (VICTORIAN 
CIVIL AND ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL, NOREEN MEGAY, SENIOR MEMBER, 30 
AUGUST 2011) 
This was an application to the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (VCAT) made under 
section 7 of the Racial and Religious Intolerance Act 2001 (Vic) (the Act), concerning whether 
an article which appeared in the defendant newspaper incited hatred on the ground of race. 
The complainant is an incorporated association in Victoria which was established in 2008 with 
the object of promoting the welfare and advancement of the Greek–Australian community.  
The particular emphasis of the association is ‘to edify, preserve and promote Hellenic 
civilisation in Australia’ particularly in relation to the ‘history and culture of Macedonia’. 
The defendant newspaper (the paper) is a weekly publication mostly in Macedonian (a 
language which uses the Cyrillic alphabet), although it is also available in a Latin alphabet 
version on its website.  The hard-copy circulation is 5000 copies per week, with additional 
exposure via the online edition. 
On 19 May 2009, the paper carried an article at page 27 (of 60 pages) entitled ‘Who in this 
celestial world gave the Greeks the right to take away the Macedonian language?’. The article 
was contentious because it dealt with a long-standing issue between Greeks and Macedonians 
as to the proper place of Macedonia in the geo-political landscape.  The article was expressed 
in hyperbolic terms, referring to ‘fascist Greeks’, ‘gruesome poisonous propaganda’, ‘Greek 
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deranged bastardly monsters’ and many similar remarks which were part of a polemic on the 
subsuming of Macedonia and Macedonians within Greece after World War 1. The particular 
emphasis of the article was on the alleged loss of the Macedonian language because of Greek 
intervention. 
This article was in English, and was by-lined ‘Gandeto’. It was sent to the editor, who was also 
the sole director and shareholder of the defendant company, from overseas. He decided to 
publish the piece on 16 May 2009.  On 17 May 2009, the editor suffered a stroke which left 
him in a coma for two months, and in hospital until the end of 2009. 
The executive director of the complainant sent a series of letters to the newspaper partially 
relating to the issue. The complainant became aware of the editor’s illness on 14 August 2009, 
but proceeded with a complaint to the Press Council on 30 September 2009.  The Press Council 
declined to deal with the matter.  An application was then taken to the Victorian Equal 
Opportunity and Human Rights Commission on 24 September 2010. The Commission was 
unable to conciliate the matter and it was transferred to VCAT pursuant to section 117(3) of 
the Equal Opportunity Act 1995 (Vic).There has been a long-standing argument as to whether 
Macedonia is part of Greece, or a separate state which is not Greek but Slavic.  The issue 
became more incendiary after the break-up of the former Yugoslavia, of which Slavic 
Macedonia had been a constituent part. When the newly formed state of ‘Macedonia’ applied 
for membership of the United Nations in 1993, it was given the name ‘The Former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia’ to distinguish it from that part of Greece which is also referred to as 
Macedonia.  Those names are still in place. 
Greeks regard the Macedonian line as unbroken from Alexander the Great, and as 
Macedonians at that time were Greek, then Macedonia can only refer to a part of Greece in 
the geographic sense.  Slavic Macedonians see themselves as an ethnic group, and the United 
Nations has in the past recognised that there are questions arising from the treatment of Slavic 
Macedonians within Greece, which it monitors via its Human Rights Watch body. 
Did the article in the paper breach the Act? The complaint contended a breach of section 7 of 
the Act, which makes racial vilification unlawful both inside and outside Victoria. Motive is 
irrelevant.  Exceptions are provided for in section 11, including artistic works; genuine 
publication, discussion or debate for academic, artistic, religious or scientific purposes; or 
publication in the public interest. 
The complainant alleged that the article constituted racial vilification as a whole, as to its 
structure and parts, and as to specific words and phrases used in the article.  As a whole, the 
complainant saw the article as contending that Greece was an incapable entity, deficient in 
human rights, poor and on a downward spiral.  The particular words and phrases complained 
of were numerous and included those mentioned above. 
The paper’s case was that the Macedonians were a cohesive ethnic group with their own 
language and religion.  The article, which originated in Canada, was of political significance to 
(Slavic) Australian Macedonians, and had been published in the public interest. 
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The Senior Member found that all the evidence given was too partisan to be of any use.  She 
stated that the Act seeks to strike a balance between freedom of speech and protection from 
racial or religious vilification, and that it was a grave matter to restrict free expression of 
political thought.  She referred to Walsh v Hanson [2000] HREOCA 8 and Catch the Fire 
Ministries Inc v Islamic Council of Victoria [2006] VSCA 284 in remarking that: 
It is a concomitant of political freedom that political activists, especially those at the 
extreme ends of the political spectrum of ideas, will from time to time, even 
frequently, hurt and offend other members of society.  It seems to me that we must be 
mature enough to accept that as a price that we must pay for the privilege of living in a 
society where political expression is to remain free and unfettered.  This is so no 
matter how odious to the majority some of the fringe manifestations of that freedom 
may be. 
The Senior Member said that the case law was clear that the article must be construed as a 
whole, and not by looking at particular words and phrases individually.  Was the article, as a 
whole, in its historical and social context, an incitement to hatred of the Greeks as a race? The 
article did contain ameliorating remarks about the modern progressive Greeks of today who 
did not engage in ethnic hatred.  Moreover, although the article in question was published in 
English, most of the paper’s content is always in Macedonian, and would not be readily 
accessible to the general public.  Thus, the audience was limited. 
Would the natural and ordinary response of a reader be incitement to hatred, serious 
contempt for, or serious ridicule of Greeks? The Senior Member held that this would not be 
the case.  The audience was limited to Macedonians reading Cyrillic Script (though the article 
was a rare one in English), and for such an audience there would be unlikely to be any undue 
or new feeling aroused by it.  It was ‘preaching to the converted’.  The Senior Member said 
that she was firmly of the view that ‘restrictions should only be placed on discourse in the 
most egregious of cases’. Therefore, there was no breach of the Act. 
The case may be found at: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/vic/VCAT/2011/1647.html 
Implications of this case 
An incorporated association has standing to bring an anti-discrimination case in Victoria: 
section 19(3) of the Act.  An incorporated association is a representative body for the purposes 
of the section 19(3). Section 19(4) provides that a representative body has sufficient interest in 
a complaint if the conduct complained of is a matter of genuine concern to the body because it 
adversely affects or has the potential to adversely affect the interests of the body or the 
interests or the welfare of the persons it represents.  The position is similar in other states, and 
in the Commonwealth anti-discrimination legislation. In this case, the association took the 
view that its interests and those of its members had been potentially seriously affected, but 
the Tribunal did not agree that the interests sought to be protected were of the kind that the 
Act defines.   
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2.2.2  HENDRICKSON V YARRA BAY 16FT SKIFF SAILING CLUB LTD [2011] NSWADT 37; 
HENDRICKSON V YARRA BAY 16FT SKIFF SAILING CLUB LTD (NO. 2) [2011] 
NSWADT 204 (NEW SOUTH WALES ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS TRIBUNAL, S 
RICE, L MONAGHAN-NAGLE, L MOONEY, 24 FEBRUARY 2011 AND 30 AUGUST 
2011) 
This was a case involving discrimination and victimisation.  The second hearing concerned 
costs. 
The Yarra Bay 16 ft Skiff Sailing Club Ltd (the club) employed Ms Hendrickson as General 
Manager in early 2006 and terminated her employment in 2007.  Ms Hendrickson (the 
complainant) is of Greek descent. She alleged discrimination and victimisation by the club.  All 
allegations were dismissed. 
The club is a company limited by guarantee, with members and a board of directors. Some of 
the people the complainant alleged discriminated against her were directors of the club.  
Both parties to this complaint were the subject of considerable criticism by the Tribunal. The 
Tribunal said that both sides of the evidence were problematical.  The complainant’s evidence 
was described as ‘chaotic’ and ‘prone to exaggeration’ amongst other things. The club’s 
evidence was ‘incomplete’ and not ‘clear-cut’. 
The complainant referred to many witnesses who were not produced; did not answer 
questions; answered questions with other questions; answered questions at too great a 
length; and was very general in her allegations, with few details of time, place and 
circumstances.  The club did not answer the complainant’s allegations fully; did not complete 
all evidence; and relied on the assertion that the complainant was a compulsive liar.  The 
Tribunal did not accept the last contention. 
Was there in fact a work environment racially hostile (to Greeks) at the club; and if so, was the 
club liable for that environment? Because of the evidentiary problems, most of the incidents 
the complainant relied on to show a racially hostile work environment could not be 
substantiated, and were dismissed by the Tribunal. However, there were incidents involving 
offensive and racially motivated graffiti being painted on the walls of the club.  These were 
substantiated, but the number of times they appeared was in dispute. 
The Tribunal found that the directors had responded appropriately to the graffiti – the 
President had removed it each day it appeared; another had reported it to the police; another 
referred the complainant to a graffiti removal service; and so on.  Although the graffiti was 
racist and offensive, the board had acted as it should, and would have so acted regardless of 
the race of the complainant. 
The Tribunal noted that there may have been incidents of racially motivated unpleasantness at 
the club, but that the club was not responsible for them.  Thus, there was no basis for the 
complaint of a racially hostile workplace. 
As to the termination of her employment, the complainant alleged victimisation by various 
directors. The club said that the termination was because of poor work performance, 
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particularly relating to financial management.  The Tribunal found that, on the evidence, there 
was no racial basis for the termination, and that poor work performance was a real and 
substantial reason for the complainant’s termination, although it may not have been the only 
reason. The Tribunal found that there was no victimisation involved in the termination. 
The costs case 
In the costs case, the Tribunal expressed the preliminary opinion that fairness did not require 
displacement of the statutory presumption that each party would pay their own costs: section 
88 Administrative Decisions Tribunal Act 1997 (NSW) (the Act). The Tribunal did, however, 
invite the parties to make an application for costs if they wished. The club subsequently 
applied for a costs order. 
In the jurisdiction of the Administrative Decisions Tribunal, each party normally bears its own 
costs, except when the Tribunal is satisfied that it is fair to award costs having regard to 
considerations prescribed in section 88(1)(a) to (e) of the Act. The exception is 'not lightly to be 
applied' because the risk of a costs order may 'discourage people from airing their grievances'. 
The prospect of a costs order helps 'to ensure that parties conduct their cases in such a way 
that costs are not unnecessarily incurred or forced on others’, which is a statement of the 
conventional policy rationale for there being the prospect of a costs order. The situation under 
the Act is that this prospect arises only when awarding costs would be 'fair' in light of 
prescribed considerations.  
Would a costs order be fair? Did the complainant so conduct her case that the club was 
disadvantaged (section 88(1)(a))? The Tribunal stated that her case was incoherent, despite 
the fact that she had legal representation, saying: 
In the year and half from the first case conference to the hearing date, it ought to have 
been apparent to Ms Hendrickson's legal representatives, and so to her, first that 
complaints against individuals were bound to fail if the individuals were not in a 
relationship with Ms Hendrickson covered by the Anti-Discrimination Act, or had not 
engaged in activity covered by the Anti-Discrimination Act, and secondly that 
complaints were bound to fail when they concerned conduct the nature of which is 
not covered by the Anti-Discrimination Act. Ms Hendrickson's maintenance of 
allegations that were bound to fail, despite her being legally represented, is a matter 
that is relevant to assessing the fairness of making a costs order.  
Although the Tribunal held that the club relied inappropriately on all subsections of section 88 
of the Act in asking for a costs order, the Tribunal found that it was fair to make a partial award 
of costs in the club’s favour.  Ms Hendrickson was ordered to pay 75 per cent of the club’s 
costs. 
The cases may be viewed at: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/nsw/NSWADT/2011/37.html 
and http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/nsw/NSWADT/2011/204.html 
Implications of this case 
This is a case which perhaps should not have been pursued, and yet costs were incurred by the 
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club, albeit partially offset. Although the complainant’s case was hopeless, the Tribunal was 
not very complimentary about the club’s case either. There was no finding of discrimination or 
victimisation in this case, but these issues remain important ones for nonprofits to pay 
attention to. And nonprofit board or management committee members should be aware that 
they may also be liable for discrimination by the organisation, as well as employees. 
 
2.2.3  PORTUGUESE CULTURAL AND WELFARE CENTRE INC V AUSTRALIAN MEDIA 
AND COMMUNICATIONS AUTHORITY [2011] FMCA 144 (FEDERAL MAGISTRATES 
COURT OF AUSTRALIA, LUCEV FM, 18 MARCH 2011) 
Note: the respondent was wrongly named in the original application (the correct title 
is Australian Communications and Media Authority). 
The applicant is an incorporated association concerned with the culture and welfare of the 
Portuguese community in Western Australia. The applicant alleged various acts of racial 
discrimination and vilification under the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) (the Act) in the 
assessment of the applicant’s application for renewal of a community broadcasting licence. 
The application was made pursuant to section 46PO of the Australian Human Rights 
Commission Act 1986 (Cth). 
The respondent, the Australian Communications and Media Authority (ACMA), is a statutory 
authority responsible for considering applications for renewal of community broadcasting 
licences, under the Broadcasting Services Act 1992 (Cth). In this application, the respondent 
sought the summary dismissal of the claims of the applicant. Summary dismissal is available 
under section 17A of the Federal Magistrates Act 1999 (Cth) where the court is of the opinion 
that there is no reasonable prospect of success of the application. 
The statement of claim of the applicant was said by Her Honour to be ‘not a concise or easily 
understandable document’.  On the other hand, the respondent was described ‘as a model 
litigant’.  The claim was that ACMA had contravened section 9 of the Act at meetings that took 
place on 30 October 2007.  Section 9 of the Act relevantly provides that: 
(1) It is unlawful for a person to do any act involving a distinction, exclusion, restriction 
or preference based on race, colour, descent or national or ethnic origin which has the 
purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on 
an equal footing, of any human right or fundamental freedom in the political, 
economic, social, cultural or any other field of public life.  
(2) A reference in this section to a human right or fundamental freedom in the 
political, economic, social, cultural or any other field of public life includes any right of 
a kind referred to in Article 5 of the Convention. 
Article 5 of the International Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination 
(the Convention), which is a Schedule to the Act, provides, in part:  
In compliance with the fundamental obligations laid down in article 2 of this 
Convention, States Parties undertake to prohibit and to eliminate racial discrimination 
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in all its forms and to guarantee the right of everyone, without distinction as to race, 
colour, or national or ethnic origin, to equality before the law, notably in the 
enjoyment of the following rights:  
(a) The right to equal treatment before the tribunals and all other organs 
administering justice; 
(c) Political rights, in particular the rights to participate in elections—to vote and 
to stand for election—on the basis of universal and equal suffrage, to take part 
in the Government as well as in the conduct of public affairs at any level and to 
have equal access to public service; 
(d) Other civil rights, in particular:  
(iii) The right to nationality;  
(vii) The right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion;  
(viii) The right to freedom of opinion and expression;  
(ix) The right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association; 
(e) Economic, social and cultural rights, in particular: 
(v) The right to education and training;  
(vi) The right to equal participation in cultural activities; 
The acts complained of by the applicant involved treatment at a meeting with an ACMA official 
who directed the bulk of his remarks to a member of the applicant’s party attending the 
meeting who appeared to speak the most English.  The applicant further complained of the 
ACMA official’s rude, insulting and inappropriate behaviour in ignoring others from the 
applicant organisation who attended (who spoke little English), and in making it clear that he 
was in a hurry.   
Her Honour found that, leaving aside the conduct of the ACMA official, the matters 
complained of were administrative matters relating to the conduct of the meeting, or were 
matters unrelated to any issue of racial discrimination or vilification. As to the behaviour of the 
official, there had been a distinction and exclusion of those persons present at the meeting for 
whom English was a second language.  It was at least arguable that these acts contravened 
Articles 5(c) and 5(e)(vi) of the Convention. 
Apart from a few sentences relating to terms used by the ACMA official, most particularly the 
term, ‘you people’, most of the applicant’s statement of claim was struck out by Her Honour.  
However, although much of the statement of claim was misconceived, and not in proper form, 
Her Honour held that it was not frivolous, vexatious or an abuse of process.  At least some of 
the allegations made by the applicant gave rise ‘to real issues of fact or law to be decided’. 
Her Honour observed that the court ‘must also consider the “exceptional caution” that must 
attend this Court’s consideration of summary dismissal applications in unlawful discrimination 
cases’.  In addition, the Federal Magistrates Court Rules, at rule 1.03(2) and (4), provide that 
the court should ‘operate as informally as possible’ and ‘avoid undue…technicality’. Therefore, 
the respondent’s application for summary dismissal was dismissed. 
Her Honour also made observations on the lack of legal representation for the applicant 
association.  The association had tried to obtain pro bono legal representation but had been 
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unsuccessful.  Her Honour allowed the President of the association to appear for the 
association, but pointed out that there was a pro bono panel available through the court’s 
Registrar which the applicant ‘might consider’. 
Her Honour also took the opportunity to correct the naming of the respondent, which had 
resulted from the applicant’s misnaming of the respondent in the original process. 
The case may be viewed at: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/FMCA/2011/144.html 
Implications of this case 
This case demonstrates the difficulty which can result when a nonprofit organisation pursues 
litigation without proper legal advice and representation.  The organisation only narrowly 
avoided its whole statement of claim being struck out, although presenting in Her Honour’s 
view at least an arguable case.  Nonprofit organisations should also consider approaching the 
pro bono legal panel of the relevant Court for legal assistance as well as other more services 
that can provide legal advice and representation at reduced or no cost. 
 
2.2.4  WALKER V WAKEHURST GOLF CLUB LTD [2011] NSWADT 213 (NEW SOUTH 
WALES ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS TRIBUNAL, A SCAHILL, D HEISS, J 
SCHNEEWEISS, 16 MAY 2011)  
This case involved a complaint of sex discrimination against the Wakehurst Golf Club Ltd (the 
club), a registered club in New South Wales. The membership of the club was approximately 
70 per cent male and 30 per cent female. Ms Walker (the applicant) was a ‘Full Lady member’ 
of the club. Ms Walker’s complaint was that sex discrimination was demonstrated by the club 
in a number of ways – by limiting the number of women who could play in the women’s 
weekend competition on Sundays, limiting numbers and reducing tee times for women in the 
weekend competition in June 2009, and by changing the conditions for Full Lady membership 
in such a way that she could no longer compete in special competitions on Tuesdays and 
Sundays. Ms Walker alleged that weekend premium playing times were 62.5 per cent for 
males and 5.44 per cent for female members. 
The applicant had previously complained to the Anti Discrimination Board (ADB) of New South 
Wales in September 2009.  She alleged that this had resulted in victimisation of her by the 
club, culminating in a letter from the club on 31 May 2010 informing her that she could no 
longer talk to members of the Ladies or match committees about any future decisions of these 
committees. Further, in April 2011, the club changed the categories of membership of the club 
such that women could no longer play in the Sunday competition, with effect from 1 July 2011.   
There were in effect three actions of sex discrimination and two actions of victimisation 
complained of.  Section 34A of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 (NSW) (the Act) states: 
(1) It is unlawful for a registered club to discriminate against a person who is not a member of 
the registered club on the ground of sex:  
(a) by refusing or failing to accept the person’s application for membership, or  
(b) in the terms on which it is prepared to admit the person to membership.  
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(2) It is unlawful for a registered club to discriminate against a person who is a member of a 
registered club on the ground of sex:  
(a) by denying the person access, or limiting the person’s access, to any benefit 
provided by the registered club,  
(b) by depriving the person of membership or varying the terms of the person’s 
membership, or  
(c) by subjecting the person to any other detriment.  
(3) Nothing in subsection (1) or (2) renders unlawful discrimination by a registered club against 
a person on the ground of sex if membership of the registered club is available to persons of 
the opposite sex only.  
(4) Nothing in subsection (1) (paragraph (a) excepted) or subsection (2) renders unlawful 
discrimination by a registered club against a person on the ground of sex if the discrimination 
occurs in relation to the use or enjoyment of any benefit provided by the registered club 
where:  
(a) it is not practicable for the benefit to be used or enjoyed:  
(i) simultaneously, or  
(ii) to the same extent,  
by both men and women, and  
(b) either:  
(i) the same, or an equivalent, benefit is provided for the use of men and women 
separately from each other, or  
(ii) men and women are each entitled to a fair and reasonable proportion of the use 
and enjoyment of the benefit.  
(5) In determining any matter relating to the application of subsection (4), regard shall be had 
to:  
(a) the purposes for which the registered club is established,  
(b) the membership of the registered club, including any class or type of membership,  
(c) the nature of the benefits provided by the registered club,  
(d) the opportunities for the use and enjoyment of those benefits by men and women, 
and  
(e) any other relevant circumstance.  
Ms Walker had to show that she was treated less favourably on the grounds of her sex than 
the club would have treated a male in similar circumstances.  This was a question of fact for 
the Tribunal to determine. The Tribunal found on the evidence that the treatment complained 
of did occur, and determined that the comparator circumstances were ‘a golf club member’s 
access to compete in same gendered competition golf on the weekend’. 
Were the grounds of the differential treatment between male and female members those of 
gender? Was the applicant’s gender one of the ‘real’, ‘genuine’ or ‘true’ reasons for the 
treatment in question? The Tribunal found that the real reason for the restrictions and 
limitations placed on the applicant’s access to competition was that she was not a male 
member of the club, but rather a female member.  The club wished to increase the access of 
male members to Sunday play. 
The Tribunal determined that in terms of section 34(2)(a) of the Act the benefits provided by 
membership of the club included access to same gendered competition at premium playing 
time on weekends. From the evidence tee times for full male members were in excess of those 
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for full female members on the weekend.  The club argued that a distinction existed between 
Business Ladies (who could not play during the week) and other ladies who could access 
weekday play.  This distinction resulted in more even playing times for the sexes. The Tribunal 
said of this proposed distinction: 
The Tribunal could not find a formal reference in the Club's Constitution to the 
categories Business Girls or Business Ladies - and there did not appear to be an 
equivalent category such as Business Boys or Business Gentlemen for men. It is not 
clear when the Business Ladies or Business Girls category commenced, how a member 
became designated as belonging to it, or how the category's playing times were 
monitored or regulated. The Respondent did not make a distinction amongst its male 
members based on their ‘business’ status. Male members did not have their access to 
same gendered competition on the weekends limited by reference to their ‘business’ 
status. The Tribunal considers that this distinction made within the group of female 
members which functioned to limit the Applicant's access to a benefit was 
discriminatory on the grounds of her sex. 
The club contended further that it was not practicable for the use or enjoyment of the benefit 
of ‘a round of golf’ that it be used or enjoyed to the same extent by both men and women.  
The Tribunal did not agree with this contention in relation to section 34A(4) and (5) of the Act.  
The Tribunal said that the appropriate circumstances were not a round of golf, but rather the 
opportunity to play a same gendered weekend competition game of golf.  This was a benefit 
that should be enjoyed by both male and female members of the club. Moreover, it was not 
fair and reasonable to reduce the conditions of membership for Full lady members. 
Therefore, the Tribunal found that the applicant was treated less favourably on the grounds of 
her sex, in that the club limited her access to the benefit of a same gendered competition 
game of golf on the weekend on the ground of her gender. In terms of section 34A(2)(c) of the 
Act this constituted a detriment to the applicant. In all, two of the three actions of 
discrimination were proven. 
As to victimisation, section 50 of the Act applied. The Tribunal found that the two actions of 
victimisation were proven by the applicant. The fact that the victimisation was partly through 
the agency of the club’s manager did not affect the club’s liability, as the club was vicariously 
liable for the actions of its manager by virtue of section 53 of the Act. 
The applicant had sought that the club be enjoined from continuing its unlawful conduct 
pursuant to section 108(2)(b) of the Act, and this relief was granted by the Tribunal. An order 
was also made that a letter of apology and retraction be given to the applicant in relation to 
the victimisation issues.  Further orders were not granted as the club had moved to abolish 
gendered membership. 
The case may be viewed at: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/nsw/NSWADT/2011/213.html  
Implications of this case 
Nonprofit organisations are bound by laws about discrimination and victimisation in all 
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Australian jurisdictions.  Care must be taken in dealings with members, employees and clients.  
In this case, the Constitution and rules of the club were outdated, and the club’s provision of 
services did not properly reflect the proportions of male and female membership. 
 
2.2.5  W, M, G AND H, THE QUEEN ON APPLICATION OF, V BIRMINGHAM CITY COUNCIL 
[2011] EWHC 1147 (ADMIN) (HIGH COURT OF ENGLAND AND WALES 
(ADMINISTRATIVE COURT), WALKER J, 19 MAY 2011) 
This case concerned the provision made for those with disabilities, in the April 2011 budget of 
Birmingham City Council (the Council). The applicants were four disabled people living in 
Birmingham. An earlier hearing had dealt with the Council's Business Plan and its Adult Social 
Care policy. This application dealt with the Council's Budget allocation for disabled assistance 
for 2011–12.  
The Business Plan and Adult Social Care Policy had indicated a change in the eligibility criteria 
which determined, in relation to a particular need or needs, whether the Council would 
provide specific support to meet the need or needs in question. National guidance provided 
for needs to be assessed so as to place them into one of four bands of increasing severity: low, 
moderate, substantial or critical. Prior to 2011–12 the Council had provided support to meet 
those needs which were assessed to be either substantial or critical. The decisions under 
challenge approved a prospective change under which individual budgets would be funded 
only to meet those needs which were assessed to be critical. The plaintiffs argued this 
prospective change was unlawful as a result of:  
i) a failure by the Council to have due regard to the disability equality duty pursuant to 
the Disability Discrimination Act 1995 at section 49A; 
ii) a failure by the Council to 'ask itself the right questions' in the Tameside sense - a 
reference to what was said by Lord Diplock in Secretary of State for Education and 
Science v Tameside MBC [1977] AC 1014 at 1065B; and 
iii) the consultations leading to these decisions (a) failing to comply with the common 
law standard for consultations established by the courts and (b) breaching the 
procedural requirements of Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. 
All four individual applicants were described by His Honour as 'severely disabled'. The National 
Health Service and Community Care Act 1990 (NHSCCA) had introduced the concept of care in 
the community. The basic legal framework for community care services is set out in section 
47(1) of NHSCCA which states:  
Where it appears to a Local Authority that any person for whom they may provide or 
arrange for the provision of community care services may be in need of any such 
services, the Authority: 
(a) shall carry out an assessment of his needs for those services; and  
(b) having regard to the results of that assessment, shall then decide whether his 
needs call for the provision by them of any such services. 
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Councils are required to take into account their resources, local expectations and local costs. 
However, when carrying out assessments of need and making service provision decisions, local 
authorities also have a duty to act under national guidance. In February 2010, a new national 
guidance, Prioritising Care, replaced the 2007 guidance, Fair Access to Care Services (FACS). In 
addition, the Disability Rights Commission (DRC) had produced a statutory code of practice, 
The Duty to Promote Disability Equality, which does not have the force of law but had also to 
be taken into account by public authorities and the courts. 
Between 2007 and 2010, the issues of prioritising care, encouraging choice and investing in 
prevention and well-being came to the forefront of the caring for the disabled agenda. These 
were 'to produce better outcomes for people at lower overall cost'. For the Council, this 
became a proposal to remove care services for disabled people with 'substantial' needs. 
The Council's business plan, including its 2011–12 budget, was due to be decided upon at a 
meeting of the full Council on 1 March 2011. The proposed business plan was set out in a 
document entitled 'Council Business Plan 2011+'. The main issue in this document was that the 
Council had to reduce its annual expenditure by over £300 million within the next three to four 
years, owing to severe cut-backs in public services generally because of the state of the overall 
UK budget and financial system. The motion seeking that the Business Plan 2011+ be approved 
set out the revenue budget calculations which were proposed. After allowing for income and 
use of financial reserves, the budget requirement for 2011–12 was identified as 
£1,023,492,720. Of this, £691,205,843 would be met from redistributed non-domestic rates 
and Revenue Support Grant. The balance of £332,286,877 would need to be recovered by way 
of council tax. This would result in a basic amount of Council Tax for City Council services for 
the financial year commencing 1 April 2011 being set at £1,113.6677. 
The meeting of 1 March approved the Business Plan and Budget with only minor amendments. 
The result of this Budget was that at least 11,000 individuals would be affected by the cuts in 
care provision and about 3,500 of those would have no care package whatsoever. The Budget 
also removed £2.4 million from packages supporting people with mental health difficulties and 
learning difficulties, with that figure rising to £6.3 million by 2014–15. 
His Honour observed that there was substantial case law on section 49A of the Disability 
Discrimination Act 1995 (DDA 1995). His Honour set out the law: 
It was common ground that, taken together with the Code of Practice and relevant 
guidance, its effect was accurately summarised [as follows]: 
To what decisions does the duty apply? 
i. The duty applies to all decisions taken by public bodies, including policy decisions 
and decisions on individual cases;  
ii. The duty 'complements' specific statutory schemes which may exist to benefit 
disabled people;  
iii. The disability equality duty is at its most important when decisions are taken which 
directly affect disabled people;  
iv. The duty requires public authorities to take action to tackle the consequences of 
past decisions which failed to give due regard to disability equality;  
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v. The duty requires the circumstances of the full range of disabled people to be taken 
into account and may require certain groups of disabled people to be prioritised, for 
example on the basis that they experience the greatest degree of exclusion;  
What does the duty entail? 
vi. The equality duties impose 'significant and onerous' obligations on public bodies in 
the context of cuts to public services;  
vii. 'Due regard' means specific regard by way of conscious approach to the specified 
needs;  
viii. Due regard requires analysis of the relevant material with the specific statutory 
considerations in mind;  
ix. General awareness of the duty does not amount to the necessary due regard, being 
a 'substantial rigorous and open-minded approach';  
x. In a case where the decision may affect large numbers of vulnerable people, many 
of whom fall within one or more of the protected groups, the due regard necessary is 
very high; 
xi. The duty (and in particular DDA 1995 s 49A(1)(d)) may require positive steps to be 
taken if the circumstances require it to address disadvantage to disabled people;  
xii. Thus, if changing a function or proposed policy would lead to significant benefits to 
disabled people, the need for such a change will carry added weight when balanced 
against other considerations;  
xiii. Similarly, if a risk of adverse impact is identified, consideration must be given to 
measures to avoid that impact before fixing on a particular solution;  
xiv. Impact assessments must contain sufficient information to enable a public 
authority to show it has paid due regard to the duty and identify methods for 
mitigating or avoiding adverse impact;  
When must 'due regard' be given to the duty? 
xv. Due regard must be given before and at the time that a particular policy that will or 
might affect disabled people is being considered by the public authority in question;  
xvi. As such due regard to the duty must be an essential preliminary to any important 
policy decision, not a rearguard action following a concluded decision;  
xvii. Put another way, consideration of the duty must be an integral part of the 
formation of a proposed policy, not justification for its adoption;  
xviii. The duty is continuing and is engaged at all stages of a decision-making process, 
meaning that further consideration to the duty may be required where new 
information comes to light;  
Who needs to pay 'due regard'? 
xix. The duty is non-delegable and is owed by primary decision-makers; 
xx. Decision-makers must be properly informed of the nature and extent of the duty at 
the time relevant decisions are taken;  
xxi. In particular, decision-makers need rigorous and accurate advice and analysis from 
officers, not 'Panglossian' statements of what officers think members want to hear;  
What is the role of the Court? 
xxii. The Court must review whether 'due regard' has been paid, not merely consider 
whether the absence of due regard was Wednesbury unreasonable. 
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His Honour went on to consider whether section 49A of the DDA 1995 had been complied 
with. The issues he considered were: 
(1) the consideration given by the Council for the purposes of section 49A to the 
proposal that substantial needs should no longer be eligible needs, and instead 
eligibility would arise only for those needs which were assessed to fall into the critical 
band. 
(2) consideration for the purposes of section 49A of other aspects of the proposed 
changes to the provision of adult social care;  
(3) general administrative law principles of illegality as a ground of challenge; 
(4) alleged failures of consultation; and 
(5) human rights considerations. 
After a detailed consideration of grounds (1) and (2), and a brief discussion of grounds (3) and 
(4), His Honour held that the challenge to the Council's decision to cut back care to the 
disabled should succeed: 
Thus I conclude that there was a failure...to address the questions which arose when 
considering whether the impact on the disabled of the move to 'critical only' was so 
serious that an alternative which was not so draconian should be identified and 
funded to the extent necessary by savings elsewhere. In reaching this conclusion I 
should not be taken to make any personal criticism of officers of the council. By way of 
comment only - for it is not necessary to my decision - I observe that council officers 
were...working under pressure of time and resources...for them disability 
discrimination - or the promotion of disability equality - was not, discretely, a major 
feature, because virtually the whole of their work was directed towards combating its 
effects and seeking to advance those who suffer from it. The combination of these 
factors, I believe, may well have led them to lose sight of what section 49A required in 
the context of something as potentially devastating as a move to 'critical only'. 
His Honour added that this decision was based on only grounds 1 to 4 (above), and that 
relevant articles of the European Convention on Human Rights did not add anything of 
substance to the heads of challenge already advanced. 
The case may be viewed at: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Admin/2011/1147.html  
Implications of this case 
Generally courts do not interfere in decisions by councils about prioritisation of resources. 
However in this case, His Honour said that 'the role of the court is to assess whether the 
Council has complied with its duty to pay "due regard" to the matters identified in [section 
49A]', and not to make a decision about the application of resources. Note this is a UK case. 
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2.2.6  WOMEN’S COMMUNITY AID ASSOCIATION (QLD) LIMITED, RE [2011] QCAT 593 
(QUEENSLAND CIVIL AND ADMINISTRATION TRIBUNAL, C ENDICOTT, SENIOR 
MEMBER, 18 NOVEMBER 2011) 
This was an application for a general exemption from the application of the Anti-Discrimination 
Act 1991 (Qld) (the Act).  The general exemption provision is in section 113 of the Act.  The Act 
provides that it is not unlawful to discriminate if an exemption in sections 104 to 113 applies, 
and also allows for defences to discrimination.   
The Women’s Community Aid Association (Qld) Limited (WCAA) is a nonprofit community 
organisation which operates the Brisbane Rape and Incest Survivors’ Support Centre and 
Women’s House Shelta. The WCAA provides services (information, individual support, support 
groups, meeting space etc) to women who have experienced sexual violence, with the object 
of being a safe, supportive and confidential environment for women. The WCAA is staffed by 
women only (both paid workers and volunteers), and its activities and premises are a women-
only space. 
The WCAA applied for a general exemption under section 113 of the Act for exemption from 
various areas of operation of the Act.  The reason for the application was that the WCAA 
needed to provide security for women and children who accessed the premises.  The 
application sought to limit the services provided by the WCAA to women only, and to prevent 
men from being on the premises. The restriction on men being in or on the premises was to 
allow women and children who had experienced violence from men not to be exposed to 
emotional triggers by encountering men while at the WCAA. 
The Anti-Discrimination Commissioner had already indicated that he had no objection to an 
exemption being granted to the WCAA.  However, QCAT needed to consider whether the 
exemption was necessary.  Specific exemptions or defences within the Act are sometimes 
enough without resort to the general exemption provision in section 113.  For example, 
section 25 of the Act permits genuine occupational requirements being imposed on work (both 
paid and volunteer).  Thus, section 25 might provide a defence for the WCAA in the area of 
work.  
A genuine occupational requirement has been held by the High Court to mean an ‘inherent 
requirement’, involving consideration as to ‘whether a position would be essentially the same 
in the absence of the requirement’.  Would a male counsellor delivering support, information 
and resources to women who had experienced sexual violence from men, be the same as 
counselling support delivered by a woman?  The senior Member thought that this was open to 
argument. A more appropriate question was held to be whether the effect on the recipient of 
those services would vary depending on the gender of the worker, and whether the presence 
of a male worker would trigger adverse emotional responses in an emotionally fragile client.  
The Senior Member said: 
It is in my view quite readily established that male workers or volunteers providing 
services at WCAA would be likely to trigger distress and discomfort in women seeking 
support after experiencing violence from men. A service where support and 
counselling is being provided by either sex to women is quite different from a service 
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where support and counselling is being provided solely by women for women in 
circumstances where the recipients of the services have experienced gender based 
violence. I am satisfied that it is a genuine occupational requirement for workers and 
volunteers at WCAA to be women. I conclude that section 25 would be available to 
WCAA as a defence to complaints of discrimination based on the attribute of sex in the 
work area. 
Thus, the Senior Member was satisfied that section 25, a specific defence under the Act, would 
be sufficient for the purposes of this application.   
Moreover, a specific exemption was also available under section 104 of the Act, which 
provides that a person may carry out conduct to benefit some members of a group of people 
with an attribute for whose welfare the conduct was designed, and in doing so, the conduct is 
not discriminatory if the purpose of carrying it out is not inconsistent with the Act itself.  In this 
case, the conduct (provision of information, support and counselling etc) was provided to a 
group of women, and that conduct was not inconsistent with the Act. 
Therefore a general exemption under section 113 was not necessary, and the application for a 
general exemption was dismissed. 
The case may be viewed at: http://archive.sclqld.org.au/qjudgment/2011/QCAT11-593.pdf  
Implications of this case 
Although anti-discrimination law applies to nonprofit organisations in all Australian 
jurisdictions, exemptions and defences are available for both specific and general purposes.  In 
Queensland, section 6(b) of the Act recognises the need for anti-discrimination legislation not 
to be too prescriptive or rigid about ensuring freedoms, but rather to be in tune with 
contemporary social mores and aspirations. 
 
2.2.7  X V MID SUSSEX CITIZENS ADVICE BUREAU [2011] EWCA 28 (COURT OF 
APPEAL (ENGLAND AND WALES), LORDS JUSTICE RIX, ELIAS, TOMLINSON, 26 
JANUARY 2011) 
This was an appeal relating to the application of disability discrimination legislation to a 
volunteer. The Court held that such legislation did not apply to volunteers. 
The relevant Act was the Disability Discrimination Act 1995 (UK) (the Act), which had to be 
read with Directive 2000/78/EEC of the European Union (the Framework Directive). The 
question before the Court was whether these two documents together created a framework 
for equal treatment in employment and occupation that gave a volunteer directly enforceable 
rights. 
Although the case was about disability discrimination, it was common ground that if rights 
could be established for volunteers on the basis of disability discrimination, then those rights 
would also extend to other forms of discrimination based on sex, race and ethnic origin, sexual 
orientation, religion and belief, and age, because of related Directives of the European Union 
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(EU) on those matters. On that basis, the case was very important to the voluntary sector as a 
whole, and the Court permitted the intervention of the Equality and Human Rights 
Commission (EHRC) and the Secretary of State for the Home Department. 
The appellant, known only as X, applied to the respondent Citizens Advice Bureau (CAB) to 
undertake volunteer work for 4 or 5 hours a week. She was disabled, but had several academic 
and practical qualifications which she wished to put to use, and wished to use the voluntary 
work to qualify her for the establishment of her own business. 
X signed a volunteer agreement on 12 May 2006. This agreement was described in writing as 
being 'binding in honour only...and not a contract of employment or legally binding'. After a 
nine month training period, X began her voluntary work as an advisor. After some time, during 
which her attendance as an advisor was erratic, she was asked to cease to act as a volunteer 
for the CAB. X claimed that this was because she was disabled. 
The appellant was unsuccessful in two hearings before an employment judge, where the 
Framework Directive was not considered significant, in what was regarded as a domestic law 
matter. It was merely noted at first instance that the Framework Directive did not alter the 
meaning and interpretation of section 4(1) of the Act. 
On appeal, X claimed that she was protected from discrimination in two ways: 
1. that the voluntary post was an 'occupation' within the meaning of Article 2 of the 
Framework Directive; and 
2. that the post of volunteer is one which constitutes a relevant arrangement within the 
meaning of section 4(1) of the Act. 
The appeal judgement did not deal at length with the Act, which had been analysed 
considerably at first instance. The Court of appeal agreed with the analysis that the Act did not 
apply to volunteers, as there was no 'employment' involved. This was because there was no 
contract of employment between X and the CAB, and therefore no legal underpinning of the 
arrangement. Nor was there any 'work placement' involved under section 14C of the Act, as 
there was no vocational training in X's work with the CAB. Vocational training was not the sole 
or dominant purpose of the voluntary work. There may have been a by-product for X in 
furthering her ambitions for remunerated work, but this was not the dominant purpose of the 
arrangement. The purpose was to give advice as a volunteer. 
The analysis in the Court of Appeal was largely concerned with the application of the EU 
directive to the appellant. The Court acknowledged that equal treatment and non-
discrimination was a fundamental principle of the EU. As to whether there was an 'occupation' 
involved, Elias LJ giving judgement for the Court, found that volunteering was not an 
'occupation' within the meaning of the Framework Directive. He said: 
In particular, I wholly reject the premise underpinning the submission of both the 
appellant and the [EHRC] that because the principle of non-discrimination is so 
important in EU law, the only reasonable inference is that the Directive was intended 
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to apply to volunteers. The logic of that argument is that the principle should apply to 
all fields of human activity, but no-one suggests that this is the case. The Directive is 
plainly limited in its field of operation, and the only question is whether CAB 
volunteers fall within or without its scope. I accept that a broad and generous 
interpretation of the Directive should be given consistent with a purposive approach 
which EU law dictates is the proper way of interpreting provisions of this nature. But 
even adopting that approach, I have no doubt that the appellant falls outside its scope. 
I say this for the following interrelated reasons in particular. First, it is far from obvious 
that it would be thought desirable to include volunteers within the scope of the 
discrimination legislation relating to employment... Second, it is inconceivable that the 
draftsman of the Directive would not have dealt specifically with the position of 
volunteers if the intention had been to include them. Volunteers are extensively 
employed throughout Europe, and it is unrealistic to believe that they were intended 
to be covered by concepts of employment and occupation which would not naturally 
embrace them. The concept of worker has been restricted to persons who are 
remunerated for what they do. [emphasis added] 
The notion of an 'occupation' in this context turned solely on remuneration for work done and 
not on contract. The court said: 
This analysis is consistent with the fact that the concept of worker under EU law is not 
defined by reference to those with a contract; it is capable of embracing all those who 
perform work for another for remuneration, whether pursuant to a contract or some 
other relationship. There is no need for a concept of occupation to capture those 
employed in a particular job. 
Thus, since volunteers are not paid for what they do, the Framework Directive could not apply 
to them. The appeal was dismissed. Moreover, the Court did not accept that there was 
sufficient doubt as to the outcome, to merit a reference to the European Court of Justice (ECJ) 
on the issue. The Court was satisfied that the appellant's case would also fail before the ECJ. 
The case may be viewed at: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2011/28.html 
Implications of this case 
This case had considerable importance for the voluntary sector in the UK. The appeal decision 
contained detailed discussion of the application of EU Directives to the domestic law of 
England. The decision was that volunteers are not covered by any anti-discrimination 
legislation or by related EU Directives because, by its very nature, volunteering is not 
remunerated. The Court of Appeal noted that the voluntary sector is substantial in England, as 
evidenced by statistics from the National Council for Voluntary Organisations showing that 73 
per cent of adults in England took part in a volunteering activity in 2007–08. Of these, 64 per 
cent undertook informal volunteering, and 43 per cent undertook formal volunteering. With 
27 per cent of people giving their time at least once a month, this amounted to approximately 
1.75 billion volunteer hours for the year.  
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There have been conflicting views in the UK about whether the voluntary sector ought to be 
subject to discrimination laws. A Disability Rights Task Force report from December 1999 
found that it was 'far from self evident' that it was desirable to bring the voluntary sector 
within the scope of disability discrimination law. In July 2010, Volunteering England conducted 
an inquiry into the alleged poor treatment of some volunteers by the bodies for which they 
worked. An interim report was published; it noted that there were strongly divergent views as 
to whether employment rights should be extended to volunteers. The issues were whether 
volunteering should be kept wholly distinct from employment, and whether legislation would 
be both a financial burden on charities and 'an unwelcome fetter' on volunteers.  
 
2.3 EMPLOYMENT AND WORKPLACE RELATIONS 
2.3.1  JGE V THE ENGLISH PROVINCE OF OUR LADY OF CHARITY AND THE TRUSTEES 
OF THE PORTSMOUTH ROMAN CATHOLIC DIOCESAN TRUST [2011] EWHC 2871 
(HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE FOR ENGLAND AND WALES, QUEENS BENCH 
DIVISION, MACDUFF J, 8 NOVEMBER 2011) 
This was a case dealing with the doctrine of vicarious liability of employers. The claimant (JGE) 
claimed damages for personal injury involving both sexual abuse and rape. The events 
occurred between May 1970 and May 1972 at a children’s home operated by the first 
defendant, an order of nuns. The perpetrator was a Catholic priest, now deceased. The issue 
before the court was whether the second defendant (standing in place of the Bishop of 
Portsmouth) was vicariously liable for the actions of the deceased priest. 
Was the priest an employee of the diocese? If so, vicarious liability would make the diocese, as 
his employer, liable for any wrongs committed in the course (or scope) of his employment.  His 
Honour stated that there was a two-stage test involved.  Was there a contract of employment, 
and were the actions complained of within the scope of that employment contract? In this 
hearing, only the first of these stages was in issue, but His Honour stated that this could not be 
discussed without considering the second stage. 
The acts involved were criminal acts.  Before 2002, it was rarely the case that vicarious liability 
could attach to an employer for criminal acts of an employee, which were regarded as outside 
the scope of employment.  However, His Honour noted that the law had moved on in the 
intervening years, particularly relating to sexual abuse cases. The test had become one of 
‘closeness of connection’ – whether the wrongdoing was so closely connected with the duties 
of the employee that it would be fair to hold the employer liable. This test related only to 
stage two of the two-stage test for vicarious liability. 
Vicarious liability is a form of strict liability which makes the employer, who has done no 
wrong, liable for the acts of the employee. Recent cases on point had referred to deterrence, 
even though the employer was not at fault.  The defendants argued that deterrence should 
not be involved in cases of vicarious liability, but His Honour said: 
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It seems to be that the concept of deterrence is the other side of the coin which would 
encourage an employer to choose his employees with care and to foster a spirit of 
safety consciousness; to put in place systems designed to encourage the employee to 
do his job properly and safely.  This is the deterrence: to deter from appointing the 
wrong person; to deter from adopting a devil-may-care approach to safe systems of 
working.... 
However, the recent cases referred to had no questions relating to the employment issue.  It 
was now possible that vicarious liability could arise from a relationship other than 
employment. Was the deceased priest ‘employed’ in the usual sense of the word? 
Traditionally, employment status was determined by the ‘control test’: whether there was 
control over the manner of work of the person.  If there was such control, the person was an 
employee.  If, however, the person was not subject to control over the manner of work, then 
the person was regarded as an independent contractor. 
In this case, the issues became whether the situation was ‘akin’ to employment and whether 
the diocese was in a position to control the deceased priest. Priests of the diocese were 
appointed verbally, and then in a newsletter circulated amongst the clergy. There was no 
contract, and there were no terms and conditions of appointment, other than those deriving 
from canon law.  
There was no control exercised over priests once they were appointed.  Only canon law 
prescribed any boundaries to the position of priest. In canon law, the bishop’s role was 
advisory and not supervisory – he had a duty of vigilance, but no power of dismissal, which 
could only be exercised by the Vatican.  In addition, the bishop could only move a priest to 
another parish within his diocese if the priest consented to the move. 
His Honour concluded that the position of a priest was not one of employment.  A priest was 
the holder of an office, with little supervision, no wages and no formal contract.  Could there 
still be vicarious liability attaching? This issue had not previously arisen in England and Wales, 
but it had been considered in Canada, where the Supreme Court of Canada had decided that a 
bishop was vicariously liable for the actions of a priest who had engaged in sexual abuse, based 
on a close connection test between the wrongdoer ‘and the person against whom liability is 
sought’.  Thus, a close connection test could be used for both stages to be determined in 
vicarious liability.  In this respect, His Honour said: 
There are, it seems to me, crucial features which should be recognised. [The deceased 
priest] was appointed by and on behalf of the Defendants. He was so appointed in 
order to do their work; to undertake the ministry on behalf of the Defendants for the 
benefit of the church. He was given the full authority of the Defendants to fulfil that 
role. He was provided with the premises, the pulpit and the clerical robes. He was 
directed into the community with that full authority and was given free rein to act as 
representative of the church. He had been trained and ordained for that purpose. He 
had immense power handed to him by the Defendants. It was they who appointed him 
to the position of trust which (if the allegations be proved) he so abused. Why, one 
may ask, does it matter that some of the features of a classic contract of employment 
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do not apply here? What is the relevance to the concept of vicarious liability, for 
example, of the lack of a formal agreement with terms and conditions; or of the 
manner of remuneration; or of the understanding that the relationship was not subject 
to adjudication by the secular courts? Those features may have relevance in a different 
context, but not to the question of whether, in justice, the Defendants should be 
responsible for the tortious acts of the man appointed and authorised by them to act 
on their behalf. 
Taking into account all the surrounding circumstances, His Honour found that the relationship 
between the deceased priest and the diocese was one of close connection. By giving the 
deceased priest a role as priest, and clothing him in the church’s moral authority, it was the 
diocese which introduced the risk of wrongdoing and the risk of harm to others.  
Therefore, His Honour adopted a test of ‘closeness of relationship’ for stage one of the test for 
vicarious liability as well as for stage two.  His Honour said: 
Of particular relevance to stage one will be the nature and purpose of the relationship: 
whether tools, equipment, uniform or premises were provided to assist the 
performance of the role; the extent to which the one party has been authorised or 
empowered to act on behalf of the other; the extent to which the tortfeasor may 
reasonably be perceived as acting on behalf of the authoriser. This is not an exhaustive 
list. Every case will be fact specific and other factors will become apparent as and 
when they occur. The extent to which there is control, supervision, advice and support 
will be of relevance but not determinative. Where the tortfeasor’s actions are within 
the control and supervision of the third party, the relationship will be the closer. 
Control is just one of the many factors which will assist a judge to the just 
determination of the question. That question will be whether on the facts before the 
court, it is just and fair for the defendant to be responsible for the acts of the 
tortfeasor – not in some abstract sense, but following a close scrutiny of (i) the 
connection and relationship between the two parties and (ii) the connection between 
the tortious act and the purpose of the relationship / employment / appointment.’ 
This case may be viewed at: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/QB/2011/2871.html  
Implications of this case 
This is an important decision for England and Wales because it extends the test for vicarious 
liability by attaching a ‘close connection’ test to both stages of the determination of vicarious 
liability of an employer.  This takes possible liability beyond the realm of mere employment in 
the traditional sense.  However, the Privy Council had previously remarked that the doctrine of 
vicarious liability should be kept ‘within clear limits’ and that it was ‘not infinitely extendable’. 
In this case His Honour reiterated that point, but nevertheless has extended the basis for 
liability significantly. 
In Australia, courts use a multifactor approach to determining whether a tortfeasor is an 
employee – control is just one of the factors in considering the whole of the relationship.  If 
the wrongdoer is found not to be an employee, the person engaging him or her may still owe 
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the claimant a non-delegable duty of care, which, if breached, will give the claimant a cause of 
action. 
 
2.4 INSOLVENCY AND WINDING UP 
2.4.1 NILLUMBIK COMMUNITY CHURCH INC, RE [2011] VSC (SUPREME COURT OF 
VICTORIA, GARDINER, ASJ, 2 DECEMBER 2011) 
This case concerns the distribution of the surplus assets of an incorporated association after 
liquidation.  Section 31M of the Associations Incorporation Act 1981 (Vic) (the AIA) imports 
into the that Act the voluntary administration provisions of Part 5.3A and the liquidation 
provisions of Division 3 of Part 5.9 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (the Corporations Act), 
subject to some modifications. In addition, section 36D of the AIA provides that the voluntary 
winding up of an incorporated association under Division 1 of Part 8 of the AIA is, subject to 
certain modifications, it is an applied corporations legislation matter for the purposes of Part 3 
of the Corporations (Ancillary Provisions) Act 2001 (Cth) in relation to the provisions of Part 5.5 
(voluntary winding up) and 5.6 (winding up generally) of the Corporations Act.  
The effect of these provisions is that they import the winding up provisions of the Corporations 
Act into the winding up of incorporated associations. Section 36CA of the AIA relates to the 
distribution of the surplus assets of an incorporated association, stating [with emphasis 
added]: 
(1) In this section surplus assets, in relation to the winding up of an incorporated 
association, means those assets remaining after satisfaction of the debts and liabilities 
of the incorporated association and the costs, charges and expenses of the winding up.  
(2) Subject to subsections (3) and (4), an incorporated association must not distribute 
any surplus assets available for distribution at the completion of the winding up of the 
incorporated association under this Part, to—  
(a) any member or former member of the incorporated association; or  
(b) to any person to be held on trust for any member or former member of the 
incorporated association.  
(3) The surplus assets of an incorporated association that is in the process of winding 
up may be distributed to a member or former member if—  
(a) the member or former member is a body corporate or an association 
(whether incorporated or not) and the Registrar is satisfied that—  
(i) at the time of the distribution, the body corporate or association is 
prevented by its rules or otherwise from distributing the surplus assets 
to its members; and  
(ii) the distribution is not contrary to this Act or the regulations; or  
(b) the member or former member is a trustee who holds, or held, 
membership of the incorporated association on behalf of a trust and the 
Registrar is satisfied that—  
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(i) at the time of the distribution, the trustee is prevented by the terms of the 
trust or otherwise from distributing the surplus assets to the beneficiaries of 
the trust; and  
(ii) the distribution is not contrary to this Act or the regulations.  
(4) ...  
(5) Subject to this section and any court order, the surplus assets of an incorporated 
association are, on the winding up of the incorporated association, to be distributed in 
accordance with—  
(a) the rules of the incorporated association; or  
(b) if there are no valid rules of an incorporated association governing the 
distribution of any surplus assets, by a special resolution of the incorporated 
association.  
(6) The Supreme Court may make an order relating to the distribution of the surplus 
assets of an incorporated association on a winding up on the application of—  
(a) the Registrar; or  
(b) a liquidator of the incorporated association; or  
(c) a member of an incorporated association; or  
(d) any person aggrieved by the operation of this Division in relation to the 
surplus assets of an incorporated association.  
(7) The Supreme Court may make an order under subsection (6) permitting the 
distribution of surplus assets to its members.  
(8) The Supreme Court, in making an order under subsection (6), must have regard to 
any relevant rules and the purposes of the incorporated association.  
(9) This section applies subject to any trust affecting all or any of the assets of the 
incorporated association. 
The Nillumbik Community Church Incorporated (the Church) was placed into liquidation on 4 
May 2010 after having previously been in voluntary administration. Prior to the ultimate 
liquidation, there had been conflict within the church which arose from the removal of a Mr 
Taylor as Senior Pastor. These events resulted in two factions within the Church with differing 
views on its future role and functions. It was resolved to wind up the Church as a result of this 
impasse. 
Voluntary administration was implemented by the Board under section 439A of the 
Corporations Act on 5 November 2009.  The voluntary administration was challenged by Mr 
Taylor on the ground that the Board which had voted for the administration was invalidly 
constituted. This application was dismissed by the court on 16 April 2010.  The second meeting 
held in pursuance of the administration voted to wind up the Church. 
On 5 August 2010, the liquidator applied to the court under section 36CA(6)(b) of the AIA 
(highlighted in the extract above), and sections 477(6) and 511(1)(b) of the Corporations Act, 
to determine the distribution of the surplus assets of the Church after the liquidation was 
complete. As required, the application for distribution was advertised on 10 August 2010 in the 
The Age newspaper (a major metropolitan daily newspaper ) and the Diamond Valley Leader, a 
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local newspaper circulating in the area where the Church was located. The result was two 
applicants for the surplus assets. 
The Church had very little cash and few creditors, but substantial land holdings in the order of 
$2.5 million to $3 million. These were subject to a $276,217.75 mortgage from Properties 
Corporation of the Churches of Christ (PCCC). The mortgage was secured by caveats. 
The Church was governed by its Statement of Purposes and Constitution. Clause 30 of this 
document provided that: 
If upon the winding up or dissolution of the Assembly there remains, after satisfaction 
of all its debts and liabilities, any property whatsoever, the same shall not be paid or 
distributed among the members of the Assembly but shall be given or transferred to 
some other Assembly or institution or institutions having objects similar to the 
Statement of Purposes of the Assembly and whose constitution shall prohibit the 
distribution to its or their members to an extent at least as great as is imposed on 
the Assembly under or by virtue of clause 34 hereof, such institution or institutions to 
be determined by members of the Assembly at or before the time of dissolution and in 
default thereof by application to the Supreme Court for determination. [emphasis 
added] 
Thus, members were not to receive any surplus upon distribution after winding up. Rather the 
surplus assets were to go to a body with a similar ethos and a similar constitutional model. 
The two applicants for the surplus assets were the Churches of Christ and the Eltham Baptist 
Church. The liquidator requested copies of their Constitutions and other relevant documents 
to determine whether they met the criteria for distribution. These documents were provided 
and were considered by the court in this application. His Honour considered that both 
applicant churches had similar objectives to the Church, though each was expressed rather 
differently. The Eltham Baptist Church constitution was not clear on its organisation without 
reference to the Baptist Union Incorporation Act 1930 (Vic). Though there were no other 
applicants for the surplus, the situation was complicated by the fact that the Eltham Baptist 
Church leased one of the parcels of land which constituted the surplus assets. 
The liquidator had proposed that the Churches of Christ should be the recipient of the surplus 
because it was most closely aligned with the Church, and the surplus could be distributed to it 
via the PCCC. His Honour required further evidence to support this choice at this hearing. After 
considering this evidence, which included a Deed of Release and Settlement agreed between 
the Baptist Union of Victoria, the Eltham Baptist Church and the PCCC relating to this leased 
property, His Honour decided that the surplus assets should go to the PCCC.  This decision 
included cost payments by the PCCC of:  
(a) the debts of the Nillumbik Community Church Inc (in Liquidation);  
(b) the costs of the administration of the Nillumbik Community Church Inc (in 
Liquidation); and  
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(c) the costs of the liquidation of the Nillumbik Community Church Inc (in Liquidation). 
These costs included the costs of this application by the liquidator. 
This case may be viewed at: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/vic/VSC/2011/590.html 
Implications of this case 
This is a straightforward case on the distribution of assets after liquidation of an incorporated 
association.  It is important to note that various provisions from the Corporations Act 2001 
(Cth) are imported into the Associations Incorporation Acts of the states. Part 5.3A of the 
Corporations Act relates to voluntary administration. Voluntary administration under section 
436A should be entered into at the first hint of possible insolvent trading, or when there is an 
impasse in the governance of the association.  Directors carry a heavy burden of liability in an 
association, and it is possible that this burden will increase over time (see the case note for 
Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Healey elsewhere in this volume). 
 
2.5 MEMBERSHIP AND OFFICE 
2.5.1  BATTLE V BUNDAGEN CO-OPERATIVE LTD (NO. 2) [2011] NSWCA 38 (NEW 
SOUTH WALES COURT OF APPEAL, HODGSON JA, CAMPBELL JA AND 
SACKVILLE AJA, 8 MARCH 2011) 
This case concerned an internal dispute within a co-operative. At first instance, the Bundagen 
Co-operative Ltd had sought a declaration that Mr Battle had been expelled from Bundagen, 
and an order that Battle cease residing on land owned by Bundagen and judgement for 
possession of that land. These orders were granted, and Battle was ordered to pay costs.5 
Battle appealed that decision. The Court of Appeal upheld the appeal in this matter, because 
the special resolution expelling Battle was held invalid.  
Bundagen is a co-operative established under the Co-operatives Act 1992 (NSW). It owns a 
large area of land near Coffs Harbour, including numerous houses in which members and their 
families live. Battle had been a member of Bundagen since February 1989. In June 2007, he 
was given notice of a special general meeting (on 22 July 2007) to consider a special resolution 
‘That Chris Battle be expelled from Bundagen Co-operative Ltd’. The notice of meeting 
included grounds for the resolution, being that Battle’s behaviour was ‘conduct detrimental to 
the co-operative’ (rule 47(a)(ii)); and listed eight ‘particulars of grounds for special resolution’ 
dating from May 1993 to January 2007. Battle was given a right to respond and his 12 page 
response was included with the notice to members. 
The special resolution passed with a two-thirds majority at a meeting lasting almost six hours 
and Battle was expelled from Bundagen, effective from 30 July 2007. In August 2007 Battle 
invoked the Co-operative’s dispute resolution procedure under rule 90, as he was entitled to 
do, having been a member within the meaning of the Act. He also subsequently raised 
                                                          
5
 Bundagen Cooperative v Battle [2010] NSWSC 160; see case note at 
https://wiki.qut.edu.au/display/CPNS/Bundagen+Co-operative+v+Battle. 
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arguments of lack of procedural fairness, and invalidity of the resolution expelling him, due to 
non-compliance with the Co-operative’s rules. In November 2008 there was another general 
meeting, with a notice setting out further particulars of a special resolution under rule 47; 
which was not a vote to expel Battle, but reiterated that he had been expelled. Battle was 
given the notice and invited to attend that meeting, but instead sent a letter which was read 
out. 
At first instance, Her Honour had held that there was no denial of natural justice, actual or 
apprehended bias, or any question of the expulsion being beyond the powers given by the 
rules. 
On appeal, the special resolution to expel Battle was impugned under rule 47(a). Their 
Honours considered that careful interpretation of rule 47(a) was needed because the effect of 
expulsion was very serious, in that Battle would be deprived of his home. Rule 47(a)(ii) stated:  
(a) A member may be expelled from the co-operative by special resolution at a general 
meeting of the co-operative to the effect: 
(i)...; or 
(ii) that the member has been found guilty of conduct detrimental to the co-operative, 
in particular, breaking the Rules or By-laws. 
According to Hodgson JA, the special resolution that was voted on was not sufficiently detailed 
to be a resolution ‘to the effect’ of para (i) or (ii) – it merely stated that he was to be expelled. 
His Honour stated (at [50]) ‘In such a serious matter, ... it is important that the resolution be in 
terms that indicate to the members voting on it that the matter to be resolved is not whether 
the member in question is to be expelled, but is rather whether the member comes within par 
(i) and/or par (ii) and is to be expelled on that basis and no other’. 
On the issue of natural justice in a general meeting, Hodgson JA considered that while the 
principles of natural justice were engaged, the principles do not operate in the same way in a 
general meeting as in a committee or tribunal; e.g. all active members have a right to vote at 
general meeting and cannot be deprived of that right on the basis of actual or apprehended 
bias, or on the basis that a member has not attended and participated fully in debate on a 
resolution.  
On the November 2008 meeting, His Honour found that the notice did not conform to rule 47: 
instead of being a resolution to expel a member, the notice conveyed the notion that he was 
already a non-member and trespasser, having been expelled; the resolution simply reinforced 
the Co-op's position. 
Sackville AJA and Campbell JA agreed with the reasoning of Hodgson JA, but Sackville AJA 
added a further reason (Campbell JA agreeing) which accorded with a submission by counsel 
for Battle that he was denied natural justice at the July 2007 meeting because there was no 
separate finding of guilt. That is, in order to satisfy rule 47 the meeting should have followed a 
2-stage process: firstly a consideration of guilt; and then a consideration of penalty – with the 
member being given an opportunity to be heard (rule 47(b)) at both stages of the process. This 
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was because the words in rule 47(a)(ii), ‘the member has been found guilty’, contemplated a 
finding of guilt before the special resolution on expulsion. In this case, the general meeting 
deliberated on the allegations set out in the particulars but it was impossible to determine 
whether any finding of ‘guilty of detrimental conduct’ was made in relation to any particulars, 
on the basis of the ‘rolled up’ resolution. 
Hodgson JA had found that there was no rule of law mandating a 2-stage process. 
This case may be viewed at: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/nsw/NSWCA/2011/38.html 
Implications of this case 
This case again illustrates how disputes within organisations can grow to become court cases 
involving huge financial and personal costs. Battle had allegedly attempted (ineffectively) to 
invoke the dispute resolution process in the cooperative's rules in 2006 prior to the 2007 
meeting, but it was not invoked effectively until after he had been expelled.  
It also demonstrates the importance of being thorough in according procedural fairness to 
anyone subject to proceedings under an organisation's rules, even if the proceeding is in 
general meeting rather than a disciplinary tribunal or committee. The legal issue of interest 
here is whether a 2-stage process – finding guilt and then penalty – is necessary in expulsion 
situations, with the person having the right to be heard at both stages. Justices Sackville and 
Campbell felt that there should have been a 2-stage process in the special resolution, and that 
this was an additional ground for invalidity. While Hodgson JA did not consider it essential, his 
reasons show that there needed to be a finding of guilt separate from the resolution for 
expulsion. Both opinions stressed the significance of the resolution's impact on the co-op 
member. 
 
2.6 NEGLIGENCE 
2.6.1  GARZO V LIVERPOOL CAMPBELLTOWN CHRISTIAN SCHOOL LTD [2011] NSWSC 
292 (SUPREME COURT OF NEW SOUTH WALES, GARLING J, 15 APRIL 2011) 
The plaintiff in this case, Mrs Garzo, slipped and fell on a pedestrian crossing in the grounds of 
the William Carey Christian School in 2007. She suffered injuries to her face, teeth and right 
arm. She sued the proprietor of the school, Liverpool/Campbelltown Christian School Ltd, and 
the maintenance contractor responsible for the upkeep of the crossing, T & J Turner Building 
Services Pty Ltd, for negligence. Both admitted they owed Mrs Garzo a duty of care, but denied 
any breach of the duty. 
The area in question was asphalt with white paint markings, heavily used by parents, students 
and staff, and was slightly wet from light rain at the time of the accident. The paint was used 
extensively in the school grounds, and there had never been any problems prior to the 
plaintiff's accident. 
Foreseeability 
Garling J held that the relevant risk of harm was the risk of a person, walking normally, slipping 
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on the crossing as it was at the time of the accident, and suffering injury. The plaintiff alleged 
that the defendants would have at least constructive knowledge of the risk. His Honour 
emphasised that this knowledge must be assessed as at the time of the incident, rather than 
with the benefit of hindsight. His Honour found that the risk was not reasonably foreseeable, 
on the basis of: 
 the entirely ordinary and normal nature of the crossing; 
 expert evidence that no hazard would have been 'visually obvious to a reasonable 
person walking normally in the relevant circumstances'; and 
 total absence of previous accidents on the heavily trafficked crossing and other areas 
in the school where the same paint was used. 
On this basis, His Honour found that neither defendant could be considered negligent. The 
claim was dismissed and the plaintiff ordered to pay costs. 
However, clearly anticipating an appeal, His Honour went on to explore all other aspects of the 
case (although none were decided in Mrs Garzo's favour). 
Nature of risk 
The test under the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) (CLA) requires action only on risks which are 
‘not insignificant’. His Honour noted that the meaning of this phrase is yet to be decisively 
determined by the court; he relied upon the interpretation matrix he developed previously in 
Benic v New South Wales [2010] NSWSC 1039 at [101]: 
 the assessment is prospective, not retrospective - any benefits of hindsight are 
irrelevant; 
 it is a higher level of risk than the common law 'not far fetched or fanciful', and was 
intended to prevent liability being imposed too easily; 
 the phrase refers to the probability of a risk occurring; 
 it is both a quantitative and evaluative measure - how you measure probability will 
depend on the circumstances; and 
 significance must be judged from the defendant's perspective and from a broader base 
than a mathematical formula. 
Taking into account the large numbers of people crossing regularly without incident; the fact 
that pedestrian crossings are a normal feature of streets; the lack of obvious defects in the 
crossing; there were no unusual events e.g. storms, which might cause special danger; and the 
fact that any harm was likely to be minimal in most circumstances, Garling J held that the risk 
was not in fact significant enough to prompt precautions. 
'Reasonable precautions' 
However, His Honour went on to consider what precautions might have been reasonable in 
the circumstances in light of the relevant risk, under the reasonable person test in section 
5B(1)(c) of the CLA. He took a dim view of Mrs Garzo's claim that the defendants ought to have 
ensured a uniform surface on the crossing, given that established case law showed ‘a plaintiff 
is not entitled, when walking in an outdoor environment, to a level surface, with uniformity of 
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finish and slip resistance. Nor is a defendant to be expected, acting reasonably, to provide 
[this]’: paras [156]–[157]. 
In addition, expert testing of the crossing paint for slipperiness found that risk of injury was 
low, and its slip resistance satisfied or exceeded the relevant Australian Standards. 
Accordingly, Garling J again found for the defendants, in that, even had the risk prompted 
precautions, there was no reason to suggest that a reasonable response required using 
different paint.  
Causation 
Despite finding that the crossing was not in all probability especially slippery at the time of Mrs 
Garzo's accident, His Honour conceded that if the crossing were slippery, this could contribute 
to a fall. This had not been borne out. In addition, given the multiplicity of causative factors at 
play, it was for the plaintiff to establish that one cause – the state of the crossing – was the 
necessary cause. She had not done so.  
Cross claims 
If the defendants had been found liable Garling J indicated that he would have allocated 35 per 
cent liability to the school and 65 per cent to the contractor. While the school supplied the 
paint, the contractor was the specialist with the relevant knowledge of how grounds should be 
maintained. 
The case may be viewed at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/nsw/NSWSC/2011/292.html  
Implications of this case 
This case illustrates the boundary line where an organisation will be legally liable for injury 
upon its premises. Note that merely contracting out maintenance functions to another does 
not absolve an organisation completely. 
 
2.6.2 OYSTON V ST PATRICK'S COLLEGE [2011] NSWSC 269 (SUPREME COURT OF 
NEW SOUTH WALES, SCHMIDT J, 13 APRIL 2011) 
This was a claim in negligence against St Patrick's College (the College) alleging psychiatric 
harm as a result of bullying and harassment directed against the plaintiff, a former pupil, Ms 
Oyston, by other pupils at the school. The Court found that the College had breached its duty 
of care to Ms Oyston and that the breach caused her to suffer psychiatric injury. She was 
awarded damages for non-economic loss and for past and future economic loss. 
The College clearly recognised the risk that bullying could lead to harm to students and had 
policies in place during the time that Ms Oyston was a pupil there. The evidence showed that 
during 2002 to 2004, the policies were under review and not really operational. The College 
had conducted a survey of students in 2004 which showed that bullying was experienced by a 
significant number of students. This was also a year when Ms Oyston made frequent 
complaints about being bullied by a group of students in her year. Ms Oyston's parents took 
her out of the school in February 2005. This claim was filed in 2007 and alleged that the 
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College's policies and practices as implemented in her case failed to protect her from a 
recognised and foreseeable risk of harm from relentless bullying during 2002 to 2005. 
The College's duty to protect its pupils from foreseeable risk of injury from bullying was not in 
issue, nor was the fact that harm from bullying can include psychiatric injury. The Court stated: 
‘There was no issue that a reasonable person in the College’s position would have taken steps 
to protect a student such as Ms Oyston from the risks which bullying posed. Whether the steps 
taken from time to time were adequate to ensure that the duty was met was in issue.’ (para 
15) 
Ms Oyston was a pupil at the school from 2002 to early 2005 – from year 7 to the beginning of 
year 10. Her evidence was that she had had no experience of bullying in primary school, but 
began to be bullied by a certain group of students in her form, in term 3 of 2002. The bullying 
included name calling, jostling and pushing, giggling and sniggering in class, and mocking her at 
school events. She reported it on a number of occasions over the three years, to the year 
coordinator, the deputy principal, the school counsellor and some of the teachers, but said 
that nothing was done. She became sad, anxious, suffered panic attacks and collapses, and 
became suicidal in 2004. 
The Court found the College's evidence showed poor recognition of behaviours as bullying 
rather than the lesser 'inappropriate behaviour'. Although the College recognised the problem 
of bullying – it had policies on: unacceptable behaviour; bullying, intimidation, violence and 
harassment; and personal protection and respect, all of which were clearly set out for pupils in 
their school diary, and which were reinforced to students in class – the Court found its 
response to be ‘ad hoc, rather than systematic’ and its record keeping to be ‘haphazard’. 
Although Ms Oyston's file was not put in evidence, the Court found from the material 
presented that (paras [36]–[37]) 
...it became apparent that no clear record was maintained as to the course followed 
when complaints were received; what conclusions were drawn from any investigation 
conducted; and importantly, what was done by way of response, if bullying or other 
inappropriate behaviour towards the student was uncovered.  
In Ms Oyston's case, the record, such as it was, showed that the types of responses 
which the College's policies envisaged would be implemented if complaints were 
received about bullying, did not result. 
Her Honour analysed the evidence, including expert evidence, on the College's policies and 
their implementation and found that ‘the College’s response was ineffective to ensure that it 
met its duty of care to Ms Oyston, even though it was apparent that real harm was resulting 
for her’ (para [52). Her Honour pointed to the difference in the College's enforcement of its 
policy on school uniforms: ‘This was a policy both clear and enforced at the College, including 
in relation to Ms Oyston, on the documents in evidence. .... The College's failure to enforce its 
conduct policies in a similar way to its enforcement of its 'Uniform Policy' underlined its failure 
in the duty which it owed to Ms Oyston’ (para [60]). 
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Her Honour found that the evidence established that Ms Oyston suffered a psychiatric injury 
during 2004 and 2005. The evidence also showed that students about whom Ms Oyston 
complained were known by the College to have been involved in bullying students; and that 
despite knowing of her mental and physical state in 2004 the College continued to treat the 
conduct complained of as only inappropriate behaviour that required investigation: 'The 
College's failure to deal with known bullies whose conduct needed to be brought to a halt, 
resulted in the College's failure in its duty of care to Ms Oyston. Injury resulted' (para [304]). 
On the issue of foreseeability, Her Honour found that the risk of psychiatric injury resulting 
from bullying was foreseen and responded to in various ways by the College, and it must be 
accepted that the risk of psychiatric injury from students being bullied at the College was 'not 
far fetched or fanciful, either in a general sense, or in Ms Oyston's case' (para [308]). 
The issue of causation was complicated by the fact that Ms Oyston had a difficult home life 
during this period. Her Honour considered whether it had been shown that 'it was more 
probable than not that Ms Oyston would not have suffered a psychological injury if the College 
had been exercising care in relation to the risk of bullying to the minimum extent at which it 
would have been performing its duty to take reasonable care' (para [318]). Her Honour 
considered the fact that Ms Oyston may have been particularly vulnerable to psychological 
injury from bullying at school did not mean that causation had not been established; the 
evidence did not show that she would have suffered the injury in any event: 'But for the 
bullying to which she was subjected at school, she would not have suffered the injury which 
she sustained. The scope of the College's liability extended to the harm which was caused' 
(para [331]). 
This case may be viewed at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/nsw/NSWSC/2011/269.html 
Implications of this case 
While recognising the difficulties involved, this case shows the importance of addressing 
bullying at school in order to meet the duty of care to prevent harm to students. But it is also a 
reminder of the importance of addressing bullying effectively wherever it occurs. The College's 
policies may in fact have been adequate to prevent bullying and to deal with misbehaviour 
before it escalated to bullying, but inadequate training and implementation meant the policies 
were not effective to prevent foreseeable harm. The year coordinator who had primary 
responsibility in this case appeared reluctant to see repeated offensive behaviours as bullying, 
and more concerned to avoid bullying the bully than to correct the bullying behaviours that Ms 
Oyston complained of.  
While the Court accepted the need for flexibility and discretion to deal with instances of 
misbehaviour, Her Honour said: ‘Discretion, a very necessary part of any teacher's role, cannot 
operate to the point where misbehaviour, including bullying is dealt with inconsistently, or 
worse arbitrarily or not at all’. While there are obvious challenges in meeting the duty of care 
in educating a large group of adolescents, the Court said ‘This is not a case where an unrealistic 
standard of impractical perfection was being demanded of the College, but rather one where 
practical operation of the policies it had designed to protect its students ... against the risk of 
injury to which ongoing bullying exposed her, were not effectively implemented.’ 
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2.6.3  RICHARDSON V MT DRUITT WORKERS CLUB [2011] NSWSC 31 (SUPREME 
COURT OF NEW SOUTH WALES, ADAMS J, 10 FEBRUARY 2011) 
This was a case concerning negligence. The plaintiff, Richardson (R), was a member of the 
defendant Mt Druitt Workers Club (the club). He slipped and fell while climbing over a locked 
gate at the rear of the club's premises, and was seriously injured. He used the club for social 
activities, and always went through the rear gate when coming to and returning home from 
the club. R had never encountered the gate locked before, and as it was raining, and the gate 
was only 200 metres from his house, he decided to climb over it rather than return to the club 
for assistance with the gate.  
R sued the club in both negligence and contract. The defendant club sought to have the 
statement of claim struck out as disclosing no reasonable cause of action. The negligence was 
alleged to arise from the fact that the gate had not been locked on previous occasions, and 
that it was foreseeable that a person in the plaintiff's position would attempt to climb over it in 
the absence of any easy way to communicate with the club building, such as an intercom. The 
breach of contract allegation was based on the fact the R had paid membership fees and that 
there should always be egress permitted through the rear gate. 
The negligence claim involved consideration of five questions:  
1. Is a duty of care established? 
2. What is the scope of that duty? 
3. Has there been a breach of that duty by the defendant? 
4. Was that breach the cause of the plaintiff's damage? 
5. Has there been contributory negligence by the plaintiff? 
A duty of care is owed by an occupier to all entrants who are lawfully present on the occupier's 
land: Australian Safeway Stores v Zaluzna (1987) 162 CLR 479. The scope of that duty is to take 
reasonable care to avoid a foreseeable risk of injury to the plaintiff. In this case, there was 
nothing in the facts to suppose a 'special relationship' between R and the club so as to give rise 
to a more onerous duty. 
It could be argued that the existence of a fence suggested that it was foreseeable that 
someone would attempt to climb it. Moreover, the fence was high and had pointed post tops 
which suggested the possibility of serious injury. His Honour suggested that this was just barely 
arguable, but that ‘the risk existed only in the case of someone ignoring the obvious’. His 
Honour said: 
Here, the plaintiff contends, in substance, that the defendant should have foreseen 
that, if it did not warn him before he left to go home that the gate was locked or 
provide an intercom at the gate, he would try to climb it and thus risk injury. So 
understood such a possibility would in my view be rightly dismissed as far-fetched or 
fanciful.  
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The alleged breach of any duty in this case arose from locking the gate and failing to take steps 
(installing an intercom, posting a warning) to obviate the risk that R would injure himself by 
attempting to climb the gate. His Honour took the view that R's injuries were not caused by 
the locked gate, or by the absence of an intercom or electronic unlocking mechanism, but by 
R's attempt to climb the fence rather than return to the club house to get assistance. His 
Honour said:  
In no sense here could the decision of the plaintiff to climb the gate be regarded as in 
the ordinary course of things the very kind of thing likely to happen as a result of the 
defendant's negligence.... The plaintiff's action is doomed to fail. It is 'so obviously 
untenable that it cannot possibly succeed'. 
Thus, there was no reasonable cause of action disclosed on the facts, and the statement of 
claim was dismissed with costs. 
This case may be viewed at: http://www.caselaw.nsw.gov.au/action/PJUDG?jgmtid=150157  
Implications of this case 
His Honour said in this case that the same conclusion would be reached under the Civil Liability 
Act 2002 (NSW), section 5B, 5C, 5D and 5G. In this respect, His Honour said: 
In my view, the risk that someone in the position of the plaintiff might attempt to 
climb the gate rather than obtain assistance to open it was not foreseeable in the 
relevant sense. The risk that such a person might attempt to climb the fence was 
inconsequential and, whilst a reasonable person in the position of the defendant might 
well have warned patrons about the locking of the gate, this would have been a mere 
courtesy as a precaution against inconvenience and not as a precaution against the risk 
that an attempt might be made to climb the fence. The probability that someone in 
the position of the plaintiff might climb the gate rather than seek assistance to open it 
in the absence of being informed before he left the clubhouse that the gate was locked 
was so slight as to be negligible. The failure to warn or place an intercom at the gate 
would have given rise to the likelihood of an inconvenient walk back to the clubhouse 
but would not have led a reasonable person to apprehend that a patron such as the 
plaintiff might attempt to climb the fence. 
 
2.7 NONPROFIT STRUCTURE AND GOVERNANCE 
2.7.1  AUSTRALIAN SECURITIES AND INVESTMENTS COMMISSION V HEALEY AND 
OTHERS [2011] FCA 717; AUSTRALIAN SECURITIES AND INVESTMENTS 
COMMISSION V HEALEY AND OTHERS (NO. 2) [2011] FCA 1003 (FEDERAL COURT 
OF AUSTRALIA, MIDDLETON J, 27 JUNE 2011, 31 AUGUST 2011) 
This case concerned the duties of directors, and whilst it dealt with a commercial company, the 
outcomes of the case also have implications for the directors of nonprofit entities (NFPs). 
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The Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) brought an action against the 
non-executive chairman, the Chief Executive Officer, the Chief Financial Officer, and the five 
other non-executive directors of Centro Properties Limited, Centro Property Trust and Centro 
Retail Trust. The basis of the action was that these members of the boards of the companies 
approved financial statements and a directors’ report for the financial year ending 30 June 
2007 at a board meeting held on 6 September 2007. These reports failed to disclose crucial 
matters, including significant amounts of short-term debt, and guarantees for short-term debt.  
Moreover, the short-term debt burden was not only undisclosed, but was misclassified as a 
series of non-current liabilities.  This gave a false view of the company’s short-term debt 
burden. 
His Honour found that ASIC had proved breaches of sections 180(1), 344(1) and 601FD(1) of 
the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (the Act), relating to care and diligence in carrying out duties 
as directors.  However, there was no suggestion that the directors had not been honest.  It was 
rather a case of the directors failing to take all reasonable steps required of them as directors, 
and not acting in the performance of their duties as directors with the degree of care and 
diligence which the law required of them. His Honour held that the matters relating to the 
short-term debt not disclosed were ‘well known to the directors, or if not well known to them, 
were matters that should have been well known to them’. 
The approval of the reports in question was ‘not about a mere technical oversight’.  The 
information not disclosed in the reports had serious implications for shareholders and for the 
share market.  Risks could not be assessed accurately without the information omitted and this 
was ‘one of the fundamental purposes of the requirements of the Act that financial statements 
and reports must be prepared and published’. The directors should not only have read the 
reports for accuracy themselves, but they should have enquired further into the financial 
statements, and should not have certified that the reports gave a true and fair view of the 
financial position of the company. 
His Honour held that: 
...there is a core, irreducible requirement of directors to be involved in the 
management of the company and to take all reasonable steps to be in a position to 
guide and monitor. There is a responsibility to read, understand and focus upon the 
contents of those reports which the law imposes a responsibility upon each director to 
approve or adopt.  All directors must carefully read and understand financial 
statements...Such a reading and understanding would require a director to consider 
whether the financial statements were consistent with his or her own knowledge of 
the company’s financial position.  This accumulated knowledge arises from a number 
of responsibilities a director has in carrying out the role and function of director.  
These include the following: a director should acquire at least a rudimentary 
understanding of the business of the corporation and become familiar with the 
fundamentals of the business in which the corporation is engaged; a director should 
keep informed about the activities of the corporation; whilst not required to have a 
detailed awareness of day-to-day activities, a director should monitor the corporate 
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affairs and policies; a director should maintain familiarity with the financial status of 
the corporation by a regular review and understanding of financial statements; a 
director, whilst not an auditor, should still have a questioning mind...A director is not 
relieved of the duty to pay attention to the company’s affairs which might reasonably 
be expected  to attract inquiry, even outside the area of the director’s expertise...What 
each director is expected to do is to take a diligent and intelligent interest in the 
information available to him or her, to understand that information, and apply an 
enquiring mind to the responsibilities placed upon him or her. 
Thus, the directors had a duty, which they could not delegate, to read and understand the 
financial statements of the companies, and to make such enquiries as seemed proper about 
those statements. While directors did not have to take part in the everyday activities of the 
companies, and were not required to have ‘infinite knowledge or ability’, they were expected 
to carry out their duties with proper diligence and care.  
In the second hearing, which considered appropriate penalties for the breaches proved by 
ASIC, His Honour found that none of the defendants had grounds for relief from liability, and 
made declarations of contravention under section 1317DA of the Act against all the 
defendants. The defendants claimed relief from liability based on reliance on others 
(management and auditors), but His Honour was unpersuaded by this: Directors should have 
sufficient financial literacy to detect errors in financial statements themselves. 
No additional penalties were imposed on the non-executive directors (other than a share of 
payment of ASIC’s costs). The Chief Executive Officer was ordered to pay a penalty of $30,000 
to the Commonwealth, and the Chief Financial Officer, who had made admissions prior to the 
first trial, was banned from managing a corporation for two years from 4.30pm on 10 October 
2011. 
His Honour observed that these penalties were not harsh, but served the purpose of general 
deterrence: 
In my view, the orders go far enough to indicate the Court’s disapproval of the actions 
of each of the defendants, and to satisfy the requirements of the principle of general 
deterrence.  Any additional penalties are not necessary to facilitate the future 
adherence to the standard of corporate behaviour found to be required by the Court 
in this proceeding...to impose greater penalties...would otherwise be unfair and 
inappropriate. 
The cases may be viewed at: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/FCA/2011/717.html and 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/FCA/2011/1003.html 
Implications of these cases 
There are three issues of importance arising from this case: delegation of duty and reliance on 
others by directors; the extent of financial literacy required of directors; and the role of non-
executive directors vis-à-vis management.  Directors of nonprofit companies have the same 
governance duties as directors of for-profit companies. Therefore, this decision implies that 
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they need to have enough financial skill to read and understand financial statements, and to 
be able to determine when matters may be delegated to others. Reliance on others, though 
permissible in some cases, should not be uncritical. If directors of nonprofit entities are 
deficient in the skills required to carry out their duties, then extra training may be necessary. 
 
2.7.2  BATH V SINGH [2011] NZHC 1392 (NEW ZEALAND HIGH COURT, VENNING J, 20 
OCTOBER 2011) 
This case involved the affairs of The New Zealand Sikh Society Auckland (the Auckland society). 
The Auckland society was incorporated under the Charitable Trusts Act 1957 (NZ) (the Act) in 
1982.  At the time, there was one other New Zealand Sikh Society operating in New Zealand, in 
Hamilton. The latter society was regarded as the foundation society of Sikhs, though there are 
now several such societies in New Zealand. 
The Auckland society was originally constituted as a branch of the New Zealand Sikh Society. 
The Rules of the Auckland society provided that there should be cooperation with the New 
Zealand Sikh Society, and, in Rule 24(a), that the Rules could be altered, added to, rescinded or 
otherwise amended by a two-thirds majority of those present at a general meeting of the 
Auckland society, provided that the changes were not inconsistent with the rules of New 
Zealand Sikh Society, and that that Society’s prior approval was obtained.  Rule 24(a) was 
amended in 1982 to add a proviso that ‘any such alteration, addition, rescission or amendment 
will not alter the exclusively charitable nature of the Rules nor extend their scope beyond New 
Zealand’. 
Alterations to the Rules of the Auckland society were proposed with the effect of the Auckland 
society ceasing to be a branch of the New Zealand Sikh Society, as this structure had become 
outmoded.  No other Sikh societies in New Zealand are constituted as branches. The changes 
proposed were: 
 To change the name to The New Zealand Sikh Society Auckland; 
 To delete the reference to being a branch of the New Zealand Sikh Society; 
 To delete the references in Rule 24(a) to inconsistency and prior approval; and  
 To replace these references with ‘provided that no amendment may be made which 
would alter the exclusively charitable nature or tax-exempt status of the Society… [or 
which preclude] Members from obtaining any personal benefit from their 
membership, or the rules as to winding-up.’ 
The meeting to adopt these changes was held on 25 November 2001. Legal advice was taken 
that there would need to be approval for the changes from the New Zealand Sikh Society. 
Discussions took place with the New Zealand Sikh Society, but no formal agreements were 
made. The legal advice went on to deal with the situation where there was no approval from 
the New Zealand Sikh Society. Four options were presented: 
1. To accept the impasse, and, possibly, to seek to change the attitude of the New 
Zealand Sikh Society over time; 
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2. To pass the resolution and get it registered and then wait to see if registration is 
challenged by the New Zealand Sikh Society; 
3. To challenge the refusal by seeking a High Court declaration on the grounds that the 
decision of members of the [Auckland Society] cannot be over-ridden by another body; 
or 
4. To form a new Society, transfer assets to it relying on the objects in Rule 4 (apart from 
sub-Rule (a)), and then either wind up the [Auckland Society] or wait until it is 
removed from the Register by the Registrar. .... 
The legal advice stated that option 2 was the cheapest option, followed by option 4. These 
suggestions were adopted by the meeting of the Auckland society on 25 November 2001, and 
approval was sought from the New Zealand Sikh Society on 8 January 2002. The New Zealand 
Sikh Society refused approval for the changes on 29 January 2002. The Auckland society then 
went ahead with the changes, which were registered in September 2002. 
Further changes were adopted in February 2009 which affected winding up. The alteration 
adopted stated: ‘If any property remains after the winding up or dissolution of the Society and 
settlement of all the Society’s debts and liabilities, that property must be given or transferred 
to another organization that is charitable under New Zealand law and has purposes similar to 
THE NZ SIKH SOCIETY AUCKLAND.’ 
All parties in this matter were members of the Auckland society. The New Zealand Sikh Society 
was not a party to this proceeding, but had indicated that it supported the plaintiffs. The 
plaintiffs alleged that all alterations between 2001 and 2009 were ultra vires (i.e. beyond the 
powers of the society’s board).  The plaintiffs had obtained an interim injunction to restrain a 
proposed motion to validate the earlier amendments. 
The plaintiffs submitted that by changing the rules of the Auckland society, the defendants 
altered the original objects of the trust and were thus devoting moneys given for one purpose 
to another. This was argued to be a breach of trust. On this basis the alterations to the rules 
were ultra vires and invalid. 
The defendants argued that there was no provision in the Act which authorised the 
entrenchment of rules of a society. The alterations to the rules which had taken place were not 
such as to endanger the charitable purposes of the society or the realisation of those 
purposes. Therefore, the rule changes should be validated. 
His Honour stated that the issues were: 
 whether the Auckland Society held its assets on charitable trust for its objects 
or whether the beneficial interest in the assets lay with the society, subject to 
its being bound by its objects to apply the funds for charitable purposes; and 
 whether it could be said that by changing its name, or by deleting the 
reference to it being a branch of the New Zealand Sikh Society, or by the 
removal of the purported entrenchment provision in r 24(1), the Auckland 
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Society had effectively changed the purposes or objects upon trust for which, 
or otherwise constrained by which, it held its assets. 
On the first issue, His Honour found that there was a distinction between a charitable trust 
board with trustees incorporated as a board (section 7 of the Act), and a charitable society 
with membership incorporated as a board (section 8 of the Act). The Auckland society was 
incorporated under section 8 of the Act. As such, the members had a contractual relationship 
with the society and each other. Consistent with this contractual relationship, members of a 
society are bound by intra vires amendments to rules even if they do not agree with them. 
In general, there is no trust involved in gifts to such societies, but the society is bound to apply 
its assets for the charitable purposes or objects set out in its constitution.  This was the 
position of the Auckland society.  His Honour said: 
Its funds and assets vested in it beneficially, subject to it being bound to apply those 
funds and assets for its charitable purposes. While constrained by those charitable 
purposes, the society may still change its rules. That is consistent with the contractual 
nature of the relationship of the Auckland Society and its members…In the present 
case s61 of the Charitable Trusts Act contemplates that a society incorporated under 
that Act may change its rules and even alter the charitable trusts upon which property 
may be held. 
Strictly speaking, the rules were not amended in accordance with Rule 24(a), but His Honour 
held that, as there is no provision in the Act for the entrenchment of rules of a society, the 
attempt to entrench the rules of the Auckland society by requiring the approval of the New 
Zealand Sikh Society was void and of no effect. Thus, the changes, which had been properly 
registered, were effective from the date of registration. The changes to the Rules since 2001 
did not vary any trusts for charitable purposes, and were valid. 
For completeness, His Honour considered whether, if he was wrong, relief in the form of a 
declaration should be granted to the plaintiffs. He concluded that it should not because: 
 Nine years had passed since the first amendments to the Rules; 
 The plaintiffs had been present at the meetings involved, and one was a member of 
the Executive of the Auckland society; 
 The amendments did not endanger the charitable purposes of the Auckland society; 
 The Auckland society was not a branch of the New Zealand Sikh society ‘in any 
meaningful sense’; and 
 The New Zealand Sikh Society was not entitled to arbitrarily withhold consent to the 
changes, especially as no reasons were given to support the refusal of consent. 
The application of the plaintiffs was dismissed with costs divided two-thirds/one-third. 
The case may be viewed at: 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgibin/sinodisp/nz/cases/NZHC/2011/1392.html 
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Implications of this case 
Where the underlying relationship in a society is contractual, as in this case, it is unlikely the 
Court will regard the relationship as one of trust in the traditional sense. Funds given to an 
incorporated body do not require or import a trust unless the terms of the gift dictate that a 
trust was intended. There is no need for the imposition of a trust because the incorporated 
body is bound by its objects to apply the funds for charitable purposes.  
 
2.7.3  CANT V KIRBY [2011] NSWSC 1193 (SUPREME COURT OF NEW SOUTH WALES, 
GZELL J, 27 SEPTEMBER 2011) 
This case concerned an Aboriginal corporation. Cant was the liquidator of the second plaintiff, 
Billa Downs Aboriginal Corporation (the Aboriginal Corporation). The defendants were 
opposing an order for possession of Billa Downs Station, an asset of the Aboriginal 
Corporation. The defendants claimed that the Aboriginal Corporation, and the second cross-
defendant, the Indigenous Land Corporation (the Land Corporation), held Billa Station in trust 
for members of the Aboriginal community of New South Wales who consider themselves to 
have a traditional connection with Billa Downs Station (the Station). 
The provisions of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (the Corporations Act) apply to the winding 
up of an Aboriginal Corporation under section 526-35 of the Corporations (Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander) Act 2006 (Cth). Section 474(1) of the Corporations Act requires a 
liquidator to take into his or her custody or control all property to which the company being 
wound up is entitled. 
The Station was granted to the Aboriginal Corporation by the Land Corporation under an 
unconditional deed of grant in 2001. The defendants argued that clause 2.1 of the deed of 
grant created a trust over the Station in favour of them and the other members of the 
Aboriginal Corporation as beneficiaries. Under clause 2.2 of the deed, the trust was to 
continue until the Land Corporation requested the transfer of the Aboriginal Corporation’s 
interest in the Station back to it. 
The defendants argued that this interest to be transferred to the Land Corporation was that of 
a bare trustee, and therefore the Land Corporation would hold the Station burdened by the 
trust in favour of the members of the Aboriginal Corporation. This would defeat the claim of 
the liquidator. 
His Honour said that if that were the case, there would be a problem with the rule against 
perpetuities (perpetual trusts). The rule against perpetual trusts prohibits a non-charitable 
trust from being longer than the perpetuity period in the Perpetuities Act 1984 (NSW). This 
period is 80 years from the date of settlement of the trust. 
His Honour stated that the defendants and other members of the Aboriginal Corporation were 
not beneficiaries of a trust created by clause 2.1 of the deed of grant. What was created under 
the deed of grant was a purpose trust the terms of which were that the Aboriginal Corporation 
should hold the Station to provide economic, environmental, social and cultural benefits to its 
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members. A purpose trust is void unless it is for a charitable purpose. The assistance of 
aboriginal persons is a charitable purpose in Australia, therefore, what was created was a 
charitable purpose trust. A charitable trust is not affected by the rule against perpetuities: 
section 16(4) of the Perpetuities Act 1984 (NSW).   
The transfer of the Station to the Aboriginal Corporation took the form of an absolute fee 
simple defeasible by a condition subsequent. The obligations of the trust were implanted on 
this fee simple. The disposition was defeated if the Aboriginal Corporation committed a breach 
of the deed of grant and the Land Corporation requested the transfer of the Station to it. This 
had occurred (a breach of clause 6.1 of the deed of grant when the Aboriginal Corporation 
failed to pay rates on the Station), and its occurrence brought the trust to an end. 
When a corporate trustee of a trust is wound up, the assets of the trust are made available to 
the creditors. Therefore, the liquidator was entitled to the Station as part of the assets of the 
Aboriginal Corporation to be disposed of for the benefit of the creditors. 
This case may be viewed at: http://www.caselaw.nsw.gov.au/action/PJUDG?jgmtid=154968  
Implications of this case 
Since 1 July 2007, indigenous corporations have been regulated by the Corporations 
(Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander) Act 2006 (Cth) (CATSI). The Act is administered by the 
Office of the Registrar of Indigenous Corporations (ORIC), an independent statutory office 
holder established under CATSI. Each indigenous corporation is required to report to ORIC 
between 1 July and 31 December each year. The reports must cover finances, membership, 
and adherence to CATSI and the corporation’s constitution. When an indigenous corporation 
falls into liquidation, the provisions of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) are applied to the 
winding up. 
 
2.7.4  GRESHAM V BEERWAH RSL & CITIZENS MEMORIAL CLUB INC [2011] QSC 288 
(SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND, DAUBNEY J, 26 SEPTEMBER 2011) 
This was an application, pursuant to section 72 of the Associations Incorporation Act 1981 
(Qld), to have the 2010 election of members to the management committee of the Beerwah 
RSL & Citizens Memorial Club Inc declared invalid and another election ordered. The applicant, 
Gresham, argued that the election was contrary to the Club's rules. On examining the Club's 
rules the Court determined that certain rules dealing with election of management committee 
members were in fact invalid as contrary to section 62 of the Act. The Court declared those 
parts of the rules invalid. While the election was not in accordance with the rules, it was valid 
under the Act. Therefore the application was dismissed.  
The Club was formed to allow non-RSL people to have access to facilities of the Beerwah-
Peachester Sub-Branch of the Returned Services League (the RSL Sub-Branch). The rules 
reflected this association between the two entities, but also allowed the RSL Sub-Branch to 
have considerable control over membership of the Club's management committee. Rule 11(A) 
provided that the management committee would have 10 members, six of which would be 
  
WORKING PAPER No 55      68 
 
elected by the RSL Sub-Branch. Rule 11(B) provided that the six members elected by the RSL 
Sub-Branch would include the president and the senior vice-president. Rule 11(C) provided for 
four 'Citizen' members to be elected at the AGM. Rule 4 set out six classes of members, 
including (a) RSL members and (b) Citizen members. 
Section 62 of the Act requires that members of an association's management committee shall 
be elected at the AGM or a general meeting in accordance with its rules. The Court found that 
Rule 11(A) purported to exclude the Club's members from the election of six of its 
management committee members. This went beyond seeking to reserve six places on the 
committee for RSL members. The first sentence of each of Rules 11(A), 11(B) and 11(C) were 
declared invalid. Any gap in the rules as a result would be filled by Model Rule 13 (by virtue of 
section 47 of the Act).  
The Court went on to note that the management committee itself had published an 
'interpretation' of Rule 11 in June 2010, which appeared to accept the invalidity of Rule 11. The 
interpretation was, inter alia, that all 10 management committee members could only be 
elected at a general meeting and that six of the elected members must also be RSL members. 
However, an interpretation could not overcome the invalidity in the rules. 
In terms of the November 2010 election of the management committee, all 10 members had 
in fact been elected validly, having been nominated properly and in proper time before the 
AGM and having been elected by members present at the meeting. 
The applicant raised other technical objections to the AGM procedures, in particular that the 
president had vacated the chair at the time of the election, allowing part of the meeting to be 
chaired by a member, which appeared to be in breach of Rule 24A. The Court found that it was 
'completely appropriate' for the president to vacate the chair for the election since he was a 
nominee. While it was unclear whether a formal resolution had been passed to endorse the 
member's taking the chair, this would have been a procedural irregularity which would not 
invalidate the election. Therefore the Court dealt with this and other technical points under 
section 133 of the Act. 
There was no order as to costs. 
The case can be viewed at: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/qld/QSC/2011/288.html  
Implications of the case 
This case illustrates many of the common mistakes made by management committees of 
Queensland incorporated associations. Management committee members are required to be 
‘elected’ by members and not ‘appointed’; gaps in the ‘own rules’ of incorporated associations 
are filled by reference back to the model rules; and minor meeting irregularities may not be 
fatal to the validity of meeting decisions. 
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2.7.5 PAO V GREALY [2011] NSWSC 355 (SUPREME COURT OF NEW SOUTH WALES, 
HARRISON ASJ, 4 MAY 2011) 
This case illustrates the difficulty of suing unincorporated associations. The case involved five 
plaintiffs, nominated by letters for anonymity, who alleged sexual abuse at the hands of 
Grealy, a religious brother of the Patrician Order, in 1974, while they were pupils at the 
Patrician Brothers’ Primary School. The issue of interest was that the case was brought not 
only against Grealy, but also against the Trustees of the Roman Catholic Church for the 
Archdiocese of Sydney (the Trustees). This hearing was of an application by the Trustees to 
have the claim against them struck out.  
The plaintiffs alleged that the Trustees operated, managed and controlled the school in 
question, were responsible for the supervision of those who taught at the school, including 
Grealy, were vicariously liable for the acts of Grealy, and had breached a non-delegable duty of 
care to the plaintiffs to exercise reasonable care for their safety. 
However, previous case law on the same issue of liability of the Trustees had established that 
there was no liability to be found: The Trustees of the Roman Catholic Church for the 
Archdiocese of Sydney v Ellis [2007] NSWCA 117. In that case, the Court of Appeal held that as 
an unincorporated association the Trustees could not be sued in their own name at common 
law, as the Trustees did not exist as a juridical entity. Although the Roman Catholic Church 
Trust Property Act 1936 (NSW) (the Act) established a body corporate for each Roman Catholic 
diocese in New South Wales, which for Sydney was called by the same name as the defendant 
in this case, that corporation dealt only with church property matters. 
The appointment, management and removal of priests are not matters for this corporation to 
deal with, but rather one for Episcopal authority. The evidence showed that the Trustees 
played no role in such matters. The Trustees are agents for the wider church, but nothing in 
the Act made them ‘the universal embodiment’ of the church within the Archdiocese of 
Sydney. The fact that a corporation can be sued does not mean that the Trustees were some 
sort of ‘universal nominal defendant responsive in law to any and every claim for legal redress 
that a person might wish to bring against a Catholic in the Archdiocese’. 
Nor did the Trustees play a role in administering education within the diocese. His Honour 
traced the history of the structure of education administration in the Sydney diocese. Both the 
Catholic Education Office (CEO), and the Catholic Building and Finance Commission (CBFC) are 
responsible for the administration and financial management of schools. Both of these entities 
are unincorporated associations, and both played a ‘considerable role’ in the operation of the 
Patrician Brothers’ school at the centre of this case.   
His Honour took the view that the relationships between the unincorporated associations in 
the case and the Archdiocese were problematical and needed to be examined further at trial.  
Were the CEO and the CBFC operating as agents of the Archdiocese Trustees? His Honour felt 
that evidence might be adduced that there was some relationship that ‘implicated’ the 
Trustees in the operation of the school in question. In those circumstances, the plaintiffs’ case 
was not necessarily hopeless, and the trial should proceed. 
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This case may be viewed at: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/nsw/NSWSC/2011/355.html 
Implications of this case 
The issue of unincorporated associations can be considered contentious in Australia. The 
unincorporated association is not traditionally regarded as a legal entity with rights and 
obligations.  In effect, unincorporated associations do not exist in law.  This is clearly a problem 
when unincorporated associations do in fact ‘exist’ in the eyes of the public and have 
members, bank accounts and perhaps other assets, and conduct activities which have real 
effects and real civic value.  
There is no basis for a member to bring an action against an unincorporated association unless 
some trust or proprietary right can be shown. In showing a true proprietary right, the 
existential problem of whether an unincorporated association is ‘real’ in any legal sense is 
again an obstacle. An unincorporated association, which is not a legal entity under common 
law, cannot hold property in its own name. Therefore, a member could not participate in the 
rights attached to that property, and so there could never be a proprietary right 
demonstrated.   
However, the test for showing a proprietary right is rather flexible in Australia. It is whether a 
member derives a tangible or intangible benefit from being a member of the association in 
question. Tangible benefits can include the right to use and enjoy an association’s social 
facilities, playing fields or equipment. Intangible benefits might apply to an association which 
has no actual facilities or equipment, such as a book club conducted in members’ homes, or an 
environmental group which conducts all its activities ‘on-site’ at contested areas. Benefits 
which are merely collateral, however, may not be sufficient. 
 
2.7.6   STEER V RETURNED & SERVICES LEAGUE OF AUSTRALIA (QUEENSLAND 
BRANCH) BEERWAH/PEACHESTER SUB BRANCH INC. [2011] QSC 91 (SUPREME 
COURT OF QUEENSLAND, BODDICE J, 29 APRIL2011) 
This case concerned meeting procedure in an incorporated association. The respondent is an 
association incorporated under the Associations Incorporation Act 1981 (Qld) (the Act), and is a 
sub-branch of the Returned & Services League of Australia (Queensland Branch) (the RSL). The 
applicant is a member of the association. He sought declarations under section 72 of the Act 
that a particular resolution passed at a general meeting of the association was invalid. 
The resolution in question concerned the termination of a lease to another club, the Beerwah 
RSL Citizens Memorial Club Inc. (the memorial Club). The grounds for relief were: 
 That the resolution was not made with the requisite notice of meeting; 
 That the resolution was put to the meeting without the applicant being given an 
opportunity to speak against the motion (this ground was abandoned later); 
 That the resolution was not authorised by prior resolution of the RSL; 
 That the resolution was in breach of the contract between the applicant and the 
respondent association. 
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The association has a constitution which provides for various powers to enter into contracts 
and deal with property subject to RSL approval. The association, which has 136 members, 
formed the Memorial Club, which has 3,500 members. The association leased premises to the 
Memorial Club. At its regular monthly general meeting of 28 November 2010, the association 
resolved to terminate the lease with the Memorial Club. The background to this termination 
was a dispute about membership of the Memorial Club’s management committee. After the 
meeting, a settlement was reached between the association and the Memorial Club 
acknowledging the termination of the lease as valid. No legal issue arose from the termination 
of the lease. 
The applicant was present at the meeting of 28 November 2010, but received no notice of the 
meeting prior to the meeting, and no notice that the question of the lease was on the agenda 
for the meeting. Was the resolution valid despite these omissions? 
His Honour commented that the rules of an incorporated association constitute a contract 
between members and the association: section 71 of the Act. Therefore, the court could 
adjudicate on any decision made under the rules of an association where that decision 
deprived the member of a right. The evidence was clear that there was no notice of the 
meeting held on 28 November 2010, apart from a notice placed in the local newspaper. This 
was a breach of the rules of the association. His Honour found that this was an irregularity, and 
that pursuant to section 133 of the Act, the irregularity could be waived. This meant that the 
resolution passed concerning the termination of the lease was valid.  
In addition, His Honour held that it did not follow that notice was required of the proposed 
resolution concerning the termination of the lease. The rules provided that business could be 
transacted from the floor of the meeting, so that there was no need for prior notice of the 
particular resolution about the lease. 
As to prior RSL approval, the RSL’s State Rules only required prior resolution of the RSL before 
a sub-branch undertakes to ‘purchase, sell, lease, mortgage, charge, exchange or otherwise 
acquire or dispose of any real property’. The State Rules did not require prior approval for 
termination of an existing lease, which was a matter of day-to-day administration within the 
authority of the management of a sub-branch. Therefore, there was no breach of the RSL’s 
State Rules by failing to obtain prior approval for the termination of the lease. 
The finding that the meeting procedure omissions were irregularities meant that there had 
been no interference with applicant’s proprietary rights or interest in the club. The Memorial 
club had no issue with the termination of the lease, and the court would ‘not lightly interfere 
in contentions or quarrels of voluntary associations’. Therefore, the application was dismissed. 
This case may be viewed at: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/qld/QSC/2011/91.html  
Implications of this case 
Each state has its own Associations Incorporation Act. However, a court has jurisdiction to give 
directions as to the performance and observance of the rules of an association or may declare 
and enforce rights and obligations of members as between members, and as between the 
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association and members. This jurisdiction is discretionary, and the traditional position, 
illustrated in this case, is that courts will not generally interfere in the internal affairs of a 
voluntary association, whether unincorporated or incorporated: see Cameron v Hogan (1934) 
51 CLR 358 at 384; Kovacic v Australian Karting Association (Qld) Inc [2008] QSC 344 at [26]–
[28].  
 
2.8 TAXATION 
2.8.1  BARGWANNA V COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION (NO. 3) [2011] FCAFC 18 
(FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA, FULL COURT, DOWSETT, KENNY AND 
MIDDLETON JJ, 17 FEBRUARY 2011) 
NOTE:  the High Court has granted the Commissioner of Taxation special leave to 
appeal in this case: [2011] HCATrans 211 (12 August 2011). 
The Full Court had previously allowed an appeal in this matter on 8 October 2010: Bargwanna 
v Commissioner of Taxation [2010] FCAFC 126 (the October 2010 appeal).6 Part of that 
judgement was that the matter should be remitted to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal for 
rehearing. This subsequent appeal was to substitute that ruling with one which would affirm 
the original decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal. As the orders had not been 
entered from the October appeal, this was possible. Although their Honours did not agree to 
the affirmation of the Tribunal’s decision, they accepted that the rehearing on remittal should 
be limited to the particular question of ‘whether or not the Fund, as a whole, was being 
applied to the relevant charitable purpose’. 
The appellants, Mr and Mrs Bargwanna, are the trustees of the Kalos Metron Charitable Trust 
(the Fund). The Fund was established on 14 October 1997, with Mrs Bargwanna as settlor. In 
the original decision of the Commissioner of Taxation (the Commissioner), tax exemption of 
the income of the Fund was denied for the years 2000 to 2007. 
Section 50-1 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) (the 1997 Act) provides that the 
ordinary and statutory income of certain charitable and other entities is exempt from income 
tax. Some of the exempt entities are set out in section 50-5, and include charitable institutions, 
religious institutions, scientific institutions, public educational institutions, and certain funds 
established for public charitable purposes. 
The objects of the trust were accepted as charitable and for the public benefit. However, the 
Commissioner denied that the trust was a nonprofit entity, and that it was applied for the 
purposes for which it was established. As to the first issue, the Commissioner took the view 
that the trust deed did not contain acceptable clauses which prevented the distribution of 
profits or assets for non-charitable purposes. The second issue arose because the income of 
the trust had been accumulated over the period of 2002 and 2003 and had not been applied 
for any of its stated purposes since 1997. 
                                                          
6
 See case note at 
https://wiki.qut.edu.au/display/CPNS/Bargwanna+%28Trustee%29+v+Commissioner+of+Taxation. 
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Thus, the Commissioner’s position was that the trust did not satisfy the requirements of 
section 50-5. This was determinative of its taxation status. The trust also did not satisfy 
sections 50-52 or 50-60 in that it did not incur its expenditure solely in Australia, was not a 
deductible gift recipient, and did not distribute its income solely to charities in Australia. These 
latter issues did not need to be pursued in the light of the trust’s failure under section 50-5. 
The Commissioner refused to review his original decision citing the failure to distribute to 
charities in the relevant years. He stated that, although ‘accumulation is acceptable…a 
substantial part of the income is still required to be distributed’. An objection was lodged to 
this decision. The Commissioner disallowed the objection, but on different grounds (the 
disallowance decision). 
The disallowance decision stated that for a fund to be endorsed as a Tax Concession Charity, 
the conditions in section 50-110 of the 1997 Act had to be met. These are that it has an ABN, 
meets the requirements of Item 1.5B of section 50-5 of the 1997 Act, and fulfils the special 
conditions of sections 50-52 and 50-60 of the 1997 Act. The Fund had an ABN, and met the 
first two sub-requirements of the second condition in that the Fund was a nonprofit entity, 
and was established for public charitable purposes. However, the Commissioner found that 
the Fund did not meet the condition that its sole purpose be charitable in nature. The 
Commissioner found that the purposes were commercial purposes; the commercial nature of 
the services conducted by the Fund were a business concern in their own right, and therefore 
prohibited the Fund from being a charitable fund. Once again, this was said to be 
determinative of the taxation status of the Fund, and the requirements of sections 50-52 and 
50-60 did not need to be considered. 
On appeal to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the Tribunal), after an exhaustive 
consideration of the evidence, the Tribunal found that the Commissioner’s decision should be 
set aside and that the Fund should be endorsed as tax exempt with effect from 1 July 2000. 
This decision was appealed to the Federal Court. The decision at first instance was that the 
Fund’s income had been misapplied, or not applied for its stated charitable purposes. 
The grounds for the October 2010 appeal were that the judge at first instance erred in holding 
that the Fund’s income had been misapplied, or not applied for the purposes for which it was 
established. Their Honours agreed with the trial judge that the decision of the Tribunal should 
be set aside, but for different reasons. They allowed the appeal so that the matter could be 
heard again in the Tribunal. 
In this application, their Honours rejected the Commissioner’s contention that any remittal to 
the Tribunal should be a complete rehearing. They accepted that the reconsideration should 
be limited, saying: 
…it would be appropriate to limit the Tribunal’s task to reconsideration upon the basis 
of the evidence previously before the Tribunal.  As the appellants noted, even if 
ultimately successful in respect of the 2000–2007 years, it would remain open to the 
respondent to revoke the fund’s endorsement [as a charity] in respect of any period 
after 2007… 
  
WORKING PAPER No 55      74 
 
Their Honours also rejected the Commissioner’s submission that the Tribunal rehearing the 
case should be differently constituted from the previous Tribunal.  There had been no finding 
of factual error in the appeal, so that there was no impediment to the same Member rehearing 
the case. 
The case may be viewed at: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/FCAFC/2011/18.html  
Implications of this case 
The table in section 50-5 of the 1997 Act distinguishes between various types of exempt 
entities including charitable institutions, and funds established by will or trust deed for public 
charitable purposes.  The majority of the High Court in Commissioner for Taxation v Word 
Investments Ltd (2008) 236 CLR 204 observed that section 50-60 required that a fund 
established for public charitable purposes must be applied for the purposes for which it was 
established. Tax exemption would be lost if this was not the case. The Bargwanna appeal 
looked at the meaning of ‘applied’ in this context – should each individual transaction within 
the fund be looked at or should the application of the fund as a whole be the issue? This issue 
is far from settled. On 12 August 2011, the High Court granted the Commissioner of Taxation 
special leave to appeal in this case, so the issue continues to be one to watch in 2012. 
 
2.8.2  BICYCLE VICTORIA INC V COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION [2011] AATA 444 
(ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL, FORGIE DP, 24 JUNE 2011) 
See case note number 2.1.1 above 
 
2.8.3  COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION V WENTWORTH DISTRICT CAPITAL LIMITED 
[2011] FCAFC 42 (FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA, FULL COURT, EMMETT, 
GILMOUR AND GORDON JJ, 28 MARCH 2011) 
This was an appeal by the Commissioner of Taxation (the Commissioner) against a judgement 
at first instance which held that Wentworth District Capital Limited (Wentworth) was an 
association formed for community service purposes within the meaning of the Income Tax 
Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) (ITAA 1997). If Wentworth were such an association, the whole of 
its income would be exempt from taxation in the relevant taxation years. 
Wentworth was formed to provide banking services in the town of Wentworth in New South 
Wales. This followed the closure of the only remaining banking facilities in the town. The 
nearest bank was then a one hour round trip away. Naturally, this closure was of considerable 
inconvenience to the town's inhabitants, and in their Honours' words had a 'significant, 
negative impact upon the local economy and general prosperity of Wentworth'. 
Local business people decided to form a community bank in the town with the backing of the 
Bendigo Bank Limited (Bendigo). Wentworth was incorporated as a company limited by 
guarantee in January 1999, and opened a banking business in March 1999. Although the bank 
is operated by Bendigo, which has a licence under the Banking Act 1959 (Cth), the bank 
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premises are owned by Wentworth and the staff employed by Wentworth. The bank is thus a 
type of franchise operation with management provided by Bendigo. 
The bank was fitted out as if it were a branch of Bendigo, with corporate colours and uniforms. 
Cheques drawn on the bank bore the Bendigo logo, and an automatic teller machine bearing 
the Bendigo marks was opened in 2005. The bank provided helpful services to the town's 
elderly population, and conducted a school banking program for the town's children. Although 
Wentworth is a nonprofit body, the bank itself began to operate at a profit. 
The Commissioner issued notices of assessment, and disallowed two objections to those 
assessments. The Federal Court at first instance held that the objections should have been 
allowed, and thus found against the Commissioner. In this decision, the Full Court unanimously 
held that the Commissioner's appeal should be dismissed. 
The issue on appeal was whether Wentworth was an association formed for a community 
purpose under Item 2.1 of section 50-10 of the ITAA 1997. The trial judge held that the 
provision of face-to-face banking services for reward could not be a community purpose, but 
that the facilitation of such services could be. It was this distinction that formed the basis of 
the appeal. 
The facts were not in dispute. The appeal turned on the interpretation of the relevant section 
of the ITAA 1997. Section 50-1 of the ITAA 1997 sets out exemptions from the payment of 
income tax. Item 2.1 of section 50-10 exempts a 'society, association or club established for 
community service purposes (except political or lobbying purposes)'. The appeal judges took a 
strict statutory interpretation approach, asking what 'established for community service 
purposes' means. There is no doubt that Wentworth was established, but was it for a 
community service purpose? This question ultimately involved considering Wentworth's main 
or dominant purpose. 
The trial judge had considered the meaning of a community purpose. This was a service which 
provided practical or tangible help. It could not be a service for reward. His Honour said that 
community service purposes included the provision of a community service. His Honour held 
that the purpose of Wentworth was not to provide banking services, but rather to facilitate the 
provision of banking services. This purpose was accomplished through the management 
agreement with Bendigo. 
Their Honours on appeal agreed that this was correct. Thus, although the Commissioner 
argued that the main or dominant purpose of Wentworth was to conduct and manage a 
franchise of the Bendigo Bank, bringing only general and economic benefit to the town of 
Wentworth, this argument was emphatically rejected both at first instance and on appeal. 
Thus, Wentworth was exempt from income tax in the taxation years of 2006 and 2007. 
This case may be viewed at: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/FCAFC/2011/42.html 
Implications of this case 
The Commissioner raised practical issues which would ensue from this decision: the tax 
exempt status of Wentworth may not continue into the future, if another banking operation 
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commences in the town of Wentworth. Thus, a similar body to Wentworth which facilitated 
another banking business in the town would not be tax exempt, and then nor would 
Wentworth. Only the 'first mover' would obtain the tax advantage, to which a competitor 
would not be entitled. Once competition commenced, Wentworth would also cease to be 
exempt from tax.  
But their Honours were not persuaded by this submission, and dismissed it: 
These 'practical difficulties' may be put to one side. An entity's tax status is to be 
addressed in each income year by looking at its activities in that year while at the same 
time it is relevant to look at the objects or purposes for which the body was 
incorporated.... Whether or not [Wentworth] would have tax exempt status in other 
years in which the circumstances are different does not demonstrate that it does not 
have tax exempt status in the years in question. 
 
2.8.4  KRISHNAMURTI AUSTRALIA INC AND COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION [2011] 
AATA 512 (ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL, 25 JULY 2011) 
See case note number 2.1.7 above 
 
2.8.5  MOUNT PRITCHARD & DISTRICT COMMUNITY CLUB V COMMISSIONER OF 
TAXATION [2011] FCAFC 129 (FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA, FULL COURT, 
EDMONDS, MIDDLETON AND JAGOT JJ, 17 OCTOBER 2011) 
This was an application by the Mount Pritchard & District Community Club (the Club) seeking 
declaratory and injunctive relief against assessments for taxation made by the Commissioner 
of Taxation (the Commissioner). The Commissioner had issued assessments for income tax for 
the years ended 30 June 2006 and 30 June 2007, despite having issued a private ruling in 2004 
which indicated that the Club would be exempt from income tax for the years ending 30 June 
2003 through to 30 June 2010. This ruling was made in accordance with Item 9.1(c) of section 
50-54 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) (ITAA 1997). The Club claimed that the 
assessments were invalid under section 170BB of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) 
(ITAA 1936), or under section 357-60 of Schedule 1 of the Taxation Administration Act 1953 
(Cth) (TAA). 
The facts of the case were not in dispute. The Club was established in 1964 to promote 
education, sport and culture in the Municipality of Fairfield and the City of Liverpool (NSW). At 
the time of the private ruling in 2004, the Club supported sub-clubs representing 28 different 
sports, leased and maintained five sporting fields, and operated a fitness centre and other 
sporting facilities. In early 2005, the Commissioner wrote to the Club purporting to withdraw 
the 2004 private ruling pursuant to section 14ZAU of the TAA. 
In April 2006, the Commissioner purported to issue a second ruling relating to the years of 
income ending 30 June 2006 to 30 June 2010. This second ruling stated that the Club was not 
exempt from income tax for those years of income. The Club lodged an objection on 13 June 
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2006, which was disallowed by letter dated 21 December 2006. Subsequently, on 15 May 
2007, the Club lodged a return for the year ended 30 June 2006. The Commissioner issued an 
assessment for tax of $436,691.70 for that year (the 2006 assessment). 
The Club sought a review of the second ruling in the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT). In 
response to this, the Commissioner wrote to the AAT stating that he now considered that the 
second ruling was not authorised by section 14ZAU of the TAA and asking that the proceedings 
be dismissed. The Chief Tax Counsel for the Commissioner then wrote to the Club's tax agent 
stating that although the first ruling was valid at the time it was made, there had been a 
'material change' in the circumstances of the Club which meant that the first ruling was no 
longer binding on the Commissioner. This material change related to a so-called 
'amalgamation' with another club. 
In June 2008, the Club and the Commissioner signed an agreement to the effect that the 
second ruling was set aside. The Club lodged an objection to the 2006 assessment on 7 August 
2009. In the meantime, the Club had lodged its 2007 return which resulted in an assessment of 
$147,996.30 (the 2007 assessment). 
In early 2010, the Commissioner disallowed the objection to the 2006 assessment which 
resulted in the Club applying to the AAT for a review of this decision under Part IVC of the TAA. 
Those proceedings were still pending at the time of this case. For the purposes of that 
application, the Commissioner accepted that the private ruling was valid when it was issued in 
2004, that the ruling had not been validly withdrawn or revised under section 14ZAU of ITAA 
1936 or section 357-60 of Schedule 1 of the TAA, and that the assessments issued for 2006 and 
2007 were inconsistent with the private ruling made in 2004. 
In its reasons dismissing this application, the court held that there was no evidence that the 
assessments were made in actual bad faith or through conscious maladministration. On that 
basis, there was no error in the process of assessment which related to actual jurisdiction of 
the Commissioner to make the assessments. The court found that a private ruling is not 
intended to bind the Commissioner where the factual position in a particular income year 
differs from that on which the ruling was originally based. Both under section 170BB of ITAA 
1936 and section 357-60 of Schedule 1 of the TAA, a private ruling can only bind the 
Commissioner in respect of the arrangement ruled upon, or where the taxpayer relies on the 
ruling by acting in accordance with it. If the arrangements become different in later years, or 
the taxpayer does not act in accordance with the ruling, then the Commissioner is not bound 
by it. 
Had the factual circumstances changed since the private ruling of 2004? No evidence was 
brought forward by either party to these proceedings to determine this issue. It would be a 
matter for the Part IVC proceedings currently before the AAT. Their Honours said: 
It cannot be said, without a factual investigation, that when the assessment is viewed 
alongside the Ruling, the assessment is inconsistent with it and is made in breach of 
s.170BB of the 1936 Tax Act or s.357-60 of Sch 1 of the TAA. It may eventuate, upon an 
adjudication before the AAT, that there has been a relevant change in circumstances, 
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and the Ruling will not be applicable. It cannot now be concluded that the 
Commissioner is bound by the Ruling not to make any assessment under s166 where 
the Commissioner in good faith contends the Ruling does not apply because of a 
relevant change in circumstance. 
The application was dismissed with costs. 
The case may be viewed at: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/FCAFC/2011/129.html  
Implications of this case 
The proceedings before the AAT are based on Part IVC of the TAA. In order to succeed in Part 
IVC proceedings, the taxpayer must show that an assessment is 'excessive': see section 
14ZZK(b)(i) of the TAA. The meaning of 'excessive' in this context is contentious. Does it relate 
only to the size and accuracy of the assessment or to some wider notion of validity? The court 
in this application commented that the Club would be successful in arguing that the 2006 
assessment was excessive if it could show that the private ruling of 2004 should have been 
applied. However, the court focused more on the threshold the Club would need to overcome 
to demonstrate invalidity and jurisdictional error: had the factual circumstances changed? 
 
2.8.6  NORTHERN NSW FOOTBALL LTD V CHIEF COMMISSIONER OF STATE REVENUE 
[2011] NSWCA 51 (COURT OF APPEAL OF NEW SOUTH WALES, ALLSOP P, 
HANDLEY AJA AND GZELL J, 15 MARCH 2011) 
See case note number 2.1.10 above 
 
2.8.7  VAN DUSEN V COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE 136 TC NO. 25 (UNITED 
STATES TAX COURT, MORRISON J, 2 JUNE 2011) 
The petitioner, Van Dusen, incurred unreimbursed expenses while fostering cats on a 
voluntary basis in her private residence. These expenses were for veterinary services, pet 
supplies, cleaning supplies and household utilities. Van Dusen's total claim for expenses 
incurred was $12,068, which she claimed as a charitable contribution deduction in her 2004 
taxation return. 
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue (the Commissioner) denied the deduction on the basis 
that Van Dusen had not rendered services to a qualifying charitable organisation under section 
170(c) of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC), and that she had failed to substantiate the claimed 
expenses under section 170(f)(8) IRC and section 1.170A-13 of the Income Tax Regulations 
(ITR). The Commissioner also contended that the expenses in question had an 
indistinguishable personal component. 
His Honour held that the foster cat expenses qualified as unreimbursed expenditures incident 
to the rendering of services to a charitable organisation, and these services were within 
section 170(c) IRC, even when given in her home. However, some of Van Dusen's expenses 
(costs of pet cremation, costs related to fixing her vacuum cleaner, Bar Association dues and 
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other membership fees, and Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) fees) were disallowed as 
claims because they were insufficiently connected to the fostering of the cats, or could not be 
determined with precision. 
The relevant organisation to which Van Dusen rendered the services was Fix Our Ferals, a 
section 510(c)(3) IRC organisation which specialises in neutering feral (wild) cats, treating them 
for disease, and then returning them to the wild. As a section 510(c)(3) organisation, Fix Our 
Ferals is eligible to receive tax-deductible contributions under section 170(c) IRC. Contributions 
can be of money, or in kind, or be unreimbursed expenses incurred in giving services to the 
charitable organisation. The services themselves are not contributions for this purpose. 
Expenses can be claimed where they are 'incident to the rendition of services': section 1.170A-
1(g) ITR. 
Van Dusen, a lawyer, cared for cats prior to release in her own home, incurring various 
expenses by doing so. This form of cat care was referred to in the case as 'foster care', and the 
cats as 'foster cats'. In addition to caring for cats prior to release to the wild, some cats were 
cared for on a longer term basis with the hope that they would become pets. These foster cats 
were removed to no-kill shelters or adoptive homes after fostering. 
In 2004, Van Dusen had some 70 to 80 cats in her care, of which 7 were her own pets. The cats 
had the run of her home, and took up all of her time outside working hours. Each day she fed, 
cleaned, and looked after the cats, laundered the cats' bedding and sanitized the floors, 
household surfaces, and cages. Her house was so extensively used for cat care that she never 
entertained guests. 
However, not all Van Dusen's cats were attributable to Fix Our Ferals as she obtained cats 
through other organisations, or voluntarily through her own efforts at trapping homeless cats. 
All the fostering arrangements arose informally, even those for Fix Our Ferals. 
The expenses involved in this fostering activity were substantial: veterinary treatments and 
medicines, vaccines, pet food, cat litter, litter boxes, pet dishes, cleaning supplies, electricity 
and water costs related to washing numerous loads of cat bedding and costs of running a 
special ventilation system for her home. Also included in this category of 'foster cat expenses' 
were Van Dusen's membership of Costco, a discount bulk grocery supplier, and costs of fixing a 
wet/dry vacuum cleaner used in cleaning up the house. Both these latter expense claims were 
disallowed by His Honour. 
The expenses themselves were not entirely contentious, but Van Dusen's record keeping was. 
Ultimately, His Honour held that Van Dusen had met the requirements for record keeping 
under section 1.170A-13(a) ITR for amounts of unreimbursed volunteer expenses of less than 
$250. Although she did not have all the necessary records, she had such records as constituted 
substantial compliance with the requirements. Thus, Van Dusen could deduct foster cat 
expenses of less than $250 each. However, Van Dusen could not deduct foster cat expenses of 
more than $250 each because she did not obtain contemporaneous written acknowledgement 
from Fix Our Ferals, as required by section 1.170A-13(f)(0) ITR.  
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The Commissioner contended that Van Dusen was an independent rescue worker whose 
services were unrelated to Fix Our Ferals. As such, her services could not benefit the 
organisation. His Honour rejected that contention. In holding that Van Dusen demonstrated a 
strong connection to Fix Our Ferals, His Honour said: 
In determining whether a taxpayer has provided services to a particular organisation, courts 
consider the strength of the taxpayer's affiliation with the organisation, the organisation's 
ability to initiate or request services from the taxpayer, the organisation's supervision over the 
taxpayer's work, and the taxpayer's accountability to the organization. 
Van Dusen's inability to trace all her cat rescue work to Fix Our Ferals did 'not pose an 
insurmountable bar to deductibility'. In any event, all the other cat organisations she was 
connected with were section 170(c) organisations. 
His Honour found 90 per cent of veterinary expenses, 90 per cent of pet supply expenses, 50 
per cent of cleaning supply expenses and 50 per cent of utility bills were foster cat expenses 
and therefore charitable. 
The case may be viewed at: http://www.ustaxcourt.gov/InOpHistoric/VanDusen.TC.WPD.pdf 
Implications of this case 
This decision is from the United States of America and is of limited judicial value in Australia. It 
does however illustrate the different laws in relation to charitable deductions and charities 
operating in the US jurisdiction. 
 
2.9 TRUSTS AND WILLS 
2.9.1  AUSTRALIAN INCENTIVE PLAN PTY LTD V BABCOCK & BROWN INTERNATIONAL 
PTY LTD (NO. 2) [2011] VSC 43 (SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA, CROFT J, 22 
FEBRUARY 2011) 
The plaintiff was the corporate trustee of the Australian Incentive Trust. It had previously been 
decided to terminate this trust on the liquidation of Babcock & Brown International Pty Ltd, an 
asset management company which collapsed in 2009. The residual beneficiaries of the trust 
were to be charities only. His Honour had reserved his decision on which charities should be 
the residual beneficiaries of the trust. 
Both the trustee and the Attorney-General of Victoria made submissions as to suitable 
charities to be benefited. The question His Honour considered was which party was best 
placed to advise on the charities to be benefited? His Honour took a firm view on the position 
of the Attorney-General as the only competent party to enforce the proper execution of 
charitable trusts. 
Therefore, although the trustee nominated four worthy charities, all based in New South 
Wales, His Honour preferred the nominations of the Attorney-General of Victoria of four 
children’s charities based in Victoria. The Attorney-General nominated Victorian charities 
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because the public benefit of a charitable purpose is normally located within the jurisdiction of 
the court, and the Attorney-General’s power and the court’s jurisdiction to supervise the use 
of charitable funds is limited to Victoria. 
The Attorney-General also indicated that the charities in Victoria had been chosen because 
they carried out valuable charitable work, had a need for further funding and did not have a 
sufficiently high profile to receive enough public financial support.  His Honour accepted all 
these contentions. 
This case may be viewed at: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/vic/VSC/2011/43.html  
Implications of this case 
The supervision of charitable trusts is the role of the Crown in the person of the Attorney-
General.  This is both a protective and advisory role.  A charitable trust must have a public 
interest component. The attorney-general of each state is the only competent party to look 
after the interest of the public in charitable trusts. 
 
2.9.2  CHARTERED SECRETARIES AUSTRALIA LTD V ATTORNEY-GENERAL OF NEW 
SOUTH WALES [2011] NSWSC 1274 (SUPREME COURT OF NEW SOUTH WALES, 
BRYSON AJ, 28 OCTOBER 2011) 
This case concerned a post mortem trust set up by Leonard Watson Chant who died on 22 
December 1979 (the Chant Trust). The residuary of the deceased’s considerable estate was left 
to various charities, one of which was ‘the Institute of Chartered Secretaries and 
Administrators (Australian Division) to set up a Trust to pay scholarships tenable overseas for 
advancement of training in Secretarial and Administrative knowledge to immediate Post-
Graduate candidates of the Institute's examination’.  
The Institute of Chartered Secretaries and Administrators (the Institute) was incorporated by 
Royal Charter in the United Kingdom on 3 November 1902 and still exists, and at the time of 
Mr Chant's death had an Australian Division which carried on its operations here. The 
governing council was located in London and the Australian Division was conducted by 
members of the Institute with the authority and under general control of the governing 
council.  
The plaintiff, known as Chartered Secretaries Australia (CSA) since 3 July 2000, is a company 
limited by guarantee formed in the Australian Capital Territory on 28 April 1986. It has 
changed its name several times. Under a series of arrangements with the Institute the plaintiff 
came to conduct the Institute's Australian affairs and in effect to function as the Institute's 
Australian Division. Members of CSA are also members of the Institute. The relationship is now 
governed by a Delegation Agreement of 27 November 2000 and a Service Agreement of the 
same date. The plaintiff's constitution shows that the continuation of this relationship is 
among the plaintiff's objects. 
When the gift became operable in 2005, after the death of the last of the deceased’s sisters, 
the money was paid to CSA by the executor of the estate.  Clarity relating to who was trustee 
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had been achieved by a Deed of Retirement and Appointment of a New Trustee dated 24 
January 2011.  The Institute retired and CSA was appointed as the trustee of the Chant Trust. 
His Honour said that it is ‘unarguably clear’ that the gift by the deceased to the Institute was a 
valid charitable gift, and that there was a general charitable intention. A trust to pay 
scholarships for advancement of training in Secretarial and Administrative knowledge was a 
trust for educational purposes.  
CSA proposed to alter the trust to pay scholarships for entry:  
a. into the Trustee's postgraduate courses dealing with applied corporate, public 
sector and/or not-for-profit sector governance, and  
b. into any other postgraduate course dealing with applied corporate, public sector 
and/or not-for-profit sector governance whether in Australia or overseas.  
There will not be a limitation to persons who have already completed the plaintiff's 
course, or to persons who have done so in the immediate past, and there will not be a 
limitation to study overseas.’ 
Was this change allowable? His Honour considered the extensive research carried out by CSA 
and said: 
It has not become impossible to administer the trust in accordance with the provisions 
of the will, but there would be marked disadvantages in attempting to do so. There are 
likely to be few graduates who wish to proceed immediately to training of the kind 
referred to: there will be some, and there is a significant risk that an attempt to 
administer the trust would lead to decisions to grant scholarships for study purposes 
which moved further and further away from the training referred to in the will. To pay 
regard of the spirit of the trust requires adopting a method of using trust property in 
which it truly is used, and does not remain unused except in relatively rare instances, 
nor remain accessible only to very small number of post-graduate students. The 
limitations of availability to studies overseas and to immediate post-graduate 
candidates have come to impede practical attainment of the original purposes of the 
trust, having regard to the spirit of the trust. The likelihood is that a candidate would 
see the opportunity to travel overseas for a further post-graduate degree as no more 
than an opportunity to obtain a second post-graduate degree on closely similar but 
not identical subjects. There would be candidates who wished to do this, and there 
would be candidates who would benefit from the opportunity, but the limitation to 
those would not tend to promote good and effective use of the trust assets or 
attainment of the objects of the trust, except in very few cases... I have concluded that 
in the circumstances of the present the original purposes have ceased to provide a 
suitable and effective method of using the trust property, having regard to the spirit of 
the trust...The trust property should be applied cy pres in accordance with the scheme 
put forward by the plaintiff....  
The Attorney-General did not oppose the scheme in its final form, though he had concerns 
relating to costs arising from the amount of research done by CSA in putting forward its 
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proposal for change.  His Honour was not perturbed by these submissions. Therefore, pursuant 
to section 9 of the Charitable Trusts Act 1993 (NSW) His Honour held that the original purposes 
of the Chant Trust had, since they were laid down, ceased to provide a suitable and effective 
method of using the trust property, having regard to the spirit of the trust. The change to the 
trust should therefore be allowed. 
The case may be viewed at: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/nsw/NSWSC/2011/1274.html 
Implications of this case 
This is another example of a cy près application relating to a charitable gift. In New South 
Wales, sections 9 and 10 of the Charitable Trusts Act 1993 (NSW) deal with this issue.  As His 
Honour noted in this decision, the grounds for a cy près application have been considerably 
widened over time.  It is no longer necessary that the purposes of the gift have become 
impossible. Rather the basis for a successful cy près application is now that ‘the original 
purposes, wholly or in part, have since they were laid down ceased to provide a suitable and 
effective method of using the trust property, having regard to the spirit of the trust.’ 
 
2.9.3  CHINACHEM CHARITABLE FOUNDATION LTD V CHAN (CACV 62/2010 AND CACV 
101/2010) (COURT OF APPEAL OF THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG 
SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION, ROGERS, LE PICHON AND KWAN JJA, 14 
FEBRUARY 2011) 
This was an appeal from the judgement of Lam J given on 2 February 2010. The case concerned 
the estate of Nina Wang (Wang), chair of the Chinachem Group. Lam J had found that a 2006 
will made in favour of the defendant Chan was a forgery, and that an earlier 2002 will, leaving 
the estate to the Chinachem Charitable Foundation Ltd (the Foundation) was valid. The 
amount in question was $HK12 billion. 
The background to the case was that the private Chinachem Group was built up over time by 
Wang and her late husband, Teddy Wang (Teddy). Teddy had been kidnapped twice, once in 
1983, and again in 1990. After the 1990 kidnapping, he was never seen again. Teddy's father 
had him declared dead in 1999, which resulted in a long legal battle over his will. Ultimately, 
after two findings that his will favouring Wang was forged, and Wang's arrest for fraud, Wang 
succeeded in having Teddy's will in her favour declared valid in 2005.  
Wang executed a will in 2002 which was agreed valid. This will left almost the entire estate to 
the Foundation, a charitable body established by Wang and Teddy in 1988. The will also 
provided for Teddy's family members, and for Chinachem staff. Wang was diagnosed with 
terminal cancer in 2004, and died on 3 April 2007. 
This dispute arose because another will emerged, dated 2006, which left Wang's estate to the 
defendant, Chan. Chan, a feng shui practitioner, had been hired by Wang in 1992 to find the 
remains of her husband, using traditional Chinese methods. Chan subsequently became 
Wang's lover, and received very substantial sums from her, in the vicinity of $HK2 billion, for 
both feng shui services and investment in his companies. 
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The Court of Appeal found no error on the part of the judge below, and agreed that on the 
evidence, particularly as to signatures, which had been thoroughly canvassed by Lam J, the 
2006 will was a forgery. The Court of Appeal was uncompromising in its finding: 
...this court has no hesitation in dismissing this appeal. The first defendant has 
persisted in pursuing a thoroughly dishonest case. In doing so, he has abused the 
process of the court. 
Despite the finding in the court below, and Chan's subsequent arrest for forgery, and the 
strong words of the appeal court, it is possible that Chan may appeal further. 
This case may be viewed at: 
http://legalref.judiciary.gov.hk/lrs/common/ju/ju_frame.jsp?DIS=75149 
Implications of this case 
This is a case from Hong Kong and so has only limited importance for Australian law. However, 
the case again illustrates the battle that can emerge when there are competing wills. It is 
essential that will-making be a formal process so that wills can be identified as valid without 
legal process. In this case, considerable evidence had to be taken to establish that the later will 
was a forgery. Despite Wang's history, she was a generous philanthropist, and her charity has 
benefited from this finding, as, no doubt, was her intention. 
 
2.9.4  CONGREGATION OF THE RELIGIOUS SISTERS OF CHARITY OF AUSTRALIA V 
THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL IN AND FOR THE STATE OF QUEENSLAND [2011] QSC 
100 (SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND, MARTIN J, 5 MAY 2011) 
This was an application for a cy près scheme relating to a charitable trust. The first applicant, 
the Congregation of the Religious Sisters of Charity of Australia (the Congregation) is a body 
corporate formed by letters patent issued in 1936 under the Religious, Educational, and 
Charitable Institutions Act 1861 (Qld). The Congregation is a group of Roman Catholic women 
who serve the community in various apostolic ministries in eastern Australia. The Congregation 
is committed particularly to service of the poor and disadvantaged. Until last year the 
Congregation was the trustee of the Bedford Trust.  
The Congregation has for some time been experiencing a decline in membership and that led 
to circumstances which caused the Congregation to be replaced by the third applicant (St 
Vincent's Healthcare Limited) as trustee as from 1 July 2009. However, delays not relevant to 
this application have meant title had not yet passed to the third applicant at the time of this 
hearing.  
The company structure used by the Congregation is as follows:  
 St Vincent's Healthcare Limited (the trustee) is a company limited by guarantee; 
 St Vincent's Health Australia Limited (the holding company) is also a company limited 
by guarantee, and is the holding company for the trustee; and 
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 St Vincent's Health and Aged Care Limited is a company limited by guaranteed and is 
the operating company. 
All three companies are under the control of the Mary Aikenhead Ministries, which is the 
'public juridic person' for the purposes of Canon Law. A public juridic person in Canon Law is a 
legal entity which allows a ministry to function in the name of the Catholic Church. The 
relevant Canon Law was made by the Holy See on 25 April 2008 and created the Mary 
Aikenhead Ministries as the body which is to carry on the ministries and traditions of the 
Congregation in the absence of actual Congregation members. 
The Attorney-General was a party to the proceedings in his role as the protector of charities, 
and of trust property used for public purposes.  
The history of the trust 
In February 1952 Mary Josephine Bedford made a gift of land in Kangaroo Point, Brisbane to 
the Congregation of the Religious Sisters of Charity of Australia upon trust for the building of a 
hospice for the 'sick and dying who are poor' to be called Mount Olivet Hospice (the Bedford 
Trust). The land was settled on trust for the Congregation on terms which included: 
(a) that the said congregation shall establish and maintain in perpetuity on the said 
land a Hospice for the sick and the dying who are also poor to commemorate the life 
and work of Dr Lillian Cooper and to be known as the Mount Olivetti (sic) Hospice ... 
(b) that the said land shall never be sold or exchanged by the said congregation ... 
No funds were transferred when the trust was settled, and the Congregation became 
responsible for meeting the costs of both building and operating the hospice on the land which 
had been donated by Miss Bedford. The Hospice was opened in 1957, together with a convent 
and a chapel. Since that time, the Hospice has been expanded to two other areas of adjoining 
land. The site now also accommodates the Marycrest Retirement Centre and the Lillian Cooper 
Nursing home, both operated by Caritas Care. 
The evidence established that the terms of the trust were not presently being fulfilled in two 
substantial respects. First, the Mount Olivet Hospital now does not only provide palliative care 
but also general care. Secondly, admission is not restricted to those who are 'poor'. Further, 
the name 'Mount Olivet' is no longer given to the entire hospital; it was renamed 'St Vincent's 
Hospital Brisbane' in 2009. The name 'Mount Olivet' is given to the specialist palliative care 
unit within that hospital. 
At the time of its creation, the trust was clearly a charitable trust, as it was for the relief of 
poverty or for purposes beneficial to the community. However, could its original purposes now 
be carried out? Dealing with a cy près application is provided for in sections 105 and 106 of the 
Trusts Act 1973 (Qld) (the Act). Section 105 of the Act liberalises the law which previously 
applied to charitable trusts. Under that section it is no longer necessary to establish that actual 
compliance with the original terms of the trust is impossible. It is now sufficient that an 
applicant demonstrate that the original terms of the trust have ceased to provide a suitable 
and effective method of using the trust property.  
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In relation to provision of hospice care to the 'poor', the applicants submitted that this was 
now a financial impossibility because of: 
 the requirements of the Medicare Agreement: the Medicare Agreement binds public 
hospitals to provide for all persons regardless of their means. Many such persons could 
not be classified as 'poor'; 
 the hospital as a whole could not just provide palliative care as that would be unviable: 
palliative care is very expensive; and 
 there is no unsatisfied demand for palliative care at the Mt Olivet Hospice, so all 
hospital beds are not required for this type of care, and could be available for general 
hospital care. 
His Honour was satisfied that the circumstances described fell within section 105 of the Act, 
especially paragraphs 105(1)(d) (the class of persons to be served has ceased to be relevant), 
and 105(1)(e)(iii) (the original purposes have ceased to provide a suitable vehicle for the trust 
property). That being so, he approved the proposed cy près scheme which provided inter alia: 
The purposes of the Bedford Trust are to use the Trust property for the purposes of 
providing care for the sick or the dying. In fulfilling these purposes the Trustee:  
(a) Is entitled to conduct a health service on the Trust Property, including but 
not limited to providing hospital services, medical care, and providing services 
by means of inpatient and outpatient services or such other services as from 
time to time may be appropriate to carry out the purposes of the Trust;  
(b) Must ensure that palliative care services continue to be made available 
from at least one unit in the facilities on and adjoining the Trust Property. Beds 
in that unit need only be made available to patients with a demonstrable 
clinical need for palliative care as inpatients rather than in their own homes or 
other places or residence. The number of beds in that unit available for 
palliative care may be reduced for any period during which the government 
funding for palliative care and any profits generated in the use of the Trust 
Property other than for palliative care are insufficient to make providing all of 
the beds for the palliative care viable. The number of beds may not be reduced 
by more than the number of beds for which it is unviable to provide palliative 
care;  
(c) Must ensure that the name 'Mt Olivet' continues to be used in conjunction 
with the provision of palliative care services to the dying from facilities on and 
adjoining the Trust Property;  
(d) Acknowledges that service of the poor is an essential element of the 
mission of the Congregation, the Trustee and all facilities under the control of 
Mary Aikenhead Ministries and that accordingly provision of services on and 
adjoining the Trust Property will be delivered with continuing concern for 
service of the poor;  
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(e) Must ensure that the Trustee, and any entity providing the health services 
from facilities on and adjoining the Trust Property, will continue to 
commemorate the life and work of Dr Lillian Cooper; and  
(f) Will permit members of the Congregation to continue to reside in the 
convent that is located partly on the Trust Property, without paying any rent to 
the Trustee. 
His Honour also corrected the technical breaches of trust which had resulted from the slow 
transfer of the trust property to the new trustee. 
The case may be viewed at: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/qld/QSC/2011/100.html 
Implications of this case 
The elements of s 105 which were of particular relevance to the issues raised in this 
application were: 
(a) Section 105(1)(d) - 'original purposes were laid down by reference to ... a class of 
persons ... which has for any reason since ceased to be suitable, regard being had to 
the spirit of the trust, or to be practical in administering that trust';  
(b) Section 105(1)(e)(iii) - 'original purposes ... have ... ceased to provide a suitable and 
effective method of using the property available by virtue of the trust, regard being 
had to the spirit of the trust ...'. 
In both those subsections, reference is made to the 'spirit of the trust'. That term refers to the 
basic intention underlying the gift in so far as it can be ascertained from the terms of the 
relevant instrument. Charitable trustees should be aware of the cy-près process and avail 
themselves of it in appropriate circumstances. 
 
2.9.5  HEGARTY, RE [2011] NSWSC 1194 (SUPREME COURT OF NEW SOUTH WALES, 
GZELL J, 21 SEPTEMBER 2011) 
Hegarty was the executor of the will of Barbara Anne Pollack who died in October 2010. This 
was an application for advice on the proper construction of the will under section 63 of the 
Trustee Act 1925 (NSW) (the Act). 
The will left $30,000 on trust to support a payment of $2000 per year to a friend of the 
deceased, for the support of the deceased’s pets after her death. After the pets died, the 
balance of the trust moneys was to be paid to the RSPCA (NSW). If there were no pets at the 
time of her death, the money was to be paid as a gift to the RSPCA (NSW). The residue of the 
estate was divided between four charities, the Guide Dogs Association of New South Wales, 
the Royal Blind Society of New South Wales, the Christian Blind Mission International and the 
Christian Children’s Fund. 
The deceased died owning four pets, a dog, two cats, and a budgerigar. However, the friend 
appointed in the will declined to care for the pets. As the testatrix did not provide for this 
eventuality in her will, Hegarty surrendered the animals to the RSPCA. 
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Was there in fact a trust of $30,000 created by the will? His Honour held that the relevant 
clause in the will set up a trust for a purpose, being the care and maintenance of the testatrix’s 
pets. Such a trust is generally void unless it is for a charitable purpose, because it contradicts 
the rule against perpetuities, or the rule that requires a beneficiary who can enforce the trust. 
Trusts must have a definite object, with a beneficiary that the court can recognise. The trust in 
question was for a purpose, and its purpose was not charitable. If the trust had been set up for 
the benefit of animals generally, this would generally be recognised as a charitable object. 
However, the trust was set up for the specific pets of the testatrix. This was a void trust 
because there is no beneficiary to enforce the trust. 
The clause in the deceased’s will was limited to 15 years, and allowed for the addition of any 
income increasing the $30,000 fund, if the animals should have lived so long, so that there was 
no perpetuity involved. However, His Honour found that this issue did not have to be 
considered because the trust failed when the friend named in the will declined to accept the 
responsibility to look after the pets. That being so, the wording of the clause (clause (h)) was 
crucial. The clause had three parts and stated: 
As to the sum of THIRTY THOUSAND DOLLARS ($30,000) to my Trustee UPON TRUST to 
pay thereout of capital as well as income to arise therefrom the sum of TWO 
THOUSAND DOLLARS ($2,000) per annum to KAREN HAYWOOD for the maintenance 
and care of any pets in my possession at the date of my death during the life of my 
said pets as long as she produces the said animals alive to my Trustee or other person 
appointed by my Trustee for that purpose and upon the death of my said animals I 
GIVE the remaining capital together with any unpaid income to THE ROYAL SOCIETY 
FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO ANIMALS NEW SOUTH WALES (RSPCA NSW)  
I DIRECT that the said KAREN HAYWOOD shall have absolute discretion as to the 
welfare of my said pets either caring for them personally or arranging for their care 
through an appropriate facility.  
IN THE EVENT THAT I have no pets in my possession at the date of my death then I 
GIVE AND BEQUEATH the said sum of THIRTY THOUSAND DOLLARS ($30,000) to the 
aforementioned Society.  
His Honour held that the three paragraphs of clause (h) read together led to the ‘irresistible 
inference’ that the testatrix set aside $30,000 firstly for the maintenance of her pets, and then 
for the RSPCA.  His Honour said: 
Whether an interest deferred for the period of the prior interest is accelerated on the 
failure or earlier determination of a prior interest will depend on the language of the 
will…If gifts following determination of the prior estate are still contingent there can 
be no acceleration because, being still contingent, one cannot tell whether they will 
take effect. 
Had the failure of the trust accelerated the RSPCA’s interest? The clause referred to ‘upon the 
death of my said animals’. Was this a condition precedent? His Honour held that these words 
did not prevent acceleration of the RSPCA’s interest. It was not a matter of a contingent 
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interest. The trust, which was for a non-charitable purpose, had failed in any event. The RSPCA 
was therefore accelerated upon failure of the trust. His Honour found that the court had 
jurisdiction to effect a gift over (what is left after the trust is determined) if the first gift fails 
from its inception, or fails in the result. 
Therefore, the executor had to pay the money to the RSPCA (NSW). All costs were ordered to 
be paid from the estate. 
This case may be viewed at: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/nsw/NSWSC/2011/1194.html  
Implications of this case 
Trusts cannot be set up for the care of specific animals in Australia. These are non-charitable 
trusts for a purpose, and will be void. The RSPCA (NSW) wished to ensure the gift came to 
them in this case, and their pursuit of the gift was appropriate because the trust as established 
was void, and because there was no cost risk to the RSPCA in pursuing the case. Costs in will 
cases are usually borne by the estate. 
 
2.9.6  MAHER (AS EXECUTOR OF THE WILL OF BRIAN JOSEPH CRANLEY (DECEASED)) 
V ATTORNEY-GENERAL FOR THE STATE OF QUEENSLAND [2011] QSC 61 
(SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND, PHILIPPIDES J, 2 MARCH 2011) 
This case concerned the issue of lapse of a gift in a will. The deceased, Cranley, had made a will 
on 14 March 1979, leaving the whole of his estate to St Vincent’s Orphanage in Nundah, 
Brisbane.  The orphanage was operated by the Corporation of the Trustees of the Order of the 
Sisters of Mercy (the Sisters of Mercy).  Cranley died on 28 April 2010.  At the date of Cranley’s 
death, the Corporation of the Trustees of the Order of the Sisters of Mercy still existed, but St 
Vincent’s Orphanage did not. The orphanage had become the St Vincent’s Home for Children 
in 1935, and Mercy Family Services in early 1992 until the present day. The same premises 
were occupied during these changes, and the changes were an evolution into the current 
entity. 
The applicant, the executor of the deceased’s will, sought to distribute the proceeds of the 
will, some $554,000, to Mercy Family Services as the successor institution to St Vincent’s 
Orphanage.  The Attorney-General took the position that this required court sanction.   
Her Honour stated that the general rule is that where a will-maker has made a gift to a 
charitable body which has ceased to exist at the time of the will-maker’s death, the gift lapses. 
The exceptions to this are: 
1. where the will-maker has a general charitable intention; or 
2. there is another institution which can be considered to be the successor to the named 
charitable body. 
Her Honour agreed that there was a general charitable intention in the relevant clause of the 
will. This was to benefit the religious purposes of the Sisters of Mercy. It was apparent that 
Mercy Family Services operated similar and expanded care and housing services for the 
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Nundah site where the orphanage had previously existed. The deceased’s gift did not lapse, 
but was saved by his intention of gifting his estate to charity. This gift could be effected by 
distributing the gift to the Sisters of Mercy for the charitable purposes of Mercy Family 
Services. 
This case may be viewed at: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/qld/QSC/2011/61.html  
Implications of this case 
This case illustrates the need for constant updating of wills so that gifts in wills can be properly 
directed by an executor. In this case, an old will did not even reflect the correct name of the 
institution at the time of its making, much less at the time of the will-maker’s death. Correct 
naming of charity beneficiaries is often neglected in wills, with subsequent delays and expense 
incurred in sorting out any resultant confusion. It is advisable to check the correct name with 
the institution or entity which is the intended beneficiary. 
 
2.9.7  MATTHEWS V WEAR [2011] NSWSC 1145 (SUPREME COURT OF NEW SOUTH 
WALES, MACREADY J, 20 SEPTEMBER 2011) 
This was a family provision case arising from the will of Phyllis May Marks. The deceased left a 
large number of bequests, including two to charities. This case is one which illustrates the 
effect of family provision rulings on charitable bequests in wills. 
The deceased had an adopted son, who was the plaintiff in these proceedings.  He was left 
$10,000 in the deceased’s will.  However, a nephew of the deceased, who had enjoyed a close 
relationship with the deceased, and had cared for her in her last years, was left $340,000 plus 
a quarter of the residue. The adopted son, who had a difficult relationship with his mother, 
and rarely had contact with her since the age of 17, made a family provision claim for $553,693 
from the estate. The total estate was $668,615; this included an investment unlikely to yield 
any return, in which case, the total estate would be $477,607. 
The plaintiff had standing to make the claim under section 7 of the previous Family Provision 
Act 1982 (NSW), since he was the adopted son of the deceased. In determining the 
appropriate amount, His Honour looked at the circumstances of the plaintiff and of several of 
the other beneficiaries. The plaintiff was 72, had almost no assets, and lived in Housing 
Commission accommodation on a government age pension. He suffered many medical 
problems, some of which needed urgent attention. There was no doubt in these circumstances 
that the plaintiff had a prima facie case for family provision. 
However, the relationship between the plaintiff and the deceased was poor and intermittent 
at best. Case law shows that estrangement or even hostility between a deceased and a 
claimant in family provision cases does not mean that there is no moral obligation to provide 
adequately for a claimant. The causes of the estrangement need to be considered, as well as 
the character and conduct of the claimant. 
In this case, both parties had difficult personalities, and there had been hurtful and 
inappropriate treatment by both the deceased and the plaintiff. His Honour felt that any lack 
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of contact with the deceased by the plaintiff should not affect provision from her will, because 
it had been partly due to the attitude of the deceased, and to the plaintiff’s reduced 
circumstances. 
His Honour reviewed the plaintiff’s claim, which included the provision of a house and 
substantial other assets. While His Honour accepted that the plaintiff was in need of some 
items on his list of claims, the question of the provision of housing was problematical. Was this 
part of the moral duty which has been consistently identified as owing to needy adult 
children? The cases make it clear that there is no rule against including the provision of a home 
as part of this duty, but it is not required. 
In this case, His Honour took the view that the plaintiff already had adequate housing provided 
by the state, and the size of the estate was also a consideration. Moreover, the nephew and 
some of the other beneficiaries were due their bequests for various reasons which His Honour 
canvassed. That being so, the provision of a house was not considered appropriate in this case. 
His Honour awarded $150,000 to the plaintiff. Since the bequests to the nephew and the other 
beneficiaries who had given evidence of their need were not to be disturbed, the increased 
amount of $140,000 for the plaintiff was to be taken from the residue (if any), and then from 
the charities, and finally from the shares of the beneficiaries who had not given evidence of 
need.  
After costs ($109,803), tax and commission payments were taken from the estate, the amount 
remaining was $477,607. An investment which was unlikely to come to fruition because of the 
global financial crisis would add a further amount to this total, bringing it to $688,615. Given 
the size of the bequests which His Honour stated should not be disturbed, this would mean 
that a bequest of $30,000 to two charities would be entirely lost. 
This case may be viewed at: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/nsw/NSWSC/2011/1530.html 
Implications of this case 
Charitable bequests are vulnerable in cases of family provision claims.  Even if there is a distant 
and hostile relationship between a deceased and a claimant, the moral duty component of a 
family provision claim dictates that provision will still be available in almost all cases of a 
claimant who has standing under the Act which applies.  In New South Wales, the old Family 
Provision Act 1982 has now been replaced by provisions within Chapter 3 of the Succession Act 
2006.  Although each state has a different Act relating to family provision, the case law is 
reasonably consistent across all jurisdictions. 
 
2.9.8   PETER PARKINSON V DIABETES AUSTRALIA [2011] NSWSC 1530 (SUPREME 
COURT OF NEW SOUTH WALES, BRYSON JA, 25 NOVEMBER 2011) 
This case concerned a bequest in the will of Noel James Poore. The will appointed Parkinson 
the executor. Probate was obtained on 1 September 2010, and in this application Parkinson 
was seeking guidance on a bequest in the will to a body named in the will as ‘Diabetes 
Australia’.   
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The Diabetes Federation of Australia was formed on 8 September 1976, subsequently being 
renamed the Australian Diabetes Foundation. On 8 November 1988 it was renamed Diabetes 
Australia (the national body) and still has that name. Diabetes Australia is a company limited 
by guarantee, but was licensed at its incorporation to omit the word ‘Limited’ from its name. It 
is a national body which has the objects of research into the prevention, early detection and 
treatment of diabetes. Diabetes Australia has state associations as members, but not all state 
diabetes associations in Australia are members. Almost all its members are associations of 
various kinds. Poore was not a member of any organisation affiliated with the national body 
known as Diabetes Australia. 
The Diabetic Association of New South Wales was established on 15 Oct 1976 but was 
subsequently renamed Diabetes Australia, being associated with the national body. However, 
the New South Wales body resigned from the national body in 2008. On 3 December 2010, the 
New South Wales body was renamed again as the Australian Diabetes Council (the state body). 
Almost all its members are individuals. Poore had some connection with this state body, being 
at the time of his death a concession member. Poore would have received communications 
from the state body, including membership renewal forms at various times, entitled Diabetes 
Australia, with references throughout to DA-NSW or Diabetes Australia-NSW. The website and 
email address include the terms ‘diabetesnsw’. However, the material which Poore would have 
received did not refer directly to the separateness of the national body called Diabetes 
Australia. 
Poore made donations and payments to the state body in most years from 1987 until his 
death. Some of these were gifts to DART, a research trust controlled by the national body. 
However, DART is not the same as either the national or state bodies. 
Both the national and state bodies issue quarterly magazines, both of which Poore would have 
received, and which if carefully read were clearly from different bodies. However, the 
distinction was not necessarily readily apparent to the casual reader. There was little evidence 
of Poore’s personal characteristics, or acuity, and even less of his use of language in relation to 
the bodies in question. 
Evidence was given that the general public had difficulty in distinguishing the two bodies, and 
even that actively involved members of the state body did not realize that it was not the same 
as the national body. Members of staff of the state body often answered the telephone with 
the name ‘Diabetes Australia’ and it is the name prominently displayed on the state body’s 
building on busy Parramatta Road in Sydney. In more formal documents, however, the state 
body always uses its correct name, and that name is readily available for the purposes of 
drafting legal documents such as wills. 
His Honour commented that uncertain names in wills were not uncommon. There are no fixed 
rules of construction applicable to particular words used in wills, but the case law shows that 
courts can look at evidence beyond the context and terms used in the document itself. An 
accurate name in a will creates ‘a strong presumption against any rival who is not the 
possessor of the name mentioned in the will’. 
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In this case there was a clear ambiguity in the name used in the will. His Honour held that the 
test for an ambiguity is that used in the National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to 
Children v Scottish National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children [1915] AC 207. This 
test is: ‘Supposing that there had been no competitor would the description have fitted the 
claimant’. In this case, the description would have fitted either claimant. His Honour said: ‘In 
the background is the important question, what would the testator say if he really did intend 
to give his gift to the person whose exact name he gave?’ 
In this case, there was no evidence of how Poore would have identified one or other of the 
defendants by use of language, but there was evidence of an association between Poore and 
the state body. Did he know that there were two different bodies? His Honour said that: 
He could well have been aware that there were two different societies. The 
information was repeatedly made available to him. It could be understood from the 
quarterly magazines. The full name of the [state body] and also the full name of the 
[national body] were often before him. It could only be a speculation to suppose or act 
on the basis that he did not know that there were two and that each had a name of its 
own. Mr Poore had strong associations with the [state body]. If anything, this suggests 
that he would have had means of knowing its correct name and using it, if he meant to 
refer to it on a serious occasion. 
Therefore, His Honour held that Poore named and meant the national body in his will as the 
recipient of his bequest. 
The case may be viewed at: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/nsw/NSWSC/2011/1530.html 
Implications of this case 
Names of beneficiaries in wills must be stated correctly to avoid just the type of confusion 
which arose in this case. Solicitors drawing up wills should check the correct name with the 
bequest recipient. Alternatively, the correct name for giving bequests may be found on the 
websites of charities. 
 
2.9.9  TOMASEVIC V JOVETIC [2011] VSC 131 (SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA, 
PAGONE J, 8 APRIL 2011) 
This case concerned the affairs of the Serbian Orthodox Church of Wodonga in Victoria. The 
underlying dispute had been going on for some time. A Serbian Orthodox Church and school 
congregation was first established in Wodonga in around 1953. Property was acquired and 
both a hall and a church were subsequently built. In about 1963 a split occurred in the Serbian 
Orthodox Church because of perceived concerns amongst expatriate Serbians of the influence 
which the then communist government might have had upon the affairs of the church.  
The Free Serbian Orthodox Church Diocese of the United States and Canada was established in 
1963. On 31 October 1964 the Free Serbian Orthodox Church Diocese for Australia and New 
Zealand was established at an assembly in Melbourne. The Wodonga congregation was one of 
14 congregations which affiliated with the Free Serbian Orthodox Church Diocese for Australia 
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and New Zealand. That community, however, was slow to accept newer arrivals from the now 
former Yugoslavia into its membership. It seems that from about 1964 there were two parallel, 
but separate and distinct, dioceses in Australia. One was known as the Serbian Orthodox 
Church Diocese of Australia and New Zealand under the jurisdiction of the Serbian Orthodox 
Church in the former Yugoslavia. The other was the Free Serbian Orthodox Church Diocese of 
Australia and New Zealand which was affiliated with the Free Serbian Orthodox Diocese for the 
United States of America and Canada. 
Discussions aimed at removing the divisions between the congregations bean in 1991, at about 
the time that the former Yugoslavia began to disintegrate politically. In April 1991 a document 
was prepared setting out recommendations for reconciliation between the Serbian Orthodox 
Patriarchy and the Serbian Orthodox New Gracanica Archdiocese. A series of events occurred 
between 2009 and 2010 in relation to the two communities of worshipers in Wodonga which, 
according to the plaintiffs, has resulted in a merger of the two churches. At the time, and at 
least until 7 February 2011, Mr Jovetic was a trustee of land held for the benefit of at least one 
of the congregations. On 7 February 2011 the Bishop purported to remove Mr Jovetic as a 
trustee. 
His Honour stated that is was clear that the trusts in question were charitable trusts. The 
question then was, did the plaintiffs lack standing without a fiat from the Attorney-General? 
His Honour said: 
It is clear that there are some cases where the Attorney-General's 'presence' as a party 
is required to proceedings where there is a dispute concerning a charitable trust. The 
necessity for the Attorney-General to be a party depends upon the nature of the 
dispute.... The necessity for the Attorney-General to be a party derives from the role of 
the Attorney-General as the guardian of charities. The Attorney-General also 
represents the Crown and is the legal protector of all persons interested in charity 
funds. As representative of those holding a beneficial interest the role of the Attorney-
General to a proceeding also binds all beneficiaries to the outcome of the proceeding.  
His Honour took the view that on the basis of decided cases, the Attorney-General did need to 
be involved in a matter concerning the identity and dismissal of trustees of a charitable trust, 
and that accordingly he should stay the proceedings. However, the Attorney-General had 
indicated, in response to written submissions from the parties, that there was no need for his 
fiat. In reviewing the cases, His Honour said: 
The legal requirement that only the Attorney-General may bring certain proceedings is 
not removed by the Attorney-General taking the view (rightly or wrongly) that he or 
she need not or will not assume that role. It may be that the appropriate course for 
one or other of the parties to this proceeding ought to have been to join the Attorney-
General as a party 'in some form' for the suit 'to be properly constituted'. 
Leaving aside his doubts as to the plaintiffs' standing, His Honour then considered whether he 
ought to consider the substantive issues. His Honour said that: 'It is plain that anything I might 
now go on to say on the substantive matters would be obiter dicta, and at best, "provisional".' 
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He declined to consider the issues, and ordered a stay of proceedings until the Attorney-
General sought leave to be substituted as plaintiff or until further orders. 
This case may be viewed at: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/vic/VSC/2011/131.html  
Implications of this case 
This case illustrates the role of the Attorney-General in matters concerning charitable trusts. 
His Honour clearly did not agree with the determination of the Acting Victorian Government 
Solicitor in this instance. Stating that the attention of the Acting Victorian Government 
Solicitor was not drawn to the correct authority, His Honour said: 
...the attention of the Attorney-General or the acting Victorian Government Solicitor 
[was not] drawn to the decision in [Num-Hoi, Pon-Yu, Soon-Duc Inc v Num Pon Soon Inc 
[2001] 4 VR 527]. A case involving a dispute about who the trustees are or about 
whether one or more trustee should be removed is different from proceedings 
brought by those who are undoubtedly trustees. Where the trust itself brings a 
proceeding it may more safely be concluded that the presence of the Attorney-General 
is not needed except, of course, that the presence of the Attorney-General as a 
defendant might still be desirable to bind all beneficiaries of the charitable trust. 
Arguably in this case, the trust was not bringing the case, but rather individuals, and it was 
proper that the Attorney-General be involved. 
 
2.9.10  TRUST COMPANY (AUSTRALIA) LTD V ATTORNEY-GENERAL (NSW) [2011] 
NSWSC 323 (SUPREME COURT OF NEW SOUTH WALES, WHITE J, 18 MARCH 
2011) 
The plaintiff is the trustee of a trust established under the will of Caroline Milne Williams in 
1939.  The will directed that the trustee hold on trust property on the George’s River in order 
to convert the property into a convalescent home for children, to be known as the Kyle 
Williams Home. The will directed that furniture and other chattels be gifted to the Home, and 
that the residual of the estate be sold and the proceeds be held for the purchase of 
equipment, renovation, alteration or extension of the Home, and for its maintenance. 
This application was to determine whether the trust established by Williams was a valid 
charitable trust, whether the original purpose of the gift had failed, and what would be a 
suitable cy près scheme or the funds of the trust, having regard to the spirit of the trust. The cy 
près scheme suggested was that the trust property be sold, with the net proceeds to be held 
by the trustees and the net income applied to charitable entities in New South Wales that 
provide care, support and rehabilitation to children suffering from illness or disability, 
including psychiatric and psychological conditions. 
The first question was whether the proposed scheme was justified. His Honour held that it was 
clear that the testatrix had a general charitable intention, and that the trust was a charitable 
trust.  The property had never been used for the purpose specified in the will, and had not 
been opened as a children’s home until 1947, because of the intervening war. From 1947 to 
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1984, the property was leased for no rent to an organisation known as Legacy House, for the 
purpose of a children’s home, as distinct from a children’s convalescent home. 
From 1985 to 2003 the property was let for no rent to the Presbyterian Church of Australia 
(New South Wales). The property was operated by Presbyterian Social Services as a family 
group home for children and young people. This use ceased when the state government 
withdrew funding.  Since 2003 the property has been unoccupied.  Although the trustee 
advertised for expressions of interest, only one organisation, Ronald Macdonald House 
Charities (RMHC), had investigated the possibility of using the property for its purposes. 
However, although the property had possibilities, it was located at some distance from major 
children’s hospitals, and required substantial capital investment to upgrade the property to a 
suitable standard, which RHMC could not afford. 
The trustee currently holds income from the trust of about $1,476,000. This income could be 
used to update the property in a suitable way. However, the property is heritage listed, and 
this imposes limitations on the renovation that could be undertaken. His Honour concluded 
that the purposes of the trust could no longer be carried out, and with the trust evincing a 
general charitable intention, a cy près scheme would be suitable: section 9(1) of the Charitable 
Trusts Act 1993 (NSW). 
His Honour stated that the proposed scheme of selling the property, and applying the income 
to other charities dealing with children was not necessarily the best way of settling the trust 
property.  The plaintiff trustee had requested that the question be settled in the current 
application, but His Honour held that there should be a two-stage application, as is usual in cy 
près cases. 
He was concerned that there had not been sufficient attempt to use the property to provide 
for the convalescence of sick children, within the spirit of the trust. The price range for the sale 
of the property was very large, and there might be a use, not specifically that of the will, that 
could fulfil the trust. His Honour directed that a scheme be settled between the trustee and 
the Attorney-General which could be brought to the court for approval. 
This case may be viewed at: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/nsw/NSWSC/2011/323.html  
Implications of this case 
Cy près applications are not infrequent in trust situations. There must be a general charitable 
intention present for a cy près scheme to proceed. The assets of a trust can then be applied for 
another, perhaps updated, purpose which reflects the original spirit of the trust. 
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2.10 MISCELLANEOUS 
2.10.1  CARBERRY V DRICE AS REPRESENTATIVE OF BRISBANE JUNIOR RUGBY 
UNION (AN UNINCORPORATED BODY) [2011] QSC 16 (SUPREME COURT OF 
QUEENSLAND, WILSON J, 11 JANUARY 2011) 
This case dealt with the extent to which the court will interfere in the internal disciplinary 
processes of an unincorporated body. The applicant, Carberry (C), was excluded from rugby 
grounds for life after punching a volunteer first aid worker at an under-13s game on 1 June 
2003. C's reason for this conduct was that he was upset by what he perceived as a refusal to 
treat his injured son.  
There were five respondents. The first respondent, Drice, was the representative of the 
Brisbane Junior Rugby Union, an unincorporated association at the time of the incident. The 
second respondent was this body after it had been incorporated on 4 February 2004 as the 
Brisbane Junior Rugby Union Inc. The third respondent, the Queensland Junior Rugby Union 
Inc., was an incorporated association. The fourth respondent was the Queensland Rugby Union 
Limited, a company limited by guarantee, to which the third respondent was affiliated. The 
fifth respondents were individuals who comprised an appeals committee of the third 
respondent.  
This case revolved around the pleadings. The respondents sought to strike out the statement 
of claim, and thus the claim as a whole, or at least certain paragraphs of the statement of 
claim. C sought a declaration of deemed admissions, and various other injunctions and 
declarations. 
At the time of the incident and until 20 November 2010, C was an undischarged bankrupt. This 
was a complication in that C held two paid positions as a rugby coach, one of which was as a 
junior rugby coach. Thus, his livelihood may have been affected by the life ban. C also held two 
unpaid positions as a junior rugby coach. The Queensland Junior Rugby Union (QJRU), through 
its Brisbane Junior Rugby Union (BJRU) Competition Committee issued a notice of suspension 
on 2 June 2003, and a show cause notice on 11 June 2003, prior to a hearing scheduled for 12 
June 2003. This hearing was adjourned twice, at the request of C's counsel, eventually being 
rescheduled for 12 February 2004. 
The notices alleged a breach of 'Competition Rule 4 Code of Conduct', and in particular Coach's 
Code point 18 and Parents' Code point 8. C did not appear at the hearing on 12 February 2004, 
and the outcome was that he was excluded for life pursuant to Rule 36.2(vi) of the BJRU 
Competition Rules. C appealed to the QJRU Judiciary Appeals Committee, but when he 
appeared before that Committee in May 2004 submitted that it did have jurisdiction to hear 
the appeal. The Judiciary Appeals Committee agreed, and remitted the matter to the BJRU. 
Ultimately, on 9 August 2005, the appeal to the Appeals Committee of the BJRU was 
terminated on the grounds that C had not brought any appeal before it. 
Her Honour referred to the statement of claim as 'prolix'. C alleged no jurisdiction for the first 
issue of the suspension notice, lack of procedural fairness and various losses in consequence of 
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his allegedly invalid life ban. The respondents contended that the statement of claim did not 
disclose any cause of action. Without a cause of action, there can be no remedy. 
Courts have been traditionally reluctant to intervene in the affairs of voluntary associations in 
Australia: Cameron v Hogan (1934) 51 CLR 358. This has continued to be so except in cases 
relating to breach of contract, an infringement of a proprietary right, or a person's livelihood 
or reputation. When invited by counsel for the respondents to decline to follow the High Court 
in some aspects of this matter, Her Honour said that 'this would indeed be a bold course'. 
After considering various subsidiary issues, Her Honour concluded that C's statement of claim 
was 'embarrassing, and should be struck out'. However, he was granted leave to replead some 
of his claims. In a separate hearing, Carberry v Drice (No. 2) [2011] QSC 19, costs were awarded 
against C for this hearing. 
The case may be viewed at: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/qld/QSC/2011/16.html 
Implications of this case 
This case confirms that courts will not ordinarily interfere with the internal affairs of 
unincorporated voluntary associations, as first established by the High Court in Cameron v 
Hogan in 1934. Nevertheless, it is important for associations to have proper processes in place, 
particularly for disciplinary matters. Any internal disciplinary body must have the requisite 
jurisdiction, and operate with proportionate procedural fairness. 
 
2.10.2  COFFS EX-SERVICES MEMORIAL & SPORTING CLUB LTD V COFFS HARBOUR 
CATHOLIC RECREATION & SPORTING CLUB LTD [2011] ATMO 118 (AUSTRALIAN 
TRADE MARKS OFFICE, ALISON WINDSOR HEARING OFFICER, 24 NOVEMBER 
2011) 
This case dealt with a dispute as to trade marks between two registered clubs in Coffs 
Harbour, New South Wales.  Coffs Harbour Catholic Recreation & Sporting Club Ltd (the 
applicant) applied under the provisions of the Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth) (the Act) to register 
a trade mark on 10 August 2009. The trade mark was ‘Club Coffs’. The trade mark was 
examined as required under section 31 of the Act, and advertised for possible registration in 
the Australian Official Journal of Trade Marks on 10 December 2009.  Coffs Ex-Services 
Memorial & Sporting Club Ltd (the opponent) filed a notice of opposition to registration of the 
trade mark on 5 March 2011. 
The issue arising was possible confusion between the names and logos of the two clubs. The 
applicant started to use the name ‘Club Coffs’ in July 2009.  The opponent had traded under a 
number of names, most recently the ‘C.Ex Group’.  However, it was a long established club in 
Coffs Harbour, popularly, though erroneously, referred to as the Coffs Ex-Services Club. 
Supreme Court proceedings based on sections 52 and 53 (c) and (d) of the then Trade Practices 
Act 1974 (Cth) had previously ensued and been settled by the addition of ‘on West High’ to the 
Club Coffs logo.  It now reads ‘Club Coffs on West High’. Since 17 February 2010 the signage 
and website of the applicant’s club has included a disclaimer stating ‘Club Coffs is not 
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connected with the C.Ex Group or C. Ex Coffs’.  However, opposition to the trade mark 
registration continued, resulting in this hearing. 
The opposition was based on sections 41-43, and 58 of the Act. Section 41 of the Act provides 
a scheme for assessing how much a trade mark is inherently adapted to distinguish the goods 
and services of one person from the similar goods and services of another.  The opponent 
argued that the two words of the proposed trade mark ‘club’ and ‘Coffs’ were not inherently 
adapted to distinguish, but rather were ordinary words which could be used by anyone.  The 
Hearing Officer stated that the trade mark had to be considered as a whole, and not dissected, 
but she nevertheless agreed that the combination of words was not inherently adapted to 
distinguish.  ‘Club’ is a common word with an ordinary meaning, while ‘Coffs’ could have only 
one meaning in Australia, namely, a reference to the town of Coffs Harbour. Thus the name 
‘Club Coffs’ only meant a club in the town of Coffs Harbour. This placed the proposed 
trademark ‘firmly into a category of trade marks [and] other traders are likely, in the ordinary 
course of their businesses and without any improper motive, to desire to use the same mark, 
or some mark nearly resembling it, upon or in connection with their own services’. The order 
of the words did not affect this conclusion.  
The disclaimer added to the name Club Coffs in February 2010 was a significant addition to the 
plain words which had been applied for, and did affect the identity of the proposed trade 
mark.  So too did the words ‘on West High’, and the colours of the logo. The Hearing Officer 
was satisfied that the proposed trade mark and the logo were not substantially the same. The 
trade mark therefore was not adapted to distinguish its services from the opponent’s, and the 
grounds for opposition were made out. 
The Hearing Officer refused to register the trade mark and awarded costs against the 
applicant. 
This case may be viewed at: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/ATMO/2011/118.html  
Implications of this case 
Trademarks are valuable intellectual property for any type of entity in Australia, including 
nonprofits.  Information about the process involved is to be found at IP Australia: see at 
http://www.ipaustralia.gov.au/get-the-right-ip/trade-marks/.  The 'opponent', has three 
months from the date the acceptance of an application for registration of a trade mark was 
advertised in which to object to a trade mark, by filing a Notice of Opposition. The trade mark 
registration process is then temporarily stopped until the merits of the opposition can be 
decided.  Only one of the grounds of opposition needs to be made out, as happened in this 
case. 
It is the opponent's responsibility to make sure its evidence contains sufficient information to 
show why the trade mark should not be registered. In this case, substantial advertising and 
other costs had already been expended in introducing the Club Coffs name, but the name 
could not be registered as a trade mark. 
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2.10.3   HAJRULA AND HAMZA, THE QUEEN ON THE APPLICATION OF V LONDON 
COUNCILS [2011] EWHC 151 (QB) (HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE, QUEEN'S BENCH 
DIVISION, CALVERT-SMITH J, 1 FEBRUARY 2011) 
This was a decision of the Administrative Court of the English High Court of Justice concerning 
services offered by the defendant councils under the London Councils Grants Scheme. Grants 
under the scheme funded services which were provided by charities and organisations set up 
to offer social services of various kinds.  
These services were funded by a levy on the London boroughs and the City of London, 
collectively referred to in the case as 'London Councils' (the councils). A decision had been 
taken by the councils to reduce the levy by nearly 50 per cent. This was to be achieved by 
recategorising and repatriating many of the services to individual boroughs. The individual 
boroughs were then to decide whether they wished to continue to fund the services, or 
perhaps to discontinue them. A further decision of the councils to fix a 2011–12 budget of 
£17.8 million based on the new categorisations was also at issue. These decisions would 
effectively terminate many services and service organisations. 
His Honour quashed the recategorisation decision. He held that the process of recategorisation 
was flawed because it had failed to pay sufficient attention to the councils' Public Sector 
Equality Duties (PSEDs), enshrined in section 71 of the Race Relations Act 1976, section 76A of 
the Sex Discrimination Act 1976 and section 49A of the Disability Discrimination Act 1995 (and 
if it became applicable, section 149 of the Equality Act 2010). The claimants submitted that this 
meant that the budget decision based on the new categorisations must be quashed by the 
court. The defendants countered that the budget decision should stand independently of the 
recategorisation decision. 
His Honour agreed with the councils on the budget issue. He said that although the budget 
decision was tainted by the flawed process of categorisation, and was therefore 'quashable', 
he was reluctant to interfere with budgetary measures because of the practical disadvantages 
of doing so. The defendants already had to do considerable work to rework the services 
decision in line with the PSEDs. Additional work related to budgets was one step too far in this 
matter. His Honour also agreed with the councils that although they must abide by the PSEDs, 
this did not have to be done in any particular way. 
All funding decisions for services made under the new categorisations were quashed, and no 
funding agreements with any organisation commissioned by the London Councils Grants 
Scheme were to be terminated except with the consent of the organisation, or following the 
expiry of the 4 year period of the original commission to the organisation. Therefore, London 
Councils have to reconsider their categorisation of services, including using full Equality Impact 
Assessments, but can do so within the budget already set for such services in 2011–12. 
However, budget revisions could also be applied. 
This case may be viewed at:  
http://www.pierceglynn.co.uk/news/news_docs/Hajrula%20v%20LondonC%20judgment.pdf  
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Implications of this case 
The amount set aside by London Councils for the services in question in this case has been 
reduced from £26 million to £17.8 million in 2011–12. In the following financial year, the 
amount is proposed to be reduced to £9.9 million. Although the charities and other service-
providing organisations were successful in quashing the recategorisation of services by the 
councils, this will not amount to a genuine victory if there is no budget to support continuation 
of services by many charities or voluntary sector groups. It is possible that the budget will be 
increased to allow services to continue, particularly those provided by small voluntary sector 
groups. It is also possible that London Councils will appeal this decision. 
 
2.10.4   HORESH V THE SEPHARDI ASSOCIATION OF VICTORIA [2011] VSC 26 (SUPREME 
COURT OF VICTORIA, ALMOND J, 11 FEBRUARY 2011) 
This case concerned the affairs of the Sephardi Association of Victoria (SAV). In 1990, Albert 
Yehuda (AY) had financed the establishment of a synagogue in St Kilda, Melbourne. The 
synagogue was named in honour of AY's father, Sassoon Yehuda. The naming followed a 
dispute between the parties which was settled by a Settlement Agreement in which the name 
of the synagogue was to be the 'Sassoon Yehuda Synagogue' in perpetuity. However, when the 
synagogue was opened in 1994 it was named the Sassoon Yehuda Sephardi Centre (the 
Centre). 
From 1 July 1993, AY's affairs were administered by State Trustees Ltd (State Trustees) under 
the provisions of the Guardianship and Administration Act 1986 (Vic). In 2002, the SAV began 
an appeal to extend the Centre by building a large hall with various attached facilities. The 
appeal was known as the Sassoon Yehuda Synagogue Extension Appeal, and a brochure was 
produced which included, inter alia, naming rights for the 'entire extension of the Synagogue' 
for a donation of $450,000. Also offered were naming rights for the hall lighting for a donation 
of $125,000. 
The SAV wrote to the State Trustees in November 2006, in its capacity as administrator of AY's 
estate, advising of the hall plan, and offering AY 'first option naming rights for the new annex' 
and 'the naming rights for the new hall'. The brochure was enclosed. In January 2007, State 
Trustees declined the offer. AY died on 4 July 2007, and Horesh (H), a solicitor and AY's 
nephew, was appointed executor of his estate. 
During 2008, H, on behalf of the estate, agreed to forgive the remaining 1990 loan, and 
provide further loans for the SAV extension plan. The amount to be forgiven was $100,000, 
and the certificate of title was to be returned to the estate. Two documents were created. A 
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) provided that 'the estate wishes to protect and 
preserve Albert Yehuda's legacy by obtaining naming rights to the proposed extension...'. The 
MOU also provided that a Naming Rights Agreement would be 'crafted and signed by both 
parties after return of the title to SAV'. 
The second document in issue was a Loan Agreement dated 17 August 2008. This provided for 
an interest free loan of $100,000 to SAV for a period of 10 years. This document stated that 
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'the lender in its capacity as the executor of the estate of Albert Yehuda wants the ground 
floor hall to be named "Albert Sassoon Yehuda Hall"...'. The terms and conditions of the loan 
were stated to be 'in consideration for the name to the hall'.  
Following this, the estate forgave the $100,000 loan from 1990 and provided a new amount of 
$100,000 to the SAV. The hall was completed and was named the 'Albert Sassoon Yehuda Hall'.  
In 2009, a dispute arose when H became aware that the words 'Lyndi and Rodney Adler 
Sephardi Centre' were inscribed over the front entrance to the entire extended premises. H 
alleged that the SAV was thereby in breach of the Settlement Agreement, the MOU and the 
Loan Agreement. H also alleged wilful misrepresentations during negotiations with the SAV as 
to the naming of the synagogue, and unconscionable conduct on the part of the SAV. 
His Honour dealt with each document in turn. In relation to the 1990 Settlement Agreement, 
the naming issue turned on the true meaning of the word 'synagogue'. 'Synagogue' was not 
defined in the Settlement Agreement. The SAV contended that it only referred to the inner 
prayer chamber of the building, and not the whole complex. The original synagogue consisted 
of a prayer hall with a women's section at the back, toilet facilities, a very small kitchen, a 
library and a study room. It was used solely for religious purposes. His Honour, construing the 
document as a reasonable person would, found that the word 'synagogue' referred to the 
whole original building and not just some inner chamber within it. Since the name 'Sassoon 
Yehuda Synagogue' is now displayed prominently inside the original building over the entrance 
to the prayer chamber, His Honour concluded that the signing rights referred to in the 
Settlement Agreement had been complied with. 
Should this name have been applied to the extended premises as a whole? The wording of the 
MOU certainly pointed to the fact that naming rights to the hall extension were expected, and 
a draft 'New Hall Naming Agreement' sent by the SAV to H also made this clear by providing 
that the hall would be known as the 'Albert Sassoon Yehuda Hall'. However, that Agreement 
was not agreed to by H, who wanted a simpler loan and naming agreement drawn up. 
Subsequently, the Loan Agreement was completed. 
The Loan Agreement certainly referred explicitly to the ground floor hall of the new extension 
as an area to be named the 'Albert Sassoon Yehuda Hall'. No other areas were referred to, 
although it is made clear that there was to be new frontage. His Honour concluded that a 
reasonable person would not find that the rights to the new frontage were included in this 
reference. The hall had been named after AY. The new frontage could bear another name. 
Therefore, there was no breach of any agreement as to naming rights. 
Had there been misrepresentation and unconscionable conduct? His Honour concluded that 
these allegations could not be made out. There was no fraud, and the estate had received 
precisely what it had bargained for, which was the naming rights to the new hall. Therefore, 
the plaintiff's claim was dismissed. 
This case may be viewed at: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/vic/VSC/2011/26.html  
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Implications of this case 
Wilful misrepresentation is a serious allegation amounting to deceit. The tort of deceit requires 
actual fraud to be proven, and 'clear and cogent proof' is required. A court would not lightly 
find that a party to a civil action such as this one was guilty of deceit. His Honour found that 
the evidence of misrepresentation presented here was 'noteworthy for its imprecision'. Such 
evidence may not be enough to establish the allegations made. Care to make agreements 
comprehensive and capture the full intentions of the parties is critical to avoiding disputes 
about such matters. 
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3.0 LEGISLATION 
 
3.1 COMMONWEALTH 
The relevant Acts and Regulations in the Commonwealth (federal) jurisdiction include: 
 Corporations Act 2001 
 Corporations (Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander) Act 2006 
 Extension of Charitable Purpose Act 2004 
 Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 
In addition, many other federal laws apply to nonprofit organisations, such as those governing 
employment of staff, anti-discrimination, using digital communication, sending funds overseas 
and being in receipt of government agency funding. 
During 2011 there were no amendments to the Extension of Charitable Purpose Act 2004. 
Amendments were made to both the Corporations Act 2001 and Corporations (Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander) Act 2006.  However, these were either technical in nature, consequential 
to amendments to other Acts, or did not cover issues of importance for most nonprofit 
organisations. 
Legislative changes were made to the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 in respect of issues 
specific to nonprofit organisations relating to Public Ancillary Funds, details of which are set 
out below. 
All Acts and Regulations for the Commonwealth jurisdiction can be found at 
http://www.comlaw.gov.au/  
PUBLIC ANCILLARY FUND AMENDMENTS 
In the May 2010 Budget, the federal government announced that it would improve the 
integrity of Public Ancillary Funds (PUFs) by introducing a new regulatory framework similar to 
that introduced for Private Ancillary Funds (PAFs). Amending legislation was introduced as part 
of Tax Laws Amendment (2011 Measures No 7) Bill 2011. Guidelines were made by legislative 
instrument on 9 December 2011, setting out rules for establishing, operating and winding up a 
PUF, and transitional provisions. Most changes took effect from 1 January 2012.  
The reformed regulatory framework takes much of its shape from that of PAFs. A new section 
426-102 inserted into Schedule 1 of Taxation Administration Act 1953 sets out the elements of 
a trust that is a PUF, including that trustees are constitutional corporations or a Public Trustee. 
The main amendments introduced have the effect that: 
 An ancillary fund is defined as a ‘public ancillary fund’ or ‘private ancillary fund’ in 
Income Tax Assessment Act 1997, section 995-1. And philanthropic trust funds can be 
‘public ancillary funds’ or ‘private ancillary funds’ under Taxation Administration Act 
1953, (Schedule 1 section 426-1); 
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 PUFs are identified as such on the Australian Business Register (Taxation 
Administration Act 1953, Schedule 1 section 426-104); 
 The Minister (Treasurer) must make binding guidelines through legislative instruments 
(Taxation Administration Act 1953, Schedule 1 section 426-103);  
 The Commissioner of Taxation will have power (under Taxation Administration Act 
1953, Schedule 1 section 426-120) to:  
o impose administrative penalties on trustees and directors of trustees who 
breach the guidelines; or 
o suspend or remove trustees for breaches of guidelines.  
The Public Ancillary Fund Guidelines 2011 set out requirements for operation, winding up and 
portability, including: 
o the PUF’s nonprofit nature; 
o minimum annual distribution of 4 per cent of the market value of net assets; 
o annual valuation of assets; 
o accounts; annual financial statements; and audit of financial accounts;  
o annual income tax return; 
o investment strategy and limitations on investing; 
o trustees’ fees and remuneration; 
o inviting the public to donate; and 
o transferring assets to another PUF. 
There are transitional rules about distribution, where a fund’s governing rules are inconsistent 
with the Guidelines, or where a fund holds prohibited investments or has existing borrowings, 
and where a trustee is not a constitutional corporation. 
More analysis of the new regulatory framework is set out below in Special Issues of 2011: 6.3 
Increased Regulation of Public Ancillary Funds, by Alice Macdougall. 
AGED CARE ACT AMENDMENTS 
The Aged Care Act 1997 was amended in 2011 by the Aged Care Amendment Act 2011. The 
amendments relate to the use that can be made of accommodation bonds and complaints 
principles.  
Accommodation bonds 
According to the Explanatory Memorandum accompanying the Amendment Bill, the 
accommodation bonds amendments are intended to:7  
 limit the permitted uses for accommodation bonds (such that providers of aged care 
may use accommodation bonds for capital works, investment in financial products, 
loans for these purposes and refunding accommodation bonds); 
                                                          
7
 Explanatory Memorandum, Aged Care Amendment Bill 2011 (Cth), p 1. 
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 introduce new criminal offences where misuse of accommodation bonds has been 
identified and the approved provider has failed financially, owing accommodation 
bond refunds; 
 introduce new information gathering powers to enable the Secretary of the 
Department of Health and Ageing to better monitor approved providers that may be 
experiencing financial difficulties or using accommodation bonds for non-permitted 
uses; and 
 remove restrictions on the use of income derived from accommodation bonds, 
retention amounts and accommodation charges.  This provides aged care providers 
with greater flexibility in managing their cashflows and assists to offset the restrictions 
proposed in relation to the lump sum element of accommodation bonds.  
New section 9-3B of the Act allows the Department to seek certain information if an aged care 
provider has not refunded an accommodation bond and the Department has concerns e.g. 
that the provider may be having financial difficulties or has used an accommodation bond for a 
purpose that is not permitted under the Act. The Department may now request information 
about various relevant issues, including the provider’s financial situation, its suitability to be an 
aged care provider, the use it has made of accommodation bonds, and the roles and 
responsibilities of key management personnel in relation to the use of accommodation bonds. 
This means the Department may seek financial statements, loan agreements and bank 
statements. 
Other accommodation bond amendments relate to the permitted use of accommodation 
bonds and prudential requirements. In particular, new Subdivision 57-EA (sections 57-17A and 
57-17B) inserts provisions for permitted uses of accommodation bonds and offences for non-
permitted uses. The Explanatory Memorandum describes the changes under section 57-17A as 
reinforc[ing] the policy intent that accommodation bonds are to provide approved 
providers with a source of capital funding for investment in residential and flexible 
aged care infrastructure. They give greater clarity for approved providers about the 
use of accommodation bonds for capital purposes and address uncertainties such as 
the capacity for approved providers to use accommodation bonds for financial 
investment.8 
The offence provisions in section 57-17B make it an offence to use an accommodation bond 
for a non-permitted use. Importantly, not only the provider, but also key personnel9 may be 
charged with an offence. The maximum penalty for the provider is 300 penalty units; for key 
personnel, 2 years imprisonment. 
The accommodation bond amendments commenced on 1 October 2011. 
                                                          
8
 Explanatory Memorandum, Aged Care Amendment Bill 2011 (Cth), p 21. 
9
 Under s 8-3A of the Act, ‘key personnel’ includes persons responsible for executive decisions of the 
entity, including directors and members of the governing body; any person with authority or 
responsibility for planning, directing or controlling activities; any person responsible for the nursing 
services or the day-to-day operations – whether or not the person is employed by the entity. 
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Complaints principles 
Provision for complaints principles (under section 96-1 of the Act), were introduced by 
Schedule 2 of the Amendment Act. New Complaints Principles 2011 were gazetted on 11 
August 2011 and took effect with the amendments to the Act on 1 September 2011. The 
complaints principles replace the former Investigation Principles 2007 (which were part of the 
Aged Care Complaints Investigation Scheme). 
Public consultation and a review of the Aged Care Complaints Investigation Scheme resulted in 
a decision to shift the focus of the scheme away from investigation, to give it ‘a greater focus 
on the care recipient and the achievement of resolution of a complaint and the best outcome 
for the care recipient’.10 The Explanatory Memorandum to the Aged Care Amendment Bill 
2011 states: 
It is intended that the new Complaints Principles (incorporated in the Aged Care 
Principles) will improve the process of handling aged care complaints and increase the 
focus on achieving outcomes for care recipients, their families and other 
representatives. They will enable the Department of Health and Ageing to adopt a 
range of approaches to assist in resolving complaints co-operatively with care 
recipients and providers of aged care (approaches that will include, for example, 
conciliation, mediation and investigation).11 
Under section 94A-1 of the Act, the Complaints Principles may deal with any of the following:  
(a) how complaints and concerns may be received, managed and resolved; 
(b) different ways of receiving, managing and resolving different types of complaints 
and concerns, and complaints and concerns in relation to different *aged care 
services; 
(c) the roles, rights and responsibilities of complainants, approved providers and other 
participants in the scheme; 
(d) considerations relevant to making decisions under the Complaints Principles; 
(e) procedures for the review of decisions and processes under the Complaints 
Principles; 
(f) actions that may be taken (including making requirements of an approved provider) 
to address complaints or concerns.12 
  
                                                          
10
 Explanatory Memorandum, Aged Care Amendment Bill 2011 (Cth), p 28. 
11
 Explanatory Memorandum Aged Care Amendment Bill 2011 (Cth), pp 1–2. 
12
 Aged Care Act 1997 (Cth) s 94-1; see also Department of Health and Ageing, ‘Aged Care Complaints 
Scheme’ website, http://agedcarecomplaints.govspace.gov.au/2011/09/01/the-complaints-principles-
2011-are-now-in-place/. 
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3.2 NEW SOUTH WALES 
The relevant Acts and Regulations in New South Wales are: 
 Associations Incorporation Act 2009  
 Association Incorporation Regulation 2010  
 Charitable Fundraising Act 1991 
 Charitable Fundraising Regulation 2008 
 Charitable Trusts Act 1993 
 Lotteries and Art Unions Act 1901 
 Lotteries and Art Unions Regulation 2007 
During 2011 no material changes were made to the relevant Acts and Regulations. 
All Acts and Regulations for New South Wales can be found at 
http://www.legislation.nsw.gov.au/. 
 
3.3 VICTORIA 
The relevant Acts and Regulations in Victoria are: 
 Associations Incorporation Act 1981 
 Associations Incorporation Amendment Act 2009 
 Associations Incorporation Amendment Act 2010 
 Associations Incorporation Regulations 2009  
 Charities Act 1978 
 Charities Regulations 2005 
 Fundraising Act 1998 
 Fundraising Regulations 2009 
 Gambling Regulation Act 2003 
 Gambling Regulation Regulations 2005 
INCORPORATED ASSOCIATIONS  
In 2012, Victoria will see consideration of the Associations Incorporation Reform Bill 2011 
which will replace the current Associations Incorporation Act 1981, introducing several key 
reforms. The reforms will incorporate deferred changes that had previously been included in 
both the Associations Incorporation Amendment Act 2009 and the Associations Incorporation 
Amendment Act 2010. 
Some of the key reforms that are incorporated in the 2011 Bill include: 
 enhanced governance arrangements for incorporated associations, including a 
codification of legal duties owed by office holders, modelled on directors’ duties found 
in the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth); 
 legislative defences and protections for office holders, including the business judgment 
rule and a statutory right to be indemnified for expenses incurred in good faith; 
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 revised annual reporting requirements, including the introduction of a three-tiered 
reporting structure based on an association’s total revenue (outlined below); 
 repeal of the current limitations on trading activities, whilst maintaining the general 
prohibition on securing pecuniary profit for members; 
 merger of the Public Officer and Secretary role, and removing the current requirement 
that this role be undertaken by a Victorian resident, extending this to a resident of 
Australia; 
 updated provisions on holding general and committee meetings, including permitting 
an association to conduct meetings through the use of technology; 
 greater clarity around an organisation’s obligation to maintain internal documents and 
records, as well as enhanced transparency on a member’s right of access to 
information held by the association; and 
 a number of additional procedural matters that an association must provide for in its 
rules prior to incorporation. 
A new set of Model Rules will accompany the reforms, requiring changes to the Associations 
Incorporation Regulations prior to the reforms coming into operation. 
The Associations Incorporation Reform Bill 2011 is scheduled for debate in early 2012. 
TIERED REPORTING 
One of the most significant of the proposed reforms involves a move from the current 2-tier 
annual reporting framework for incorporated associations to a 3-tier system. If the changes 
proceed unaltered, the level of annual reporting by associations will be contingent on their 
annual revenue.  Tier 1 associations are those with total annual revenue of up to $250,000, 
which will be required to report their financial statements to the Registrar annually.  Tier 2 
associations are those with total revenue above $250,000 but less than $1 million. These will 
no longer be required to produce a formal audit of their accounts, instead, they may have their 
accounts reviewed by an independent accountant holding a current practising certificate.  Tier 
3 associations are those with total revenue of over $1 million.  These associations must have 
their accounts independently audited each year. 
OTHER CHANGES  
The Payroll Tax Act 2007 (Vic) was amended by the State Taxation Acts Further Amendment 
Act 2011. In relation to nonprofit organisations, the Act amends section 48 of the Payroll Tax 
Act with effect from 1 July 2012, in relation to exempt wages of nonprofit organisations. The 
amendment is in response to the High Court’s decision in Commissioner of Taxation v Word 
Investments Ltd (2008) 236 CLR 204, which, the Minister stated in the second reading speech, 
‘had the unintended impact of extending the payroll tax exemption to wages paid for 
commercial activities’. The amendment aims to ensure that nonprofits’ payroll tax exemption 
will not apply to wages paid or payable to employees engaged purely in commercial activities 
of nonprofit organisations.  Section 48(1)(b) of the Act now states that wages are exempt for 
persons ‘engaged exclusively in work of a religious, charitable, benevolent, philanthropic or 
patriotic nature....’ 
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The Explanatory Memorandum states [emphasis added]: 
The new provision restores the long-standing policy position that wages paid or 
payable to employees engaged in the commercial activities of a charity that are 
unrelated to its charitable purposes are not exempt from payroll tax. .... 
This will place non-profit organisations that undertake commercial activities on the 
same level playing field as commercial enterprises, which is consistent with the 
principle of competitive neutrality. 
All Acts and Regulations for Victoria can be found at http://www.legislation.vic.gov.au .  
 
3.4 QUEENSLAND 
The relevant Acts and Regulations in Queensland are: 
 Associations Incorporation Act 1981 
 Associations Incorporation Regulation 1999 
 Collections Act 1966 
 Collections Regulation 2008 
 Charitable Funds Act 1958 
 Charitable and Non-Profit Gaming Act 1999 
During 2011 one notable measure was inserted into the Associations Incorporation Act 1981 to 
allow associations incorporated under this Act to transition seamlessly to the Corporations Act 
2001 (Cth) or the Corporations (Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander) Act 2006 (Cth) (CATSI 
Act).13 Corporations incorporated under the repealed Religious, Educational and Charitable 
Institutions Act 1861 (RECI Act) are also now able to transition to either Commonwealth Act, 
while still retaining their legal status under the RECI Act. This means that an association can 
incorporate as a company limited by guarantee or a CATSI corporation without having to 
transfer its existing assets and membership to the new entity and then wind up the 
association.  It also avoids potentially having to pay transfer duty and capital gains tax.  
The chief executive (Office of Fair Trading) or the Minister (for associations under the 
Associations Incorporation Act 1981 and the RECI Act 1861) needs to authorise the transfer; 
then, upon receiving the authority, the association applies to register as a corporation under 
the Commonwealth Corporations Act or the CATSI Act. 
This amendment brings Queensland into line with most other states and territories with 
respect to associations being able to transfer easily to the Commonwealth corporations 
regime. 
There were no other material changes to the relevant Acts and Regulations in Queensland.  
However, a review of the Associations Incorporation Act 1981 and the Associations 
                                                          
13
 Civil Proceedings Act 2011 (Qld) s 1, Pt 32, Div 1. The date of assent was 6 December 2011 and the Act 
commenced on the date of assent. 
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Incorporation Regulation 1999 is still in progress. This review has been principally considering 
dispute resolution and governance provisions.14 
All Queensland Acts and Regulations can be found at 
http://www.legislation.qld.gov.au/Acts_SLs/Acts_SL.htm 
 
3.5 WESTERN AUSTRALIA 
The relevant Acts and Regulations in Western Australia are:  
 Associations Incorporation Act 1987 
 Associations Incorporation Regulations 1998  
 Charitable Collections Act 1946 
 Charitable Trusts Act 1962 
 Gaming and Wagering Commission Act 1987 
 Gaming And Wagering Commission Regulations1988 
 Street Collections (Regulation) Act 1940 
 Street Collections Regulations 1999 
During 2011, the only material change to the relevant Acts and Regulations was in relation to 
the Charitable Trusts Act 1962, inserting a new Part VA.15 The Act now allows the trust 
instruments of ‘prescribed trusts’ to contain a power for trustees to give to ‘eligible recipients’. 
‘Prescribed trusts’ are existing and future Private Ancillary Funds (PAFs) and ancillary funds; 
‘eligible recipients’ are DGRs recognised by the Commonwealth legislation. The amendment 
also expands the distribution power of existing prescribed trusts to give to DGRs and validates 
grants made by prescribed trusts to DGRs. However, it does not authorise a prescribed trust to 
make grants that are inconsistent with specific prohibitions in their trust deeds on the making 
of grants to certain kinds of bodies. 
Before trustees of existing prescribed trusts can exercise the additional powers given in the 
Act, the trustees will have to execute a deed declaring that the new law will apply to it. This 
ensures that trustees consider the tax and legal implications of ‘opting in’ to the new 
provisions. The Act prescribes the form of such a deed to ensure the decision of the trustees is 
recorded with certainty. The prescribed form will also help trustees with the administrative 
aspects of opting in, as the ATO will require documentation of the decision of the trustees. The 
deed, or a certified copy, will need to be kept with the records of the trust. The Act makes it 
clear that even though a prescribed trust can donate to a body that is not charitable at law, 
this will not affect its status as a charitable trust. This is important, as these bodies must 
                                                          
14
 Queensland Office of Fair Trading, Review of the Associations Incorporation Act 1981 and Associations 
Incorporation Regulation 1999, http://www.fairtrading.qld.gov.au/Associations-incorporation-act-1981-
and-associations-incorporated-regulation-1999.htm. Submissions close on 25 May 2012. 
15
 Charitable Trusts Amendment Act 2011 (WA) commenced on 2 May 2011.  
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continue to remain subject to the Charitable Trusts Act 1962 and to the general charity law. 
The Supreme Court’s supervisory role is also expressly preserved.16 
In addition, the substantive sections of the Associations Incorporation Amendment (Transfer of 
Incorporation) Act 2010 came into effect in February 2011. This amendment allows an 
incorporated association to decide by resolution to seek registration or incorporation as a 
prescribed body corporate under the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth).  The association must get 
approval of the Commissioner before it can apply (see new Part IIIA of the Associations 
Incorporation Act). 
Western Australia’s new ‘Associations Bill’ is still classified as priority legislation for the 
relevant government agency (Consumer Protection) and consultations have been in progress 
with the nonprofit sector. (However, it is likely that the timetable for drafting will be affected 
by elections in 2012.) It is expected that the final form of the Bill will take account of the 
financial reporting and accountability provisions being established by the ACNC, in order to 
prevent overlapping or inconsistent requirements, which could introduce unnecessary costs to 
the sector. 
All Acts and Regulations for Western Australia can be found at 
http://www.slp.wa.gov.au/legislation/statutes.nsf/default.html 
 
3.6 SOUTH AUSTRALIA 
The relevant Acts and Regulations in South Australia are:  
 Associations Incorporation Act 1985  
 Associations Incorporation Regulations 2008  
 Collections for Charitable Purposes Act 1939 
 Lottery and Gaming Act 1936  
 Lottery and Gaming Regulations 2008 
 Health Services Charitable Gifts Act 2011 
 Health Services Charitable Gifts Regulations 2011 
The only material change during 2011 was the repeal of the Public Charities Funds Act 1935 
and introduction of the new Health Services Charitable Gifts Act 2011. 
HEALTH SERVICE CHARITABLE GIFTS ACT 2011 
The Public Charities Funds Act 1935, which previously dealt with the powers of the 
Commissioners of Charitable Funds and the vesting of gifts, was repealed as of 1 July 2011 and 
                                                          
16
 Charitable Trusts Amendment Bill 2010, Second reading speech, Western Australia Legislative 
Assembly, Parliamentary Debates, 23 February 2011, p 1014.  
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replaced by the Health Services Charitable Gifts Act 2011.17 The Commissioners of Charitable 
Funds continue to exist as the Health Services Charitable Gifts Board.18 
The Public Charities Funds Act 1935 established the Commissioners of Charitable Funds to 
manage donations to public charitable institutions in South Australia, particularly hospitals. 
The Act remained virtually unchanged in its 75 years of operation and had become outdated in 
terms of its language, drafting style and prudential requirements for preserving invested 
capital. The new Act is essentially the same in its operation as the repealed Act but is 
expressed in modern terms. For example, the old Act used language no longer acceptable to 
the community such as the definition of an institution being given as  '…any public hospital, 
destitute asylum, lunatic asylum, hospital for the mentally defective, orphanage, reformatory 
or other institution of like character…'. The new Act no longer speaks of institutions but uses 
the terms public health entities and a prescribed research body.  
The new Act increases measures of accountability and transparency and confers more 
contemporary responsibilities and powers on the Commissioners. In the second reading 
speech to the South Australian House of Assembly19 the Minister said the new Act would apply 
to all public hospitals, with some exceptions:20   
The hospitals can be proclaimed either individually such as the Royal Adelaide Hospital 
or Modbury Hospital for example, or as the incorporated entity, such as Adelaide 
Health Service, to be a public health entity for the purpose of the Act.  The main 
exception is for Health Advisory Councils and their local country hospital sites. The 
government previously made a commitment to people in the country regions of South 
Australia that the Health Advisory Councils established for those hospitals would retain 
control of local assets, including donations to a local hospital. In keeping with this 
commitment, the Bill specifically precludes Health Advisory Councils from being 
proclaimed a public health entity and the property they hold on trust from being 
vested with the Health Services Charitable Gifts Board that is proposed to be 
established by the Bill.  
The Bill provides for another exception for donations made to a hospital by a 
foundation or local auxiliary of a hospital. These donations will be exempted from 
being vested in the Board where the Minister grants such an exemption on application 
from a hospital. Such an exemption will avoid an overly bureaucratic process where 
public donations made to a body such as a hospital foundation or an auxiliary for a 
hospital must vest with the Board, and the hospital then having to apply to the Board 
for access to those donations. It also supports the direct relationship of a local auxiliary 
with the hospital and assures them that their fundraising efforts will remain for the 
benefit of that hospital.’ 
                                                          
17
 Health Services Charitable Gifts Act 2011 (SA) Sch 2 cl 1. 
18
 Health Services Charitable Gifts Act 2011 (SA) s 5. 
19
 South Australia, House of Assembly, Parliamentary Debates, 24 November 2010, p 2142 (Hon JD Hill, 
Minister for Health, Minister for Mental Health and Substance Abuse). 
20
 Ibid p 2143. 
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All Acts and Regulations for South Australia can be found at 
http://www.legislation.sa.gov.au/index.aspx  
 
3.7 TASMANIA 
The relevant Acts and Regulations in Tasmania are: 
 Associations Incorporation Act 1964 
 Associations Incorporation Regulations 2007 
 Associations Incorporation (Model Rules) Regulations 2007 
 Collections for Charities Act 2001 
 Gaming Control Act 1993 
During 2011 amendments were made to the Associations Incorporation Act 1964 to clarify the 
operation of section 25B(2) of the Act. The Act was intended to transfer separate legal 
personality and all the rights and obligations that flow from such personality when a charitable 
company incorporated as an incorporated association. The Act was previously drafted in a way 
which brought legal uncertainty as to whether there was a transfer of separate legal 
personality between forms,21 and ASIC requested this be remedied. The amendment of section 
25B(2) now corrects the uncertainty.22 Where a company is incorporated as an association 
under section 25A, the incorporated association is a continuation of, and the same legal entity 
as, the company.  Further, the company’s directors, assets (subject to any subsisting trusts, 
covenants or contractual obligations), rights, liabilities, claims and proceedings all vest in the 
incorporated association.23 
There were no material changes to other relevant Acts and Regulations. 
All Acts and Regulations for Tasmania can be found at 
http://www.legislation.tas.gov.au/index.w3p  
 
3.8 AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY 
The relevant Acts and Regulations in the ACT are: 
 Associations Incorporation Act 1991 
 Associations Incorporation Regulation 1991 
 Charitable Collections Act 2003 
 Charitable Collections Regulation 2003 
 Lotteries Act 1964 
                                                          
21
 Tasmania, Parliament (2011) Facts Sheet: Associations Incorporation Amendment Act 2011, 
http://www.parliament.tas.gov.au/bills/Bills2011/51_of_2011.htm. 
22
 Ibid.  
23
 Associations Incorporation Act 1964 (Tas) s 25B(2), Associations Incorporation Amendment Act 2011 
(Tas) s 4. 
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 Unlawful Gambling Act 2009 
 Unlawful Gambling Regulation 2010 
ASSOCIATIONS INCORPORATION ACT 1991 
A number of amendments were made to the Associations Incorporation Act 1991 during 2011. 
The material changes to the Act were as follows: 
 Section 93(3)(e) (cancellation of incorporation after notice) was amended to be 
consistent with section 93(1)(e) (notice before cancellation of incorporation). Under 
section 93 the registrar-general has the power to cancel incorporation in certain 
circumstances, including failure to lodge annual returns. Section 93(1)(e) refers to 
failure to lodge for the last 2 years, while section 93(3)(e) referred to satisfying the 
registrar-general that annual returns had been lodged for the past 3 years. Both now 
refer to 2 years.24 
 The Justice and Community Safety Legislation Amendment Act 2011 (No 2) amended 
the Associations Incorporation Act as follows: 
o New section 63A has been inserted to enable the registrar-general to take action 
where a person is disqualified from holding office but continues to do so, in 
contravention of section 63 of the Act. The registrar-general can now apply to 
ACAT for an order to disqualify the office-holder.25 ACAT may make a 
disqualification order if the person or the association fails to comply with statutory 
obligations.  
o Section 64(2)(g) is a consequential amendment: the circumstances in which the 
office of the public officer is taken to be vacant now include that the public officer 
is subject to a disqualification order under 63A. 
o Section 74(3) was amended to replace ‘National Institute of Accountants’ with 
‘Institute of Public Accountants’.26 
 The Statute Law Amendment Act 2011 (Part 3.3) made minor technical amendments to 
various provisions of the Act, in line with modern drafting practice or to maintain 
consistency with other legislation. The amendment also added the term ‘public 
holiday’ to the dictionary of the Act. 
CHARITABLE COLLECTIONS ACT 2003 
The Charitable Collections Act 2003 was amended during 2011 by the Justice and Community 
Safety Legislation Amendment Act 2011 by inserting section 54(1)(b) which deems an 
investigator under the Fair Trading (Australian Consumer Law) Act 1992 to be an authorised 
person.27  Section 56(7) was inserted to define ‘identity card’ for an authorised person. To 
avoid investigators having to be issued with separate identity cards, it can now either be one 
                                                          
24
 Amendment contained in Justice and Community Safety Legislation Amendment Act 2011 (ACT) Part 
1.2 [1.2] which commenced on 17 November 2011. 
25
 Justice and Community Safety Legislation Amendment Act 2011 (No 2) (ACT) Sched 1, Part 1.1 [1.2] 
26
 Associations Incorporation Act 1991 (ACT) s 74 (3), Justice and Community Safety Legislation 
Amendment Act 2011 (No 2) (ACT) Sched 1, Part 1.1 [1.4] 
27
 Justice and Community Safety Legislation Amendment Act 2011 (ACT) Part 1.3 [1.3] 
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that is issued under section 37 of the Fair Trading (Australian Consumer Law) Act or under 
section 55 of the Charitable Collections Act.28  
A minor amendment substituted ‘Chief Executive’ for ‘Director General’ in the Charitable 
Collections Act 2003,29 as well as in the Charitable Collections Regulation 2003.30 
OTHER LEGISLATION 
The Payroll Tax Act 2011 commenced on 1 July 2011, replacing the Payroll Tax Act 1987. The 
Act continues the exemption from payroll tax for charitable organisations (with the stated 
exception of certain educational purpose charities). (See section 2.12 of Schedule 2 Part 2.2).  
All Acts and Regulations for the ACT can be found at http://www.legislation.act.gov.au/  
 
3.9 NORTHERN TERRITORY 
The relevant Acts and Regulations in the Northern Territory are: 
 Associations Act  
 Associations Regulations 
 Associations (Model Constitution) Regulation 
 Gaming Control Act  
 Gaming Control (Community Gaming) Regulations 
 Gaming Machine Act 
 Gaming Control (Gaming Machines) Regulations 
The Penalties Amendment (Justice and Treasury Legislation) Act 2010 commenced in February 
2011. This has the effect of making the maximum penalty under Gaming Control (Community 
Gaming) Regulations 17 penalty units31 (regs 17(2), 19(2), 20(6), 24(3), 26(3), 27, 29(3), 30(4), 
47(5)). Modifications to penalty provisions were also made in the Gaming Control Act and the 
Gaming Machine Act (replacing penalty amounts with penalty units).  
There were no material changes to relevant legislation during 2011.  
All Acts and Regulations for the Northern Territory can be found at 
http://wvbgww.dcm.nt.gov.au/strong_service_delivery/supporting_government/current_nort
hern_territory_legislation_database  
                                                          
28
 Justice and Community Safety Legislation Amendment Act 2011 (ACT) Part 1.3 [1.4] 
29
 Administrative (One ACT Public Service Miscellaneous Amendments) Act 2011 (ACT) Part 1.23, [1.76]–
[1.78]  
30
 Administrative (One ACT Public Service Miscellaneous Amendments) Act 2011 (ACT) Part 1.24 [1.79], 
[1.80] 
31
 See Penalties Amendment (Justice and Treasury Legislation) Act 2010 (NT) Schedule 1, s 3.  
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4.0 ACCOUNTING AND AUDITING 
 
4.1 RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN ACCOUNTING AND 
AUDITING STANDARDS 
Julie-Anne Mee, The Australian Centre for Philanthropy and Nonprofit Studies 
The Australian Accounting Standards Board (AASB) is responsible for the development and 
implementation of accounting standards for all organisations in Australia. Unlike other OECD 
countries, Australia has sector neutral or transaction neutral standards for all organisation 
types.  The AASB is undertaking several projects in the nonprofit arena including: 
 Accounting for Income of Not-for-Profit (NFP) entities (Exposure Draft due during 2012) 
 Control in the NFP sector (Exposure Draft due first half 2012) 
 Disclosures by NFP entities 
 Service Performance reporting 
The AASB has said of each of these:32 
Accounting for Income of NFP Entities 
Current requirements are sometimes criticised by practitioners, because of concerns 
that income is required to be booked too early, which may send the wrong message to 
potential donors.  There is concern that an entity could appear to be highly profitable, 
making it harder for it to attract further income.  The AASB is reviewing the current 
requirements by assessing an approach whereby income is not recognised as being 
earned until performance obligations are fulfilled.  Under this approach, in some 
instances, the income would be booked later than under current requirements.  
Control in the NFP Sector 
This project seeks to address issues relating to control in the NFP sector – in particular 
which entities a NFP entity should consolidate in its financial statements. 
Disclosures by NFP Entities  
The AASB recently introduced a second, significantly less onerous, Tier of general 
purpose financial reporting requirements, retaining the full recognition and 
measurement requirements of Australian Accounting Standards, but substantially 
reducing disclosure requirements.  This second Tier of reporting is available to NFP 
entities (and certain for-profit entities) immediately, subject to the requirements that 
might be imposed by other regulators.  
In addition to this second Tier initiative, the AASB plans to further examine 
opportunities for reducing the disclosure burden on NFP entities. 
                                                          
32
 Australian Accounting Standards Board, ‘The AASB’s work will complement the work of the Australian 
Charities and Not-for-profits Commission’ (Media Release, 20 December 2011) 
http://www.aasb.gov.au/News/Media-releases.aspx?newsID=63157 
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Service Performance Reporting 
The AASB is considering the information needs of users of NFP financial reports and 
has identified information about service performance as an area needing focus. 
THE IMPLICATIONS 
Accounting for income for nonprofit entities has been a vexed issue since the AASB mandated 
implementation of the International Accounting standards for financial periods beginning on or 
after 1 January 2005. The transactional nature of the accounting process in the guidelines by 
the AASB is not consistent with generally accepted accounting processes for for-profit 
businesses.  This means that the sector neutrality of the accounting standards is 
accommodated by adding ‘AUS’ clauses for the nonprofit sector rather than providing separate 
nonprofit accounting standards as happens in other OECD countries. Generally, government 
grant makers advance grants to nonprofit organisations and the current standards require 
these monies to be booked as a revenue item in the period they are received, rather than a 
liability to enable expenses to be allocated as they occur. The transparency for donors and 
readers of financial reports is clouded and many nonprofit organisations are disadvantaged in 
the giving programs, because they are unable to raise funds for non-program activities. 
There are diverse types of nonprofit organisations and, depending on the legislation, size and 
funding arrangements, nonprofits produce financial statements of varying quality and 
composition. One size does not fit all. The concept of tiering appears to have become an 
avenue for inclusion (or exclusion) for financial reporting disclosures, so this could also be 
extended for the control concepts. In practice, the disclosure concepts have extended 
requirements of adherence to the accounting standards rather than reducing the burden, as 
nonprofits still have to comply with the standards, even if the disclosure is less.  A further 
review of the standards will be necessary. 
It appears that the AASB is considering service performance reporting in the same manner as it 
requires for-profits to disclose through segment reporting. Grant-makers require a number of 
service reporting disclosures ‘unique’ to their requirements or related to State–
Commonwealth agreements and, for that reason, inclusion of these into an accounting 
standard will either be extremely vague, or prescriptive and potentially inflexible, adding 
another layer of administration and reporting for nonprofit entities. 
The Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (AUASB) is the standard setter, making and 
formulating standards and guidance on auditing and assurance, assisting auditors in their 
engagements with organisations. In April 2011, Guidance Statement (GS 019) Auditing 
Fundraising Revenue of Not-for-Profit Entities (revision to AGS1054 Auditing Revenue of 
Charitable Entities) was issued.  These guidelines are broader in application than AGS1054, 
applying to all nonprofit entities.  There are no new or changed requirements for auditors 
arising from the updated references and terminology. 
 
  
WORKING PAPER No 55      121 
 
4.2 DEVELOPMENTS IN THE STANDARD CHART OF 
ACCOUNTS 
Julie-Anne Mee, The Australian Centre for Philanthropy and Nonprofit Studies 
The QUT Standard Chart of Accounts for nonprofit organisations has been developing since 
2002 and in now being adopted across Australia. It seeks to have government agencies only 
request financial information that is consistently defined, thus allowing nonprofit organisations 
to collect the necessary information just once through their Chart of Accounts. 
In the past, lack of consistency in accounting categories and terms used by state and federal 
government departments in their funding relationships with nonprofit organisations caused: 
 Significant compliance costs to nonprofits;  
 Significant administration costs for government agencies; and 
 An inability to aggregate and compare financial data for any purposes, such as public 
policy development; benchmarking of performance; and indications of financial 
effectiveness or efficiency, for funders. 
The effects of variation in terminology and treatment – especially in terms of implications for 
cost compliance – are quite profound for nonprofit organisations. These effects are 
exacerbated for organisations receiving grants from multiple sources, which require different 
reporting definitions. Since a nonprofit organisation’s accounting system is designed to capture 
financial transactions just once, an imposed requirement to report similar transactions in 
different and incompatible ways means that nonprofit organisations often have to manually 
recalculate financial transactions from the vouchers, thus adding significantly to their costs of 
compliance. 
Unlike many other OECD countries, Australia does not provide specific national accounting 
standards for nonprofit organisations (developed in consultation with a national regulator and 
the sector). There is a need to improve the reliability and comparability of the financial data (in 
particular) across the nonprofit sector for use by government, organisations and the public.  
HISTORY OF THE STANDARD CHART OF ACCOUNTS 
In 2002, researchers in the QUT School of Accountancy and the Australian Centre for 
Philanthropy and Nonprofit Studies (ACPNS) decided that a standardisation of accounting 
terms agreed to by government and the sector would provide a solution to the problem. The 
development of agreed standard reporting definitions or a ‘data dictionary’, as the only set of 
definitions used by government funders in their transactions with the sector (grant 
applications, acquittals and reporting) would radically streamline administrative processing 
and cut compliance costs. The alignment of existing charts of accounts (particularly for larger 
organisations) and their definitions (including clear references to the appropriate accounting 
standards) is part of a solution that has been developed and implemented over time.  A 
Standard Chart of Accounts (SCOA) was first developed for use in Queensland and launched in 
2006. With consultation, work was begun on developing SCOAs in other jurisdictions. 
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In early 2009, the Council of Australian Governments (COAG) Business Regulation and 
Competition Working group (BRCWG) agreed that the Commonwealth, states and territories 
would work together on the practical measures of implementing a Standard Chart of Accounts. 
A sub-committee of BRCWG was formed in mid-2009 culminating in a recommendation to 
implement a SCOA from 1 July 2010. This was considered by COAG33 and a consultation draft 
of a national SCOA was distributed to state and federal agencies for comment in late 
December 2009. The draft National SCOA (NSCOA) is a combination document using the SCOA 
for each of New South Wales, Queensland, Western Australia and Victoria. The Communique 
released after the April 2010 COAG meeting stated:34 ‘COAG also agreed to additional reforms 
for the not-for-profit sector, including an implementation plan and governance structure to 
develop a nationally consistent approach to fundraising regulation, and the adoption of a 
standard chart of accounts where possible by 1 July 2010.  This will further reduce the 
regulatory burden and improve public confidence in the not-for-profit sector’.35  
In its Research Report, The Contribution of the Not-for-Profit Sector,36 the Productivity 
Commission supported implementation of the SCOA. Further, the Senate Economics Reference 
Committee’s 2011 report, Investing for Good: the Development of a Capital Market for the 
Not-for-profit Sector in Australia, also urges all Australian governments to remember the COAG 
agreement to implement the NSCOA in funding agreements with the nonprofit sector.37 
In its 2011–12 Budget, the federal government announced the establishment of the Australian 
Charities and Not-for-Profits Commission (ACNC). The ACNC Implementation Taskforce 
released a Discussion Paper in December 2011,38 including the proposed design and 
implementation of the new reporting framework for charities that will be administered by the 
ACNC. The proposal includes implementing the NSCOA as part of the reporting framework.  
The Agreed National SCOA – April 2010 (NSCOA39) has been amended following further 
consultation with all jurisdictions, resulting in the ‘NSCOA May 2011 Draft’ (in ‘draft’, until it is 
agreed to through the COAG processes).40 Ongoing consultation during 2011 has identified a 
number of harmonisation items and general jurisdictional specifics which will be included in 
the next version.  
                                                          
33
 Council of Australian Governments, Communique (COAG meeting, 7 December 2009, Brisbane), 
‘Regulatory reform’, http://www.coag.gov.au/coag_meeting_outcomes/2009-12-
07/index.cfm#reg_reform. 
34
 19-20 April 2010 COAG meeting in Canberra 
35 
Council of Australian Governments, Communique (COAG meeting, 19–20 April 2010, Canberra), p 14, 
http://www.coag.gov.au/coag_meeting_outcomes/2010-04-19/docs/Communique_20_April_2010.pdf. 
 
 
36
 Recommendation 6.6, Productivity Commission, Contribution of the Not-For-Profit sector: Research 
Report (2010) http://www.pc.gov.au/projects/study/not-for-profit 
37 
 Senate Standing Committee on Economics (2011), Investing for Good: the Development of a Capital 
Market for the Not-for-Profit sector in Australia, ch 3, 
http://www.aph.gov.au/senate/committee/economics_ctte/capital_market_2011/report/index.htm. 
38
 Australian Charities and Not-for-profits Commission Implementation Taskforce (2011), Australian 
Charities and Not-for-profits Commission: Implementation Design: Discussion paper, 
http://acnctaskforce.treasury.gov.au/content/Content.aspx?doc=publications.htm. 
39
 Available at https://wiki.qut.edu.au/display/CPNS/Full+list+of+NSCOA. 
40
 The May 2011 Draft is also available at https://wiki.qut.edu.au/display/CPNS/Full+list+of+NSCOA. 
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While NSCOA has been developed chiefly by QUT, consultation with all stakeholder groups has 
been a key to the comprehensiveness and validity of the NSCOA. The input has been from 
sector participants, large and small; community bookkeepers; voluntary and paid treasurers; 
accountants; auditors; grant makers; all levels of government; grant acquitters; peak body 
representatives at both the ‘coal face’ and on committees, and the research project team. The 
consultation process has ensured that NSCOA incorporates the different state-based legislative 
requirements and definitions (e.g. the various definitions and requirements for Gaming and 
Fundraising.) However, while the NSCOA accommodates and defines these activities, 
implementation at a local level will vary. With input from each jurisdiction’s working group, the 
NSCOA has been aligned in all aspects and improved with new information, clarification and 
examples for inclusion and exclusion. All versions of NSCOA are now freely available from a 
dedicated ACPNS website.41 
ACCOUNTING STANDARDS AND NSCOA 
Even though the Australian Accounting Standards have transaction and sector neutrality, the 
accounts in NSCOA have been cross-referenced with the relevant standards for ease of use and 
updating. In announcing its work plan, the Australian Accounting Standards Board has stated: 
As the independent national accounting standard setter, the Australian 
Accounting Standards Board (AASB) is investigating ways to improve, from a 
cost/benefit perspective, the quality of general purpose financial reports 
prepared by charities and other not-for-profit (NFP) entities, ….42 
EVALUATION AND ADOPTION  
In order to test the assertions about ease of use and benefits gained, ACPNS conducted 
research in 2008 to quantify the time and cost of government-generated paperwork for 
Queensland nonprofit organisations, prior to the introduction of the SCOA. These will be 
measured again, after full implementation of the SCOA, to assess the reduction in compliance 
costs, with the findings to be published in a peer-reviewed journal.43  
A Post-Implementation Review was undertaken by the Victorian government in 201144 to 
assess the benefits delivered to Victoria’s nonprofit sector by the Victorian SCOA to the 
Victorian nonprofit sector. Savings to the sector have been quantified at over $3.1million per 
year. 
In 2011, the South Australian government identified two key activities to achieve red tape 
reduction in the nonprofit sector: ‘... a Standard Chart of Accounts agreed by COAG and 
                                                          
41 
https://wiki.qut.edu.au/display/CPNS/Standard+Chart+of+Accounts  
 
42
 Australian Accounting Standards Board, ‘The AASB’s work will complement the work of the Australian 
Charities and Not-for-profits Commission’ (Media Release, 20 December 2011) 
http://www.aasb.gov.au/News/Media-releases.aspx?newsID=62951.  
43
 M McGregor-Lowndes and C Ryan (2009) ‘Reducing the compliance burden of non-profit 
organisations: Cutting red tape’ The Australian Journal of Public Administration 68(1) 21-38. 
44
 Victoria, Department of Planning and Community Development (2011), Victorian Standard Chart of 
Accounts: Post-Implementation Review, 
http://www.dpcd.vic.gov.au/communitydevelopment/community-sector/ocs-initiatives/victorian-
standard-chart-of-accounts . 
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Standardised Grant Agreements across State Government’.45 It is expected that the value of 
these initiatives will be assessed through the 6-monthly reports prepared for the government 
by Ernst & Young.46 
For full benefit, the standardisation depends on grant making departments having the 
disciplines in place to request only information specified in the SCOA. Nonprofit organisations 
are not compelled to use the SCOA. However, it is likely that most will convert to using the 
SCOA over time, as it provides significant ongoing benefits to organisations adopting it. 
The adoption of the SCOA by small, medium and large organisations in the nonprofit sector 
(despite its only being intended for small and medium organisations) is a clear indicator of the 
current need for reform of the disclosure regimes of nonprofit organisations in Australia. The 
SCOA pulls together the disclosure requirements of the AASB and various other pieces of 
regulation. Nothing new is proposed in the SCOA, but the fact that it is sector specific, 
contained in one place and has the necessary ‘educative’ tools attached has attracted both 
small and large organisations to adopt it. The key is that government departments discipline 
themselves to only require information in terms of the agreed data dictionary. 
QUT remains focused on transferring ownership of the NSCOA to a body with appropriate 
governance mechanisms with representatives of the sector and QUT for maintenance and 
ongoing support. This could be a body such as the ACNC through one of its working groups or 
the Treasurers’ meetings, or a Standard Business Reporting (SBR) working group. It is expected 
that some decisions relating to this will occur in the first half of 2012. 
 
4.3 HOT TIPS FOR VOLUNTEER TREASURERS47 
Under the various statutes and according to the rules or constitutions of their organisations, 
Treasurers are responsible for the following: 
 Signing verification that financial transactions are properly recorded and reported 
(specific requirements, e.g. how often this is done, will depend on the size of the 
organisation); 
 Assisting other members of the board or management committee to understand the 
financial information, when making strategic resource allocation decisions; 
 Overall management of external influences such as changes to taxation (e.g. GST, FBT, 
payroll tax, land tax, DGR status), legislation and accounting standards; 
 If applicable, lodging audited financial statements (responsible along with the 
President and Secretary or their equivalents). 
                                                          
45
 South Australian Government (2011), Reducing Red Tape for Business in South Australia 2010–2011, p 
20, http://www.competitivesa.biz/documents/ReducingRedTapeforBusinessinSouthAustralia2010-
11.pdf  
46
 Ibid, p 26–27. 
47
 These tips were compiled by Julie-Anne Mee drawing on work and materials developed by Professors 
Chris Ryan and Helen Irvine of the School of Accountancy, QUT. 
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A Treasurer’s Report to the board or management committee (internal) should include: 
 What monies have been received – in categories and by account; 
 What monies have been spent – in categories and by account; 
 Estimates of receipts and expenses for the next period (e.g. the next month); 
 Comparisons to budgets (month and year to date as required); 
 Cash flow management; 
 Ratios and benchmarking ; 
 Program reports (as required by funders). 
The Treasurer’s Report to external stakeholders is usually contained in the Annual Report – 
there are different requirements depending on the type and size of organisation.  Currently 
there are two types of Annual Financial Reports: General Purpose Financial Reports (GPFR) and 
Special Purpose Financial Reports (SPFR).  The AASB is suggesting that all entities require 
GPFRs but with some reduced disclosure requirements.  The questions to ask to determine 
whether or not the organisation should provide GPFRs are:  
 Who are your stakeholders?  
 Are your management team and committee separate? and 
 Does your organisation have a significant community impact?   
Where these questions are answered in ‘closed’ manner, the reporting should be more specific 
to the organisation, in a simple format (extensive accounting standards are unnecessary), and 
with no misleading statements. Factors such as DGR status, revenue basis, and incorporation 
type are indicators of the report format. Whatever reporting decision is made, the board or 
management committee should document the decision in the minutes with the appropriate 
rationale, and include the basis of preparation note in the financial statements (e.g. in Note 1 
of either GPFR or SPFR). This decision should be reviewed annually. 
Items for the Treasurer to consider: 
 Revenue streams— 
o Fundraising; 
o Grants; 
o Member subscriptions and donations; 
o Sales and commercial operations; 
o Each as a percentage of the total. 
 Expenses— 
o Fixed – insurance, rent, leases; 
o Salaries – fixed (executive staff, e.g. manager and assistant), program and 
commercial operations; 
o Program costs – non-salary; 
o Fundraising; 
o Commercial operations – non-salary; 
o Other costs of revenue raising – e.g. grant applications; 
o Each as a percentage of the total. 
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 Program funding requirements— 
o Service agreements; 
o Budgets; 
o Quarterly or periodic financial reports; 
o Annual audited statements; 
o Data returns. 
 Capital funds— 
o Grants – government – Commonwealth, state & local; 
o Grants – philanthropic; 
o Borrowings. 
 Assets 
o Acquisitions and valuations; 
o Cash reserves – unrestricted and restricted. 
 Liabilities 
o GST, FBT; 
o Employee benefits – e.g. superannuation, accumulated leave. 
 Ratios – generally ratios are not well-understood or well-presented by the sector— 
o Total funds spent to funds spent on our primary purposes (program costs/total 
costs); 
o Cost of fundraising efforts as a percentage of total funds raised: 
 Fundraising expenses/total expenses; 
 Fundraising expenses/fundraising revenue; 
o Surplus or margin: comparing total revenue and expenses: 
 Cash position with and without capital expenses and non-cash items 
such as depreciation; 
o Current ratio: capacity to pay the bills in the next financial period: current 
assets: current liabilities; 
o Overall position of the organisation: total assets/total liabilities; 
o Sustainability ratio: capacity to trade without grants. 
When indicators or ratios are used in either internal information or in external reporting: 
 keep these focused for the organisation;  
 keep them simple and easy for others to understand;  
 explain them clearly;  
 make sure they are accurate e.g. they add up; and  
 do not leave any room for interpretation. 
 
4.4 RESERVES 
Mike Booth, The Australian Centre for Philanthropy and Nonprofit Studies 
Organisations generally, be they for-profit or nonprofit, are aware of the need to ensure their 
long-term futures through a range of strategies.  These will include access to external funding, 
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flexibility in cost control, access to new sources of revenue, the ability to liquidate assets or the 
ability to access internal capital. 
WHY RESERVES? 
For nonprofits, access to external sources of capital is generally more problematic than it is in 
for-profit firms.  In order to secure medium- and long-term viability, these entities, in addition 
to ensuring sound management and governance practices are in place, should consider the 
need for internal reserves.  It is generally accepted that holding a level of reserve gives entities 
the capacity to manage unexpected events such as a reduction in revenue (amount or source) 
or unexpected increases in expenses.  Reserves also allow entities to embrace innovation and 
may provide a degree of independence from funder expectations. 
WHAT ARE RESERVES? 
A formal definition of reserves is actually not available in Australia.  The term is not defined 
either by the Australian Accounting Standards Board (AASB) or the Corporations Act 2001 
(Cth). Reserves in for-profit use are usually specific to a particular need such as accounting for 
assets revaluations or foreign currency fluctuations.  The Charity Commission for England and 
Wales defines the term in its Statement of Recommended Practice,48 as ‘that part of a charity’s 
income funds that is freely available’.49 The Commission produces various operational 
guidelines, and in its general Glossary of terms, gives a more detailed explanation of ‘reserves’, 
including50 ‘more specifically ... reserves [is] income which becomes available to the charity 
and is to be spent at the trustees' discretion in furtherance of any of the charity's objects ... 
but which is not yet spent, committed or designated (i.e. is 'free')’.  Consequently any funds 
which are restricted are not usually considered part of reserves. The Commission therefore 
defines a reserve as ‘the resources the charity has, or can make available to spend for any or 
all of the charity's purposes once it has met its commitments and covered its other planned 
expenditure’.51   
We usually consider reserves as a part of equity, where equity equals the entity’s assets less 
their liabilities: that is, how much the entity ‘owns’.  Equity may include accounts identified as 
reserves as well as retained earnings.  In practice, all items of equity which are unrestricted 
may be considered as reserves made ‘available to spend for any or all of the charity's purposes 
once it has met its commitments and covered its other planned expenditure’.52 
                                                          
48
 Charity Commission for England and Wales (2005) Accounting and Reporting by Charities: Statement 
of Recommended Practice, p 74, (the Charities SORP) http://www.charity-
commission.gov.uk/Library/guidance/sorp05textcolour.pdf. The SORP defines accounting treatment for 
entities under Charity Commission jurisdiction. See also Charity Commission for England and Wales, 
Charities and Reserves (Charity Commission Guidance, CC19, 2010) 
http://www.charitycommission.gov.uk/publications/cc19.aspx 
49
 Ibid p 74. 
50
 Charity Commission for England and Wales, ‘Reserves’, Glossary of Terms used in OGs, 
http://www.charitycommission.gov.uk/About_us/OGs/glossary.aspx. 
51
 Charity Commission for England and Wales (2009) Charity Income Reserves: What Constitutes 
‘Reserves’ and How to Identify Them (Operational Guidance, OG 43 B1) para 1. [emphasis in original], 
http://www.charitycommission.gov.uk/about_us/OGs/g043b001.aspx#_Toc205193381. 
52
 Ibid [emphasis in original]. 
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Note that reserves do not have to be in cash.  Simply put, they may be any asset which is 
realizable within the timeframe relevant to the organisation.  Assets may be sold or used as 
collateral against debt.  There is a separate need for an entity to ensure that it is a going 
concern in the immediate term, i.e. it has the capacity to pay its creditors as their claims fall 
due. 
MUST WE HAVE RESERVES? 
The holding of reserve funds has been subject to extensive discussion in most jurisdictions with 
the advantages of holding these funds, such as outlined above, balanced against a perception 
of hoarding or accumulating funds, rather than using them to achieve mission.  Generally it has 
been accepted that the diversity of missions, and entities serving those missions, prevents 
government or regulators from setting prescriptive guidelines requiring entities to either hold 
reserves or setting a prescribed level. 
What is seen as desirable is that nonprofit entities take a deliberative approach to the decision 
to hold reserves.  This requires that boards publish the level of reserves held and the reasons 
for holding that level.  Boards should establish formal reserves policies for their organisations 
which will include the desired level, the method and timeframe for accumulation of the 
reserve along with approaches for replenishment if necessary.  Investment strategies will also 
need to be considered. 
WHAT IS INDUSTRY PRACTICE? 
Guidance by international bodies varies.  Even where a recommendation of levels is provided it 
is important to note that the diversity of nonprofits means that a prescriptive level cannot be 
given.  Some examples of the guidance available are: 
 The Charity Commission for England and Wales does not provide a metric but stresses 
the importance of policy development and transparency in reporting; 
 In the United States, the Nonprofit Operating Reserves Initiative Workgroup and the 
Center on Nonprofits and Philanthropy at the Urban Institute have set out a number of 
guidance documents. While stressing that the reserves policy should be tailored to the 
organisation’s needs and funding structures, it suggests that the minimum board-
established operating reserves ratio be no less than three months of operating 
expenses.53 
 Analysis of Canadian nonprofits also indicates three months as the minimum 
benchmark.  
 The Commissioner of Charities for Singapore54 does not provide a metric; however its 
’Reserves Policy Guide’ identifies a number of negative implications for charities with 
reserves of less than a one year equivalent of total expenditure.   
                                                          
53
 Nonprofit Operating Reserves Initiative, 
http://www.nccs2.org/wiki/index.php?title=Nonprofit_Operating_Reserves. 
54
 ‘Reserves Policy Guide’, available at http://www.charities.gov.sg/charity/charity/viewPublications.do 
(see heading: Sample Templates for Charities & IPCs). 
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In Australia, there is not yet a generally available data repository of accounting information 
which would allow analysis and reporting of items such as reserves held.  Emerging research in 
the overseas aid sector does indicate that, in common with the US, almost 40 per cent of 
entities hold less than three months total expenditure as reserves with 50 per cent of those 
holding less than one month. 
In summary, there is an accepted view that nonprofit organisations should hold a level of 
reserves to hedge uncertainty and facilitate innovation.  Balanced against this is the 
recognition that funders and donors may see holding reserves as hoarding.  There are no strict 
guidelines on the desirable level of reserves to be held, however three months equivalent of 
yearly total expenditure has some support.  Generally, government and regulators see the core 
issues as both the development of the policy, which requires consideration of purpose, size 
and method of accumulation, and the reporting of the reserves.   
Further information may be obtained from the following: 
 The Charity Commission for England and Wales 
http://www.charitycommission.gov.uk/publications/cc19.aspx 
 Nonprofit Operating Reserves Initiative 
http://www.nccs2.org/wiki/images/d/df/Operating_Reserves_Policy_Toolkit_1st_ED_
2011-07-28.pdf 
 The Commissioner of Charities for Singapore 
http://www.charities.gov.sg/charity/charity/viewPublications.do 
 
4.5 CHANGES TO FBT AND MOTOR VEHICLES 
John McIntosh, The Charities Tax Advisory Service 
On 10 May 2011 at 7.30pm we entered a new fringe benefits tax environment for motor 
vehicles.  A new simplified methodology of valuing motor vehicle fringe benefits was created. 
Or was it? 
For fringe benefits tax (FBT) purposes, the value of a motor vehicle provided to an employee 
can be calculated by using either the statutory formula method, or the operating cost method. 
The statutory formula method has historically been beneficial for employees who travel high 
kilometres per annum regardless of whether the travel is of a business or private nature.  The 
following table shows the decreasing taxable value and FBT payable on a $30,000 motor 
vehicle as the car travels more kilometres during a year. 
Total kilometres travelled during the FBT 
year (1 April–31 March) Old statutory rate 
Taxable 
Value Tax Payable 
Less than 15,000  26% $7,800 $7,488.67 
15,000 to 24,999 20% $6,000 $5,760.51 
25,000 to 40,000 11% $3,300 $3,168.28 
Over 40,000 7% $2,100 $2,016.18 
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By contrast, the operating cost method of calculating the FBT value of a motor vehicle is 
radically different.  The operating cost method is reliant on the actual business usage of the 
motor vehicle as calculated over a consecutive 12 week period, regardless of the number of 
kilometres travelled. 
These vastly different calculation methods and the provision of motor vehicles to employees 
(mostly as part of an employee’s remuneration package), encouraged the development of 
driver behaviour, so that each March (the last month in the FBT year) employees clocked up 
significant mileage, in order to achieve the next statutory formula band or to achieve the 
projected statutory formula band as promised by the driver 12 months beforehand.   
The solution to this problem was the introduction of a flat 20 per cent statutory rate.  The 
headache with this solution is the transition period and its operation. The following table55 
shows the transitional arrangements for progressing to a flat statutory rate of 20 per cent 
(with increases shown in bold type). 
Distance travelled during the FBT 
year (1 April–31 March) 
Statutory rate for new contracts entered into after 7:30pm 
(AEST) on 10 May 2011 
Existing 
contracts 
From 10 
May 2011 
From 1 
April 2012 
From 1 
April 2013 
From 1 
April 2014 
0 – 15,000 km 26% 20% 20% 20% 20% 
15,000 – 24,999 km 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 
25,000 – 40,000 km 11% 14% 17% 20% 20% 
More than 40,000 km 7% 10% 13% 17% 20% 
 
As with all changes it is in the detail that the practical complexities start arising.   
Firstly, employers will now be required to identify and then allocate their vehicles into two 
categories: 
 vehicles that will remain subject to the old FBT statutory rates; and 
 new vehicles, or existing vehicles that become subject to a ‘new commitment’. 
The introduction of the concept of ‘commitment’ with respect to a motor vehicle fringe benefit 
is new. A commitment, or a new commitment, includes the following: 
 the employer enters into a contract for the acquisition of a car; 
 the employer enters into a new financial lease/product for a car; 
 the employer refinances an existing financial lease/product for a car; 
 the employer alters the length of an existing financial lease/product for a car; 
 an employer has an existing car and modifications are made to the car that result in a 
change in the value or number of lease payments for the car; 
 an employee commits to a lease or novation agreement for a car; 
                                                          
55
 Sourced from: Hon Bill Shorten MP, Assistant Treasurer and Hon Wayne Swan MP, Treasurer, 
‘Reforms to car fringe benefits rules’ (Media Release No 076, 10 May 2011). 
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 an employee alters the duration of an existing lease or novation agreement; 
 an employee changes employers, even if the new employer is still within the same 
corporate structure/group, or as a result of a merger/buyout. 
Identifying these commitments may be straightforward when making an assessment for cars 
that form part of an employee’s salary package.  The commitment trigger will not be so easy to 
identify for fleet vehicles that may or may not have permanent employee custodians. Schedule 
5 of Tax Laws Amendment (2011 Measures No. 5) Bill 2011 contains the amendments to the 
FBT law for these changes.  Section 8, the application provision, states: 
(1) The amendments made by this Part apply to a car fringe benefit in relation to a 
year of tax beginning on or after 1 April 2011, whether the car fringe benefit is 
provided before, on or after the commencement of this item. 
(2) Despite sub-item (1), the amendments do not apply to a car fringe benefit, in 
relation to an employer in relation to a year of tax, that relates to a car, if: 
(a) any car fringe benefit, in relation to the employer in relation to the year of 
tax in respect of employment of an employee by the employer, that relates to 
the car is constituted by the application or availability of the car for a period; 
and 
(b) the last time at which: 
(i) the employer, or an associate of the employer; or 
(ii) the employee, or an associate of the employee; 
committed to the application or availability of the car for that period, in 
respect of the employment, occurred before 7.30 pm Australian Eastern 
Standard Time on 10 May 2011. [emphasis added] 
At the ATO’s National Tax Liaison Group meeting of August 2011, the issue of fleet vehicles 
was raised.  The ATO confirmed that fleet vehicles used during an FBT year by different 
employees would not constitute a new commitment when a different employee uses the 
vehicle.  The basis for this conclusion was that the employer’s original intention for the vehicle 
will not have changed, as it was acquired for the purpose of being a fleet vehicle.   
However, the ATO went on to state that if an employee enters into a salary sacrifice 
arrangement in relation to a previously held fleet car, then ‘the signing of the salary sacrifice 
agreement could constitute a “commitment to the application or availability of the car” by the 
employer’.56 The implications of this statement are potentially significant. Consider the 
scenario where an employer ‘charges’ its employees a notional value from the employee’s 
salary for use of fleet vehicles, and at some point the dollar value of this charge changes, to 
reflect increasing vehicle costs.  The implication from the above statement is that all fleet 
vehicles will become subject to the new transition rules.  
                                                          
56
 National Tax Liaison Group, ‘ATO interpretation of reforms to the car FBT legislation (Statutory 
formula method) (TTI): 7.5 Vehicle reallocation’, FBT minutes (August 2011) 
http://www.ato.gov.au/taxprofessionals/content.aspx?menuid=43140&doc=/content/00297923.htm&p
age=32&H32. 
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Consider further, when a new employee commences during the FBT year and becomes subject 
to the same ‘charges’ from the employer for use of the fleet vehicles.  Will the new 
commitment rules be triggered in this instance for the fleet vehicle/s? 
In an attempt to make compliance with these rules easier there is an option to skip the 
transition rules and move straight to the flat 20 per cent statutory rate for a car.  However, this 
option can only be taken if the employee is not ‘worse off’ as a result of the choice to skip the 
transitional rules.  If an employee is worse off, then the employee must consent to the change.   
‘Worse off’ is not a defined term and so employers must now also determine whether or not 
the employee is, in the words of the ATO ‘placed at a direct financial disadvantage as a result 
of that choice’.57   
These are just a couple of issues that an employer will need to grapple with.  Perhaps it is 
easier if we all just walk. 
 
 
                                                          
57
 National Tax Liaison Group, ‘ATO interpretation of reforms to the car FBT legislation (Statutory 
formula method) (TTI): 7.8 Meaning of “worse off”’, FBT minutes (August 2011), 
http://www.ato.gov.au/taxprofessionals/content.aspx?menuid=43140&doc=/content/00297923.htm&p
age=35&H35. 
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5.0 ATO UPDATES 
 
Non-Profit News Service No. 0309 - Support for victims of Queensland floods 
Jan 2011. The Queensland government recently declared several flood-affected areas of Queensland to 
be disaster situations. We provide information for those wanting to collect funds or make donations to 
assist flood victims. 
Non-Profit News Service No. 0310 - Additional disaster areas declared in Queensland 
Jan 2011. The Queensland government recently declared additional flood-affected areas of Queensland 
to be disaster situations. This information is for those wanting to collect funds or make donations to 
assist flood victims. 
Non-Profit News Service No. 0311 - Support for the victims of the New South Wales and Victorian 
floods 
Jan 2011. The Treasurer has declared the Victorian and New South Wales floods to be disaster 
situations. We provide information for those wanting to collect funds or make donations to help flood 
victims. 
Non-Profit News Service No. 0312 - Recent court case: Cooperative Bulk Handling Ltd 
Jan 2011. On 17 December 2010, the Full Court of the Federal Court handed down its decision in the 
Cooperative Bulk Handling Limited case. 
Non-Profit News Service No. 0313 - Government consultation - national not-for-profit regulator 
Jan 2011. The Assistant Treasurer and the Minister for Social Inclusion have released a consultation 
paper on the design of a new national regulator for the not-for-profit sector. The closing date for 
submissions is 25 February 2011. 
Non-Profit News Service No. 0314 - Claiming deductions for donations to flood relief 
Jan 2011. The ATO will allow deductions without a receipt for donations up to $10 made to 'bucket 
appeals' for the floods in Victoria, New South Wales and Queensland. If the donation is over $10 donors 
will need to keep a receipt for tax purposes 
Non-Profit News Service No. 0315 - Donations to help victims of Cyclone Yasi 
Feb 2011. The Queensland Government recently declared a disaster situation due to Cyclone Yasi. We 
provide information for those wanting to collect funds or make donations to assist cyclone victims. 
Non-Profit News Service No. 0316 - Support for victims of Western Australian bushfires and Victorian 
floods 
Feb 2011. The Assistant Treasurer has declared the Western Australian bushfires and the Victorian 
floods in February 2011 to be disasters. We provide information for those wanting to collect funds or 
make donations to help these bushfire and flood victims. 
Non-Profit News Service No. 0317 - New guide for non-profit sporting clubs 
Feb 2011. We have released a new guide - Income tax exemption and sporting clubs - to help non-profit 
clubs self-assess whether they are exempt from income tax as a society, association or club established 
for the encouragement of a game or sport. 
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Non-Profit News Service No. 0318 - Donations to help earthquake victims in Christchurch 
Feb 2011. The Assistant Treasurer recognises the earthquake in Christchurch, New Zealand as a disaster 
for the purposes of tax deductibility of donations. 
Non-Profit News Service No. 0319 - Bargwanna Case: Federal Court allows appeal 
Mar 2011. On 17 February 2011, the Full Federal Court allowed the applicant's appeal in Bargwanna v. 
Commissioner of Taxation and remitted back to the AAT. 
Non-Profit News Service No. 0320 - Support for earthquake and tsunami victims in Japan 
Mar 2011. The Assistant Treasurer recognises the earthquake and tsunami in Japan as a disaster for the 
purposes of tax deductibility of donations. 
Non-Profit News Service No. 0321 - Christchurch Earthquake Appeal to be listed by name as a DGR 
Mar 2011. On 22 March 2011, the Assistant Treasurer announced the New Zealand Government's 
Christchurch Earthquake Appeal will be listed by name in the tax law as a deductible gift recipient (DGR). 
Non-Profit News Service No. 0322 - Winding up a deductible gift recipient 
Apr 2011. Endorsed deductible gift recipients are reminded of their obligations if their fund, authority or 
institution is wound up. 
Non-Profit News Service No. 0323 - Support for flood victims in Roma, Queensland 
May 2011. The Queensland Government recently declared a disaster situation in relation to the Roma 
floods. We provide information for those wanting to collect funds or make donations to assist flood 
victims. 
Non-Profit News Service No. 0324 - Just released: draft ruling on charities and decision impact 
statement on Aid/Watch 
May 2011. We have released for public comment Draft Taxation Ruling TR 2011/D2 Income tax and 
fringe benefits tax: charities and Decision impact statement: Aid/Watch Incorporated v. Commissioner 
of Taxation. TR 2011/D2 replaces TR 2005/21 which has been withdrawn. 
Non-Profit News Service No. 0325 - 2011-12 Budget: Measures relevant to non-profit organisations 
May 2011. The Australian Government has announced several measures that are relevant or of interest 
to non-profit organisations in the 2011-12 Budget. 
Non-Profit News Service No. 0326 - Donations to help tornado victims in southern USA 
Jun 2011. The Assistant Treasurer recognises the multiple tornadoes in the southern United States of 
America as a disaster for the purposes of tax-deductible donations. 
Non-Profit News Service No. 0327 - New chair of advisory board to ACNC announced 
Jun 2011. The Assistant Treasurer recently announced the new chair of the advisory board assisting the 
Australian Charities and Not-for-profits Commission. 
Non-Profit News Service No. 0328 - Consultation paper released: Better targeting of not-for-profit 
concessions 
Jun 2011. The Assistant Treasurer recently announced the release of the consultation paper, Better 
targeting of not-for-profit concessions. The closing date for submissions is 8 July 2011. 
Non-Profit News Service No. 0329 - Refund of franking credits application package 
Jun 2011. On 23 June 2011, we mailed the 2010-11 refund of franking credits application package to 
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non-profit organisations that applied for and received a refund of franking credits in the previous 
financial year. 
Non-Profit News Service No. 0330 - New version of GiftPack 
Jun 2011. We have released a new version of our guide GiftPack, which replaces the previous version 
issued in December 2007. 
Non-Profit News Service No. 0331 - Fuel tax credit rate change for heavy vehicles from 1 July 2011  
Jul 2011. From 1 July 2011, there has been a change to the fuel tax credit rate for heavy vehicles. 
Non-Profit News Service No. 0332 - Chair of implementation taskforce for ACNC announced 
Jul 2011. The Assistant Treasurer recently announced the Chair of the Implementation Taskforce for the 
Australian Charities and Not-for-profits Commission. 
Non-Profit News Service No. 0333 - Final report on scoping study and exposure draft consultation 
paper released 
Jul 2011. The Assistant Treasurer recently released the final report on the scoping study for a national 
not-for-profit regulator and the exposure draft consultation paper on restating the special conditions for 
tax exempt entities. 
Non-Profit News Service No. 0334 - Public ancillary funds: draft legislation and guidelines released 
Jul 2011. The Assistant Treasurer released for public consultation an exposure draft of legislation and 
draft guidelines that provide a new regulatory framework for public ancillary funds. Submissions close 
on 1 August 2011 for the exposure draft and 31 August 2011 for the draft guidelines. 
Non-Profit News Service No. 0335 - Draft addendum to TR 2005/22 on companies controlled by 
exempt entities 
Jul 2011. A draft addendum has been issued to Taxation Ruling TR 2005/22 to take account of the 
decision of the High Court of Australia in Commissioner of Taxation v. Word Investments Limited. 
Non-Profit News Service No. 0336 - Recent tribunal decision: Bicycle Victoria Incorporated 
Jul 2011. On 24 June 2011, the Administrative Appeals Tribunal handed down its decision in the case of 
Bicycle Victoria Incorporated. The tribunal held that Bicycle Victoria Incorporated is a charitable 
institution but not a health promotion charity. 
Non-Profit News Service No. 0337 - Recent tribunal decision: Krishnamurti Australia Inc. 
Aug 2011. On 25 July 2011, the Administrative Appeals Tribunal handed down its decision in the case of 
Krishnamurti Australia Inc. The tribunal held that Krishnamurti Australia Inc. is not a health promotion 
charity. 
Non-Profit News Service No. 0338 - New version of Tax basics for non-profit organisations 
Aug 2011. Tax basics for non-profit organisations has been updated to include changes since it was last 
issued in 2007. The guide provides an overview of tax issues relating to non-profit organisations such as 
charities, clubs, societies and associations. 
Non-Profit News Service No. 0339 - Bargwanna Case: ATO granted special leave 
Aug 2011. The Australian Taxation Office has been granted special leave to appeal to the High Court in 
the Bargwanna Case. 
  
  
WORKING PAPER No 55      136 
 
Non-Profit News Service No. 0340 - Decision impact statements released: Bicycle Victoria and 
Wentworth District Capital Ltd 
Sep 2011. We have released decision impact statements outlining our position on the case decisions in 
the Bicycle Victoria and the Wentworth District Capital Ltd cases. 
Non-Profit News Service No. 0341 - Changes to GST legislation 
Sep 2011. Following changes to the GST law, non-profit sub-entities will be able to access the same GST 
concessions as their parent entity. 
Non-Profit News Service No. 0342 - Self-governance checklist for non-profit organisations is now 
available 
Oct 2011. A new checklist for non-profit organisations is now available on our website to support your 
governance approach to tax and superannuation affairs. 
Non-Profit News Service No. 0343 - Public ancillary funds legislation tabled 
Oct 2011. Legislation to improve the integrity of public ancillary funds was tabled in Parliament on 21 
September 2011. A special issues article on Public Ancillary Funds is included in this Almanac: see below 
6.3 Regulation of Public Ancillary Funds. 
Non-Profit News Service No. 0344 - Treasury releases new newsletter on NFP reforms 
Oct 2011. The first issue of Treasury's not-for-profit reform newsletter has been released. 
Non-Profit News Service No. 0345 - Charities taxation ruling released 
Oct 2011. We have released Taxation Ruling TR 2011/4 Income tax and fringe benefits: charities. This 
ruling replaces TR 2005/21 and finalises draft ruling TR 2011/D2. 
Non-Profit News Service No. 0346 - Consultation paper released: A definition of charity 
Nov 2011. The government has released a consultation paper on the definition of charity as part of a 
consultation process. The closing date for submissions is 9 December 2011. 
Non-Profit News Service No. 0347 - ACNC Taskforce launches its website 
Nov 2011. The Australian Charities and Not-for-profits Commission (ACNC) Taskforce has launched its 
website to keep you up-to-date on their activities. 
Non-Profit News Service No. 0348 - Draft ruling released about the application of GST to financial 
assistance payments. 
Nov 2011. We have released for public comment the draft ruling GSTR 2011/D4 Goods and services tax: 
financial assistance payments. The draft ruling is a rewrite of GSTR 2000/11, which will be withdrawn 
when the draft ruling is finalised.  
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6.0 SPECIAL ISSUES 
 
6.1 NONPROFIT ORGANISATIONS: YES, GOOD CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE APPLIES TO YOU TOO!  
Darren Fittler, Gilbert + Tobin  
Corporate governance was definitely in the spotlight during 2011.  While most of the focus, 
including a number of high profile court decisions, was on commercial for-profit companies, 
there is much that applies equally to those governing and running nonprofit organisations.  
This is because many nonprofit organisations are subject to the same laws and corporate 
governance obligations as for-profit organisations are.   
In this article the term ‘director’ is intended to cover a member of a management committee 
of an incorporated association or a member of a similar governing body; and similarly the term 
‘board’ is intended to include management committees, governing councils, or similar bodies.  
People find themselves on the board of a nonprofit organisation for all kinds of reasons 
including because:  
 they established the organisation; 
 they have a particular expertise or knowledge relating to the operations or activities 
of the organisation; 
 they are passionate, enthusiastic or have good networks or connections; 
 an existing director simply invited them to join; 
 they feel they cannot step down due to the risk of the organisation falling below the 
required minimum number of directors;  
 there has been a recent turnover of key employees and someone has to remain for 
the sake of consistency and transition management; or 
 they have been there through the tough times and want to stick around for the good 
times. 
This list is not exhaustive and is not unique to nonprofit organisations.  In fact the same list 
could just as readily apply to for-profit companies.  However, it doesn’t matter why a person is 
on a nonprofit board.  The fact that a person sitting on the governing body of a nonprofit 
organisation is unpaid, or that the organisation operates for a charitable purpose or does not 
operate on a for-profit basis, also does not relieve the organisation of the need for good 
corporate governance practices.   
2011 was the year that reminded corporate Australia of the importance of solid and reliable 
corporate governance practices.  Below are nine lessons learned, accompanied by some tips 
for nonprofit organisations and their directors.  In summary however, each senior employee of 
a nonprofit organisation and each of those sitting on its governing body must: 
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 establish and maintain knowledge of the organisation’s objectives, activities, 
financial affairs, strategies, culture, employees and clients;  
 establish and maintain knowledge of his or her own legal duties and the legal 
obligations of the organisation; 
 combine the above knowledge with his or her own particular skills and expertise, 
when considering the organisation’s affairs, reviewing materials and making 
decisions; 
 ask questions when something is unclear or uncertain or when an error is 
suspected; and  
 ensure that proper corporate governance practices and procedures are in place 
such as those relating to the taking and approving of minutes, receipt of materials 
and the preparing of accounts.   
1 KNOWLEDGE OF THE BUSINESS 
Lesson:  Directors should have at least a basic understanding of the organisation’s objects, 
business and activities.  A level of knowledge which is more than basic is of course preferable. 
Organisation Tips:  Implement an induction program on the objects, work, strategic plan, 
activities, practices and procedures of the organisation for all incoming directors and staff 
(including volunteers). Create an information pack on the organisation to provide to 
prospective directors.  If the organisation’s constitution permits, invite a prospective director 
to join a sub-committee before graduating to the board if all concerned are willing to do so.  
The board and senior management should all have a refresher on these issues periodically. 
Individual Tips:  People thinking of becoming directors should do their own research on the 
organisation before taking the task on.  Use the Internet, read current and past annual reports, 
meet with current directors and staff.  Volunteer to join a sub-committee if possible, to get a 
sense of how the organisation works. 
2 TAKE MINUTES 
Lesson:  Be sure to take minutes of all directors’ meetings, including those held on an 
impromptu basis or held by telephone.  While a template form of minutes can be handy, do 
not just use the minutes from the last meeting as the starting point.  
Organisation tips:  Ensure that someone is given the responsibility for taking minutes for each 
meeting.  This is particularly important if the usual minutes taker is absent.  If the minute 
taking responsibility is rotated, for example because it’s seen as an important learning 
opportunity or to share the load, then rotate every three or four meetings, not every meeting.  
Individual tips: Ensure that each resolution relates only to one decision. For example instead 
of resolving ‘that Bob be authorised to search for new premises for the organisation at a rent 
cap of $50,000 per annum’ break it down into two resolutions: ’resolved that Bob be 
authorised to search for new premises for the organisation’ and ‘resolved that the limit for 
rent on a new premises is $50,000’.  This helps directors to focus on one issue at a time and 
can save confusion and conflict in the future.   
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3 READ THE MINUTES BEFORE THEY'RE APPROVED  
Lesson:  Organisations must keep minutes of the proceedings of its board meetings and 
general meetings. For a company limited by guarantee and an Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander Corporation, the minutes of a meeting must be recorded in a minute book within 1 
month of the relevant meeting.  Other nonprofit organisations, such as incorporated 
associations and co-operatives, should check whether there is a requirement for the minutes 
to be recorded in a minute book within a specified timeframe.  Unless there are particular laws 
or regulations requiring a lesser period, organisations should ensure that minutes are properly 
entered in the organisation’s minute book no later than one month after the meeting to which 
the minutes relate.  In any event, the minutes must be signed within a reasonable time by the 
chair of that meeting or the next meeting.  It is presumed that a minute is evidence of the 
resolution to which it relates unless it can be proved otherwise.   
Organisation tips: Do not wait until the last moment to finalise a meeting’s minutes and 
distribute to directors.  Minutes that are written up directly after a meeting tend to be much 
more accurate than those finalised weeks later, as the meeting is fresh in the memory of the 
minute taker.  Also, the sooner the minutes are ready the sooner they can be sent to directors 
and the more time directors will then have to review and consider them. 
Individual Tips: All directors should review proposed minutes of meetings carefully, and raise 
any objection to the contents of those minutes before they are approved, to ensure the 
minutes reflect what actually occurred at the meeting. 
4 KEEP A COMPLETE SET OF DOCUMENTS TABLED AT THE BOARD MEETING 
Lesson:  Directors should keep a complete set of all documents which are provided in board 
packs or tabled at a board meeting, so there is clear evidence of what the directors have, and 
have not, seen. If directors' papers are typically collected by the company after the meeting, 
the secretary of the board should retain a complete set of these papers, with directors having 
a right to access them. 
Organisation Tips:  Ensure that any board materials not included in the initial board pack (e.g., 
correspondence received after the board papers were sent and reports tabled at the meeting) 
are combined with the initial board pack.  Ensure that each set of board materials is well 
labelled and kept in a secure place.  
Individual tips:  If directors are permitted to keep copies of board meeting materials, each 
director should ensure that they are kept in a secure place.  This still applies even if they are 
kept in an electronic form. 
5 KNOWLEDGE OF ACCOUNTS AND FINANCIAL POSITION 
Lesson:  Directors should review the organisation’s accounts carefully on a regular basis, to 
maintain their knowledge of the financial circumstances of the organisation.  Directors are not 
expected to have a detailed knowledge of all accounting standards but should be financially 
literate and have a basic knowledge of key accounting concepts.  While some reliance on the 
work of others to prepare the accounts is permitted, the directors have ultimate responsibility 
for approving the accounts and cannot delegate this role.  
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Organisation tips:  Arrange financial literacy training for all directors.  Ensure that the training 
is pitched at the right level, complements the organisation’s accounting processes and is run 
often enough to ensure that new directors have attended and current directors are refreshed.  
Individual tips:  Directors should be honest about the level of financial literacy they have and 
seek clarity and training when required.  Spend time with the person or team responsible for 
keeping the organisation’s accounts and ask them to explain how the accounts are kept and 
presented and the key financial metrics for the organisation.  Arrange external financial 
literacy training if the organisation is not providing any or adequate training.  
6 ASK QUESTIONS 
Lesson:  If a director is unclear about something relating to the affairs of the organisation, 
identifies an error or discrepancy, or suspects information provided is incomplete, incorrect or 
unclear, he or she should ask questions of fellow directors, management and the auditors. 
Organisation tips:  Create a culture where asking questions is not just acceptable but is 
encouraged and expected.   
Individual tips:  Don’t be afraid to ask questions.  It is almost guaranteed that someone else is 
wondering about the same thing but just doesn’t feel comfortable asking.   
7 REVIEW DOCUMENTS CAREFULLY 
Lesson:  Directors must read, understand and focus on each document that they are given 
before it is signed off, approved or adopted, taking account of the knowledge they have of the 
organisation’s operations and financial position.  
Organisation tips:  Ensure that directors receive materials with sufficient time for proper 
review.  
Individual tips: Directors should set aside sufficient time prior to the meeting to review and 
consider the materials properly.   
8 APPROVING ANNUAL ACCOUNTS 
Lesson:  Approving the annual accounts is a core function of directors, for which they have 
specific responsibility.  While they can rely on others (internal and external) to prepare the 
accounts, directors need to review the accounts thoroughly and carefully, in light of the 
knowledge which they each have of the organisation’s operations and financial position.  
Organisation tips:  Ensure that sufficient time is allowed for directors to undertake a careful 
review of the financial statements and to conduct an ‘inquisition’ of management and the 
auditors, before the financial statements are approved by directors.  This scrutiny and inquiry 
should assist in identifying any potential inconsistencies between the information which 
directors know about the organisation and the information disclosed in the financial 
statements. 
Individual tips:  Do not presume that the accounts are in order and that the organisation is in 
good financial health just because the treasurer or finance committee says so.  Independent 
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inquiry and judgement must be applied.  Don’t be afraid to ask questions of other directors, 
management, the organisation’s finance team or the auditor, if something is unclear or seems 
amiss. 
9 MANAGE DOCUMENTS AND MATERIALS 
Lesson:  Directors need to manage the volume of information which is provided to them, or 
the way in which it is presented, to ensure that they can maintain an appropriate level of 
knowledge of the organisation’s operations without being over-burdened with detail.  
Directors, and other decision makers, should be given all information needed to assess an 
issue and make a decision. 
Organisation tips:  Check in regularly with directors about the information provided and be 
responsive to their needs and requests.  Remember that the way information is presented can 
sometimes be just as important as the information itself, when it comes to ease of 
comprehension.  Some organisations choose to break down the board materials into two 
categories: core (or essential) materials; and background materials.  If this practice is adopted, 
be sure that nothing in the background materials should in fact be included in the core 
materials.  Make sure that all materials, or if circumstances dictate at least the essential 
materials, are sent out well in advance of the meeting. 
Individual tips: Speak up if too much or too little information is being provided or if what is 
being provided is difficult to understand or manage.  Be proactive in working with those who 
are providing the material to help develop a practice that is both achievable from an 
administration sense and appropriate from a director’s perspective.  
 
6.2 EQUAL PAY AND PAY EQUITY 
Linda Lavarch, The Australian Centre for Philanthropy and Nonprofit Studies 
Australians like to see themselves as a fair and reasonable people and nation. Whether valid or 
not, the image of the ‘fair go’ persists as part of our national identity, and is often believed to 
be exemplified by a fairer distribution of wages and salaries, compared to other major 
developed economies. However the image ignores the fact of significant – some say growing – 
inequality within the Australian economy. 
In part, this is the product of the success of Australian working people and unions in ensuring 
that, while a fair go might be an article of faith the distribution of the fruits of the fair go has 
often been covertly, and sometimes overtly, discriminatory. 
The Australian wages system had its origin in the decision of Higgins J in the Harvester case.58 
This decision formed the basis for the Australian wages system for nearly 100 years. Following 
Harvester, the basic wage was set at a level deemed sufficient for a man to support his wife 
and three children.  However the corollary was that women's wages were assumed not to have 
                                                          
58
 Ex parte McKay (1907) 2 CAR 1.   
  
WORKING PAPER No 55      142 
 
the same social requirement; hence the basic wage for women workers was set at 54 per cent 
of that for men.59 
Such discriminatory wage rates were an established part of wage fixation in Australia at the 
time. In fact the Harvester judgment was itself an attempt at social engineering and racial 
purity: the matter did not proceed under the, then novel, Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904 
(Cth), but under the Excise Tariff (Agricultural Machinery) Act 1906 (Cth). The aim was to 
ensure that Australian goods could prove that they were produced by ‘European labour’, thus 
holding at bay the flood of imported goods which it was believed would place Australian 
industry and society in jeopardy. 
In the same period, discriminatory wage rates and arrangements were set for the wages and 
conditions of Aboriginal and Islander workers, as well as ‘aliens’ such as South Sea Islanders 
who remained after being kidnapped and indentured (the infamous blackbirding).  
While the ‘basic wage and margins’ of the Harvester judgment remained the cornerstone of 
wage fixation in Australia until 1967, various attempts were made to address the fundamental 
discrimination against women workers. During WWII, with fears of mass unemployment after 
the war, unions sought to make the wages of women workers, especially in defence factories, 
as high as possible, to ensure that men returning to employment after the demobilisation, 
would not be priced out of the labour market. As a compromise, the wages for female workers 
of comparable skill were set at 75 per cent of the male rate. In 1952, the ACTU sought to 
mount an equal pay case – but, while acknowledging the discrimination inherent in the 
system, the Industrial Court did not change the fundamentals of the system as it then stood. 
With the beginnings of ‘Second Wave’ feminism, the first Equal Pay case was mounted by the 
ACTU in 1969,60 and the second in 1972.61 The decisions of the Conciliation and Arbitration 
Commission in those two cases have formed the basis of equal pay cases ever since. From 
these cases came the principle not only that there should be no discrimination based on sex 
alone (equal pay for equal work) but that there should be equal pay for work of equal value – a 
principle that continues to apply. 
However ‘equal pay for work of equal value’ fails to recognise the basic ‘gender segmentation’ 
of the Australian workplace. While it is clear that the workforce in the traditional blue collar 
industries of construction, mining, and (to a lesser extent) manufacturing, are male-
dominated, it is equally clear that industries such as retail, health and welfare are female-
dominated. Historically, these industries have not been able to attract high earnings, with the 
result that many women possessed of significant levels of skill have been paid at a lower rate 
than men working in jobs of equivalent skill. 
Consequently it has been recognised for some time that the principle of equal pay still fails to 
address the problem of equal remuneration. The form of equal pay can still mask significant 
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inequity which results from a complex mix of factors such as community regard for the work 
being undertaken, the nature of the work (physical versus mental labour), the economic 
environment in which the work is undertaken, the level of collective organisation or 
unionisation in the workplace and the capacity for bargaining. 
In 1999, the Queensland Parliament passed a new Industrial Relations Act. It enacted the 
principle of ‘equal remuneration for work of equal or comparable value’.62 This was given life 
in 2002 by the Queensland Industrial Relations Commission (QIRC) promulgating its Equal 
Remuneration Principle; unions representing significant numbers of female workers – the 
LHMU (now United Voice) and the Australian Services Union – then made applications under 
the principle. The QIRC’s rulings in those cases resulted in improved pay for dental assistants, 
childcare workers, and social and community services (SACS) workers. 
The SACS workers decision issued in 200963 recognised major inequity in the remuneration of 
workers in that sector. Following that decision, to its credit the Queensland government 
provided commensurate increases in funding to the sector. However, given the mix of funding 
in the sector between state and federal governments it was clear that the decision of the QIRC 
would be inadequate unless accompanied by a comparable decision in the federal jurisdiction.  
Industrial regulation through awards and agreements is a relatively new phenomenon in the 
sector. It was only with the federal registration of the Australian Social Welfare Union (ASWU, 
now amalgamated with the Australian Services Union) following the ASWU case in the High 
Court64 that federal regulation of industrial conditions in the sector was possible. Until then, it 
was covered by a mishmash of state regulations, state awards, and private agreements, 
especially in respect of the established churches.  
The trend towards federal regulation, not only in the welfare sector but generally in the 
workplace, was accelerated by the ASWU case because it resulted in a broader definition of 
what could be classified as an ‘industrial matter’. This tendency to ‘federalise’ has become a 
hallmark of industrial relations in Australia, bringing most industrial regulation under the 
jurisdiction of Fair Work Australia (FWA) (formerly, the Australian Industrial Relations 
Commission (AIRC)).  
EQUAL REMUNERATION CASE 2011 
On 11 March 2010, unions representing a range of health and community sector employees 
lodged an application to FWA for an equal remuneration order.65 The Full Bench decision on 
the equal remuneration order was published on 16 May 2011 (the interim decision).66 In that 
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decision the Bench sought further submissions on the nature of the order which should be 
made.  The final decision on the equal remuneration order was handed down on 1 February 
2012.67 In addition to considering the application for equal remuneration, the Bench was also 
asked, in subsequent applications, to consider variations to the Social, Community, Home Care 
and Disability Services Industry Award (the modern award, MA100).68 
It should be noted that FWA, like the AIRC before it, and its predecessor the Conciliation and 
Arbitration Commission, is not a court, even though it has the appearance and in certain 
respects the practices of one. Historically, the role of the tribunal has been legislating for 
industrial regulation, following conciliation and, where necessary, arbitration of the 
contending parties. However, FWA’s procedure follows that of the adversarial processes found 
in common law courts. When a matter of national importance is before FWA a Full Bench is 
convened; this must include a Presidential member.  
Effectively, FWA was asked to endorse the decision of the Queensland Industrial Relations 
Commission (QIRC) in making the Community Services and Crisis Assistance Award – State 2008 
(the SACS Award), especially as regards its wage rates and classification structure. The interim 
decision in May 2011 confirmed the jurisdiction of FWA to determine matters of equal 
remuneration under Part 2-7 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (FW Act).69  
The Bench was also asked to make an award which included: 
 More generous sleepover provisions; 
 Higher commencement rates for workers with tertiary qualifications; and 
 Higher commencement rates for disability support workers with a Certificate III or IV.70 
There were 24 parties to the case. The unions and the ACTU supported the application, but the 
employer groups opposed it. The position of the Commonwealth and other state government 
parties (with the exception of Queensland), could be described as cautious.71 The 
governments’ caution was based in large part on the financial impact of any decision on their 
funding of the sector. 
Hence FWA could not proceed on a consent basis, but had to exercise its arbitral powers. In 
effect, this meant that, within the constraints of the FW Act and the rules of administrative 
law, FWA was to determine the matter ‘at large’. A major issue in any decision in the case was 
the size and diversity of the industry.72  
The Bench refused to grant the unions’ application, that is, it declined to simply follow 
or endorse the QIRC Equal Remuneration decision.73 However it did find that employees 
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in the SACS sector are ’predominantly women and are generally remunerated at a level below 
that of employees of state and local governments who perform similar work’.74 On this basis, it 
determined that an order for equal remuneration would be issued, taking the form of an 
addition to rates in the modern award (MA100, the Social, Community, Home Care and 
Disability Services Industry Award 2010),75 and sought submissions from the parties about how 
this would be effected.76 The Bench concluded: 
We consider gender has been important in creating the gap between pay in the SACS 
industry and pay in comparable state and local government employment.  And, in 
order to give effect to the equal remuneration provisions, the proper approach is to 
attempt to identify the extent to which gender has inhibited wages growth in the SACS 
industry and to mould a remedy which addresses the situation.77 
On this basis, the Bench determined that an order for equal remuneration would be issued, 
taking the form of an addition to rates in the modern award (MA100) and sought submissions 
from the parties about how this would be effected. The Bench then sought the views of the 
parties on the following six matters:78 
1. The nature of the alterations, if any, that should be made to the classifications and 
associated wage rates in the Social, Community, Home Care and Disability Services 
Industry Award 2010 having regard to the Commonwealth’s previous submission 
concerning graduate wage rates in that modern award; 
2. The extent to which wage rates in the SACS industry are lower than they would 
otherwise be because of gender considerations, including how the amount of the 
gender related undervaluation of the work of the classifications in the industry should 
be calculated and concrete estimates of that gender related undervaluation;  
3. The amount or amounts, either dollar or percentage, to be included in any equal 
remuneration order and estimates of the cost; 
4. The phasing-in of any equal remuneration order and the effect of such phasing on the 
transitional provisions in the modern award; 
5. The form of any equal remuneration order, including whether it should specify the 
particular wage rates that are to apply to the classifications in the modern award, or a 
monetary or percentage addition to the wage rates for the classifications in the 
modern award and whether it should provide for salary packaging and absorption of 
any over award payments;  
6. Whether the quantum in any equal remuneration order could or should be included in 
the modern award having regard, amongst other things, to the operation of the better 
off overall test. 
At this time the Bench also encouraged parties to hold discussions regarding the matters with 
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a view to reaching agreement, or at least, narrowing the areas of disagreement.79 
In subsequent proceedings, FWA determined most of the outstanding matters as a result of a 
joint submission lodged by the Union and the Commonwealth government.80 This was no 
doubt assisted by a decision announced by the Prime Minister in November 201181 to allocate 
$2 billion for pay rises and associated matters.  
FINAL DECISION 
On 1 February 2012, the Full Bench released its final decision.82 The decision largely followed 
the proposals in the joint submission,83 with graduated increases on pay rates in the modern 
award (from 19 per cent on level 2 up to 41 per cent on level 8); however the Bench extended 
the phase-in period. Therefore the increases will be introduced in nine equal instalments, on 
1 December in each of the years 2012 to 2020.84 To take account of impediments to bargaining 
for annual loadings in the industry, the order included a cumulative 4 per cent loading also 
phased in over nine instalments.  The Full Bench also determined that any amounts payable 
under the order could be subject to salary packaging, complementing the provisions in clause 
14 of MA100.85 
While complex to describe, the ultimate result will be that all workers covered by MA100, will 
be paid the same minimum rate of pay (this will not prevent additional payments through 
bargaining or other mechanisms). In most instances, workers will be covered by an 8-level 
classification structure, with three pay points in each, which will range in weekly payments 
from $641.00 to $1,143.80 per week. 
The transitional arrangements are set out in Schedule A to MA100.86 For those workers being 
paid less than the award minimum, transitional arrangements apply which will reduce the 
difference between the worker's existing rate of pay and the award rate by 60 per cent from 1 
February 2012, by 40 per cent from 1 July 2012, and 20 per cent from 1 July 2013.87 From 1 
July 2014 the same minimum rate will apply to all workers covered by the award. Where a 
worker is being paid more than the award minimum under their existing instrument, the 
worker's pay is protected, and transitional amounts calculated to ensure that this occurs 
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without loss, based on the 60 per cent; 40 per cent; and 20 per cent reduction of difference 
scale, phased in from 1 July 2012 to 1 Jul 2013. In addition, penalties and allowances for 
excessive hours beyond the maximum of 38 per week are to be phased in using the same 
scaling.88 
At the same time as making a final decision on the equal remuneration order, the Bench 
addressed the application of Australian Business Industrial (ABI) in respect of the varying the 
modern award as it related to minimum wages for graduates.  It was determined that an error 
had occurred in the classification definitions in the modern ward and these were amended. 
However, the Bench determined it could not increase the rates, as neither the applicant nor 
the Commonwealth had the required standing under FWA to bring such an application. Whilst 
FWA could have increased the minimum pay rates on its own motion, the bench considered it 
inappropriate for them to do so in the circumstances.89 
This matter has a complex origin but it appeals to Australia’s self-image as a nation of ‘the fair 
go’, where wages and salaries are paid fairly, according to skill not on the basis of 
characteristics such as gender. Most importantly, it will go some way to addressing the low 
rates of remuneration which have dogged the SACS sector for many years – along with the 
difficulty of attracting and retaining skilled and committed staff, the consequent high rates of 
burnout and associated issues.  The actions of the unions in advocating for change – supported 
by the Queensland, Commonwealth and other governments, and reputable employers in the 
sector – demonstrate the maturity of a non-discriminatory industrial relations system, 
culminating in a significant decision of FWA.  The challenge now is for Australian governments 
and the nonprofit sector to implement the award increase without diminishing services to the 
community, particularly the vulnerable who rely most on assistance from skilled workers in the 
sector. 
 
6.3 THE NEW MEANING OF ‘CHARITABLE’ ACCORDING TO 
THE ATO – TAX RULING TR 2011/4 
Anne Robinson, Prolegis Lawyers 
The ATO has released a revised Taxation Ruling, Income tax and fringe benefits tax: charities, 
TR 2011/4, which primarily deals with the meaning of ‘charitable’. The Ruling replaces Taxation 
Ruling TR 2005/21. It was released in draft form on 11 May 2011, and then in final form on 12 
October 2011.  
A SUMMARY 
1. The Ruling sets out the Tax Commissioner’s view on the meaning of ‘charitable’ in the 
context of the income tax and fringe benefits tax legislation. 
2. Like its predecessor, the Ruling differentiates between what constitutes a ‘charitable 
institution’ and what constitutes a ‘fund established for public charitable purposes’.  
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3. The Ruling takes into consideration a number of significant recent charity law cases, 
such as AID/Watch Incorporated v Commissioner of Taxation (2010) 241 CLR 539, and 
Commissioner of Taxation v Word Investments (2008) 236 CLR 204.   
4. The first section of the Ruling (23 pages) is called the ‘legally binding’ section. The 
balance is made up of explanations and examples, to assist interpretation of the legally 
binding section. 
5. As the law currently stands, TR 2011/4 is our best guide for the purpose of attempting 
to determine whether a nonprofit organisation is ‘charitable’ for the purpose of 
determining entitlement to various tax exemptions and/or concessions.  Treasury has 
released a consultation paper on the statutory definition of charity which may alter 
certain aspects of this Ruling again, however the Ruling itself does not take that 
consultation paper into consideration. 
WHAT IS NEW IN THIS RULING? 
The main changes that the Ruling introduces (compared to the previous Ruling) are as follows. 
Distributions to members 
A significant change in this Ruling relates to the distribution of surpluses to members of the 
organisation.  The law has always stated that an organisation that carries out its activities for 
the private profit or benefit of its owners or members is not charitable.  This is because it 
cannot satisfy the public benefit requirement.  However, the Ruling states that where the 
objects of an institution are charitable, the fact that the organisation can distribute surpluses 
to its members in furtherance of those objects, does not preclude the organisation from 
satisfying the public benefit requirement.   
However, the Ruling does state that in order for an organisation to continue to satisfy the 
public benefit requirements whilst distributing surpluses to its members, it must satisfy the 
following requirements: 
(a) the organisation’s sole purpose must be charitable; 
(b) the organisation’s constitution must allow it to distribute its surplus to another 
entity; and 
(c) members who receive distributions, must themselves be charitable entities that 
have similar charitable purposes to the organisation itself. 
The following example is given.90 
Q Limited is an institution that has as its purpose the advancement 
of the welfare of vision impaired young adults.  Its objects include 
operating a transport service for the general public, to raise funds for 
Q Vision Impaired Association (an endorsed charitable institution). Q 
Vision Impaired Association is the sole member of Q Limited and the 
constitution of Q Limited provides that no other members can be 
added. 
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Q Limited is being operated for the charitable purpose of advancing 
welfare of vision impaired adults. Its charitable status does not 
change because it pays its surplus to Q Vision Impaired Association. 
 
Profit making and accumulation of funds 
As a result of the Word Investments case, the Ruling specifically states that a charitable 
institution that endeavours to make a profit from its activities can still be charitable if its profit 
making goal is only in aid of its charitable purpose.   
Further, the Ruling sets out that an organisation can be charitable even where that 
organisation is accumulating profits, provided that the profits are being accumulated by the 
organisation for its charitable purpose, i.e. in order to increase the funds available for carrying 
out its charitable purpose.  However, the Commissioner’s view is that profit making and 
accumulation of funds cannot be unrestricted: 
An institution that accumulates all or most of its profits for a number of years may find 
it difficult to sustain that is it truly established for a charitable purpose.91 
Commercial Activities 
Also as a result of the Word Investments case, the Ruling states that the conduct of 
commercial and business-like activities can be compatible with a charitable purpose.  For the 
Commissioner, whether an organisation carrying out commercial and/or business-like activities 
will continue to be deemed a charity turns on the ‘purpose’ of the organisation in carrying out 
those commercial or business-like activities.  Therefore, an organisation undertaking such 
activities can be charitable if: 
(a) the sole purpose of the organisation is charitable and it carries on a commercial 
enterprise to generate surpluses in order to further that charitable purpose; or 
(b) the sole purpose of the organisation is charitable and the commercial activities 
directly carry out the charitable purpose; or 
(c) the commercial operations are merely incidental to the carrying out of the 
charitable purpose; or 
(d) the activities are themselves intrinsically charitable but are being carried on in a 
manner that is commercial.92 
The following examples are given.93 
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S Enterprises Ltd has a purpose of encouraging the Christian faith by 
promoting or conducting evangelistic services and other religious 
gatherings and bible study.  S Enterprises Ltd itself does not 
undertake any of these activities.  Instead, its objects state that it is 
to carry on a commercial activity (e.g. selling musical instruments 
and recordings) to generate funds for S Campaigners, an 
unincorporated association that is an endorsed charity established 
for the advancement of religion. S Campaigners conducts religious 
services and other religious events. 
The fact that S Enterprises Ltd raises funds by commercial means will 
not detract from it being considered a charitable institution. Its 
commercial activity is merely a means to give effect to its charitable 
purpose. 
 
Catering Pty Ltd is a catering company established for the profit of its 
shareholders.  It is contracted by various charities at market rates to 
supply hot meals to the clients of those charities, being the 
disadvantaged and homeless in a particular region.  
Whilst the activities undertaken by Catering Pty Ltd are similar to 
those of a charity, its activities are carried on to generate a profit for 
shareholders and are not in furtherance of a charitable purpose 
 
Political purpose 
As a direct result of the AID/Watch case, the Ruling accepts that there is no principle in 
Australian law which excludes a charity from having political purposes.  Following this decision 
by the High Court, an entity can be charitable if it has a purpose of generating public debate, 
with a view to influencing laws and policy in relation to one or more of the four heads of 
charity.  Further, an entity can put forward a singular point of view (as opposed to a balanced 
position), so long as the subject matter comes within one of the four heads of charity. 
The following examples are provided.94 
CC is a not for profit environmental organisation.  It has an advocacy 
and campaigning focus.  Its constitution states that its objects are: 
1. to advocate and campaign publicly for policy changes and 
actions to minimise global warming; and 
2. to engage with and inform policy makers and the community 
about the risks to human health from climate change and the 
solutions available to reduce risks.  
The organisation carries out a range of activities to support the 
achievement of its objects. Its main and continuing activities are 
gathering evidence to develop policy papers and submissions, 
commissioning and publishing research, meeting with Members of 
Parliament and government officials with a view to influencing their 
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position on climate change etc. The organisation raises awareness, 
campaigns and advocates for action in relation to a significant 
environmental issue. The purpose of the organisation is charitable 
under the fourth head of charity. The organisation is generating public 
debate about a subject matter that comes within one of the four heads 
of charity. 
 
B Australia is a not for profit community advocacy organisation.  Its 
constitution states that its purpose is to review, comment on and 
campaign in relation to the policies of political parties in Australia.  Its 
objects state that its aim is to allow the average Australian to ‘have a 
voice in the democratic process’.  Issues are selected on the basis of 
what is topical, and what its members consider appropriate.  
Some of the issues the organisation campaigns on may be subject 
matters that come within one of the four heads of charity, but the 
organisation does not restrict itself to these types of issues. The 
organisation’s activities are directed to a purpose which itself is too 
broad to come under any of the four heads of charity.  
 
 
 
6.4 INCREASED REGULATION OF PUBLIC ANCILLARY FUNDS 
Alice Macdougall, Freehills 
INCREASED REGULATION 
From 1 January 2012, public ancillary funds (PUFs) are subject to a new regulatory regime95 
applying to all public ancillary funds, subject to some limited transitional provisions. 
The requirements are contained in the Public Ancillary Fund Guidelines 2011. The ‘Guidelines’ 
are in fact a legislative instrument under the Taxation Administration Act 1953. If not complied 
with, the trustee and the directors may be subject to administrative penalties, or even 
suspension or removal as trustees. 
There are significant additional compliance requirements, including an audit/review and 
having to lodge a return to the ATO. All PUFs will need to review their operations and 
governance, and put in place systems and procedures to ensure compliance before 30 June 
2012. 
MAIN AREAS OF CHANGE 
The main areas of change from the previous requirements for PUFs are: 
(a) minimum annual distribution of 4 per cent of the net assets as at the end of the 
previous financial year; 
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(b) the market value of the assets must be estimated annually (land must be valued 
every three years by a certified valuer); 
(c) an investment strategy must be documented, implemented and reviewed 
annually;  
(d) with some exceptions, no borrowings are allowed, no collectables can be 
acquired, and no business activities are permitted;. 
(e) transactions with the founder, trustee, officers, members and employees of the 
trustee and with donors must be at arm’s length; 
(f) an auditor is required and the auditor must audit or review not just financial 
statements but compliance with the Guidelines; 
(g) a return must be filed with the ATO; 
(h) new PUFs must have a company (or incorporated association) as the trustee. 
 
SUMMARY OF REQUIREMENTS FOR PUFS96 
Trustee requirements  
A PUF must be established by a will or by trust instrument.97 The ATO provides a model trust 
deed for a PUF and applicants are required to identify any changes from the model trust deed 
in the application for DGR status.  
All new PUFs must have a constitutional corporation as the trustee.98 Existing PUFs with 
individual trustees or a trustee which is not a constitutional corporation do not need to change 
trustees. 
At all times, a majority of the individuals involved in the decision making of the PUF must be 
individuals with a degree of responsibility to the Australian community as a whole.99 This is 
consistent with the previous requirement. The Guidelines add as a responsible person an 
individual before whom a statutory declaration may be taken. 
Those meeting the responsible person requirements should be actively involved in decision 
making on fundamental issues such as the investment strategy, valuation policy, operating 
budget and expenses, fundraising strategy and distributions policy. 
Purposes 
The purposes of the trust must be limited solely to providing money, property or benefits to 
item 1 DGRs.100  
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98
 TAA Schedule 1, s 426-102. 
99
 Guidelines 14 and 56. 
100
 Funds, authorities or institutions, gifts to which are deductible under item 1 in the table in s 30-15 
ITAA 97. 
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The item 1 DGRs eligible to receive grants from the PUF will either be limited to those item 1 
DGRs which are charitable, or may, if available in the state where the PUF is established, also 
include any item 1 DGR101 (in Victoria, it includes those which would be charitable but for their 
connection to government). Depending on this choice the PUF will be eligible to be endorsed 
as a charitable fund102 or an income tax exempt fund.103 
The trust deed must specify that the PUF is nonprofit104 and specifically provide that on the 
loss of DGR status, gifts and money received from gifts must be distributed to eligible item 1 
DGRs.105  
Distributions 
Guideline 19 introduces a requirement for minimum annual distribution to the value of at least 
4 per cent of net assets as at 30 June in the previous financial year. There are some allowances 
and transitional provisions for PUFs with less than $220,000.  
Valuation (Guidelines 20 – 23) 
The market value of the fund’s assets (other than land) must be estimated annually within 2 
months before or after the end of the financial year. The methodology and data used for an 
estimate must be documented in the PUF’s records and must be reasonable and supportive of 
the estimate. The market value of land held by the fund must be estimated by an independent, 
certified valuer, at least every 3 years. 
Accounts, financial statements and audit (Guidelines 24 – 29) 
PUFs are required to keep proper accounts and must prepare financial statements for the end 
of each financial year in accordance with accounting standards.  
A return must be lodged each year with the ATO. Based on the Private Ancillary Fund regime, 
the return will be likely to require some financial information and respond to questions 
confirming compliance with the Guidelines. 
A registered company auditor must be appointed to audit, or review (if the revenue and assets 
are less than $1 million), not only the PUF’s financial statements but also the PUF’s and the 
trustee’s compliance with the Guidelines.  
Investment strategy and limitations (Guidelines 30 – 40) 
An investment strategy must be documented and implemented. The decision of the trustee 
adopting the investment strategy must be minuted. In line with Trusts Acts in the states and 
territories, the trustee must exercise the powers of investment with the care, diligence and 
skill that a prudent person would exercise in managing the affairs of other persons; and must 
take into consideration a number of matters referred to in the Guidelines. At least once in 
                                                          
101
 For further information, see the model deed, and the explanation on this issue in the FAQ for Private 
Ancillary Funds. 
102
 s 50-5. 
103
 s 50-20. 
104
 Guidelines 10 and 11. 
105
 ITAA 97 s 30-125. 
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every year, the trustee must review the performance of trust investments (individually and as 
a whole).106 
Borrowings are not permitted (with some limited exceptions). Borrowings existing at 31 
December 2011 may be maintained but the trustee is not able to alter the terms of the 
borrowings without the ATO’s approval. A PUF must not give any security over its assets (with 
some limited exceptions) and may not invest in collectables.107  
A PUF is also not permitted to carry out any business activities though it may carry out normal 
investment and fundraising activities. 
Transactions with trustee and others (Guidelines 41 – 43) 
The income or capital of a PUF may be applied for the reasonable expenses incurred on behalf 
of the fund and to pay fair and reasonable remuneration for the trustee services in 
administering the fund.  
Other than reasonable remuneration and grant making to eligible item 1 DGRs, no material 
benefit may be given to the founder, the trustee, a member, officer, employee or agent of the 
trustee, a donor or an associate of any of these persons. Transactions with any of these 
persons must be at arm’s length and must not be uncommercial, except in favour of the PUF, 
and must be recorded in the financial statements. 
Public donations (Guidelines 44 – 48) 
The public must be invited to contribute to the fund.  The PUF should ensure it is compliant 
with all relevant state and territory fundraising requirements.  
Receipts must be issued in accordance with the requirements of ITAA 97. If the PUF manages 
donations from particular donors, or for particular causes, using sub-funds, care must be taken 
that separate trusts or funds are not created.108  
Portability (Guideline 50) 
A significant change allows a PUF, with the agreement of the ATO, to distribute all its assets or, 
if it has sub-funds, all of the assets of a sub-fund, to another public ancillary fund or private 
ancillary fund. Care will be needed to ensure compliance with trustee duties and the terms of 
the trust deed. 
ATO information 
The ATO has a useful website for PUFs with information and links to forms.109 
 
                                                          
106
 Applicable state or territory Trustee legislation 
107
 Defined in s 108-10 of ITAA 97 as any of the following if used or kept mainly for personal use or 
enjoyment: (a) artwork, jewellery, an antique, or a coin or medallion; or (b) a rare folio, manuscript or 
book; or (c) a postage stamp or first day cover; or any interest in, debt from or option to purchase any of 
those. 
108
 Taxation Determination TD 2004/23. 
109
 See http://www.ato.gov.au/content/00303223.htm. 
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6.5 WORD OF MOUSE: DO YOUR DIRECTORS REALLY 
UNDERSTAND THE IMPACT OF SOCIAL MEDIA ON YOUR 
NONPROFIT ORGANISATION? 
Jennifer Robertson, Senior Consultant, Board Matters 
If part of a board’s corporate governance obligation is to understand the environment in which 
the organisation operates, then what happens when only 5 per cent of board directors 
participate in social media,110 let alone understand its potential power for good...or evil?   
Do your board members have a Facebook or LinkedIn profile? Do they tweet? Do they know 
how to? 
Many of your board members may have only engaged with technology by accessing board 
papers on a secure website or other portal.  Board members may even be receiving and 
reading board papers on an iPad or similar device. And that may very well be it ... for now. 
An understanding of the pros and cons of social media should inform boards of the offensive 
and defensive strategies directors may be able to put in place to ensure that their 
organisations are not left behind in the social media juggernaut. However recent research 
indicates that only 17 per cent of executives have programmes in place to monitor and 
mitigate reputational risks associated with social network usage.111 Social media can enhance 
an organisation’s reputation but can also take it away very quickly.  No longer is reputation or 
commentary passed on as word of mouth, it’s word of mouse.   
From a legal perspective, the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) has 
successfully taken on organisations publishing misleading and deceptive statements on those 
organisations’ websites.  
In November 2011, Citymove Pty Ltd (Citymove) was pursued successfully by the ACCC for 
publishing false testimonials on its website. Citymove was the registered owner of the ‘Moving 
Review’ website on which Citymove posted testimonials as to its own services. None of the 
testimonials were genuine – in fact, they were simply copied (and slightly altered) from 
another review website. The ACCC also found that the organisation failed to have procedures 
in place, to ensure the accuracy of the copied testimonials; and it allowed the website to ‘go 
live’ in the knowledge that errors existed on the website.112  
Whilst the above success may come as no surprise for many, the ACCC has also been successful 
in obtaining Court orders that a corporate Facebook page owner was legally responsible for 
                                                          
110
 Competia (2011) ‘When Social Media Matters: a Guide to the Board of Directors for better 
Governance’ [informal survey], http://www.competia.com/when-social-media-matters-a-guide-to-the-
board-of-directors-for-better-governance.  
111
 Deloitte (2009) ‘Into the fray – How should companies approach collaboration marketing given the 
potential risks?’ http://www.deloitte.com/assets/Dcom-
UnitedStates/Local%20Assets/Documents/us_consulting_IntoTheFray_072809.pdf. 
112
 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2011) ‘Removalist admits publishing false 
testimonials’, http://www.accc.gov.au/content/index.phtml/itemId/1016423/fromItemId/142. 
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the misleading or deceptive statements posted on the company’s Facebook page, not by the 
company itself but by devotees of the company’s services.  
The ACCC took Allergy Pathways Pty Ltd (Allergy Pathways) to the Federal Court of Australia 
twice. In the second round, Allergy Pathways was pursued for a breach of orders not to publish 
certain statements, when it allowed posts written by genuine customers to remain on its 
Facebook wall/Twitter page. Allergy Pathways was found responsible, despite a company 
disclaimer on the wall and the fact that the company removed any extravagant claims posted.  
The ACCC contended that if Allergy Pathways allowed a misleading or deceptive statement to 
remain on its Facebook wall or Twitter page, then it would be legally responsible for those 
statements. That is, in failing to remove the statements, Allergy Pathways accepted 
responsibility for them. The Court agreed. 
It has long been known that material posted on Facebook and other social media sites can end 
up as evidence in litigation (which ought to prompt any board member to think about how that 
material is saved and located, should the need arise). The above examples however bring to 
light the issues for organisations which allow material to remain on a website, Facebook wall 
or a Twitter page – even if the material was not posted by them.   
In this new world of social media, boards must be prepared to recognise that tweets, blogs and 
other consumer generated commentary is democracy at its purest.  Greenpeace have been 
quite active in this space: 113 
 In a recent attack against BP, Greenpeace sought support for its cause and voiced 
consternation over unfair company practices by shutting down 50 BP petrol stations in 
London. Greenpeace put up signs saying: ‘Closed. Moving beyond petroleum’, flipped 
safety (flow) switches on petrol pumps and posted a video on YouTube to articulate its 
issues with BP’s strategic direction.114 
 Nestlé was also attacked by Greenpeace for using palm oil from companies that were 
trashing Indonesian rainforests, threatening the livelihoods of local people and 
pushing orangutans towards extinction. Greenpeace prepared a frontal assault with 
prepared assets such as off-brand logos, detrimental videos, and called for their 
Twitter followers to attack Nestle’s Facebook page.115 
And it’s not just the nonprofit sector flexing its social media muscles. Personal experiences can 
capture the public’s interest: think of the public reaction when United Airlines broke a guitar 
belonging to one of its passengers during a flight in 2009. Four days later, the passenger, Dave 
Caroll posted a song on YouTube called ‘United Breaks Guitars’. Following this uniquely 
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 Torben Rick (2011) ‘Leveraging Social Media to its Great Advantage’, 
http://www.torbenrick.eu/blog/social-media/leveraging-social-media-to-its-great-advantage/. 
114
 Torben Rick (2010) ‘Transparency in a Social Media Age’, 
http://www.torbenrick.eu/blog/strategy/transparency-in-a-social-media-age/. 
115
 Torben Rick (2011) ‘Leveraging Social Media to its Great Advantage’, 
http://www.torbenrick.eu/blog/social-media/leveraging-social-media-to-its-great-advantage/. 
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penned tale of a dreadful customer service experience, United’s stock price reportedly 
dropped by 10 per cent.116   
Clearly the power and potential impact of social media have only just begun to be felt and it’s 
time for boards to sit up and listen. No longer can an organisation control what is being said 
about it. What the board and the executive team can do is control the time it takes them to 
hear what is being said about their organisation and how the organisation responds. 
Some nonprofits have been savvy social media users for some time now, and are already 
harnessing what’s available in this space. Twitter is the great communicator, an uninterrupted 
24/7 pipeline to people of influence and interest. One Brisbane nonprofit in particular regularly 
tweets high profile political figures with causes and issues for concern in relation to their 
mission.   
Perhaps this should cause boards to think about whether the board’s composition requires a 
social media savvy Gen Y-er to help them out. At the very least, an understanding of social 
media is the starting point for all board members. There’s a sea of possibilities out there and it 
might be time to dive in. 
 
6.6 WORKPLACE HEALTH AND SAFETY LAWS: MODEL WORK 
HEALTH AND SAFETY ACT 
Anne Overell, The Australian Centre for Philanthropy and Nonprofit Studies 
INTRODUCTION 
The Commonwealth, states and territories in Australia have had workplace health and safety 
legislation since the late 19th century.117 The legislation creates ‘duty of care offences’ to 
require employers to ensure that workplaces are healthy and safe and will not adversely affect 
employees or other persons who enter onto workplaces. In the most recent versions of the 
legislation in some jurisdictions, those protected included volunteers as well as anyone at a 
workplace. 
As reported in the 2009 Legal Almanac,118 the Workplace Relations Ministerial Council agreed 
in February 2008 to develop model occupational health and safety legislation. The draft model 
law was released for consultation by Safe Work Australia in December 2009 and the 
harmonisation of occupational health and safety laws across Australia was intended to be in 
place by 1 January 2012.  However not all jurisdictions have passed the new legislation and the 
                                                          
116
 Wikipedia, ‘United Breaks Guitars’, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Breaks_Guitars. 
117
 Victoria was the first to implement a version of the British Factories Acts in 1873. Other states 
followed in the 1890s. 
118
 Nathan MacDonald (2010) ‘Workplace Health and Safety’, in Myles McGregor-Lowndes (ed) The 
Australian Nonprofit Sector Legal Almanac 2009 (ACPNS Working Paper 49). 
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hope of harmonisation has not been realised yet. The table below sets out the state of 
enactment of the model laws in each Australian jurisdiction:119 
Current status of Model WHS Act harmonisation (as at January 2012) 
WHS Act passed 
Commonwealth The Commonwealth WHS Bill was passed on 24 November 2011 
NSW The New South Wales WHS Bill was passed on 27 May 2011 
Queensland The Queensland WHS Bill was passed on 26. May 2011 
ACT The Australian Capital Territory passed the WHS Bill on 20 September 2011 
NT The Northern Territory Bill was passed on 1 December 2011 
WHS Act awaiting enactment 
Victoria 
Victoria has not introduced a WHS Bill and has advised it intends to delay its 
introduction for 12 months 
SA 
The South Australian WHS Bill was introduced into Parliament on 19 May 
2011. Legislative Council debate on the Bill is expected on 14 February 2012 
WA 
Western Australia has not announced any commitment to introduce 
harmonised WHS laws 
Tasmania 
Tasmania introduced the WHS Bill into Parliament on 18 October 2011. In 
December the Legislative Council voted to delay the Bill for 12 months. 
 
Recent newspaper reports120 have sensationalised the impact of the laws on organisations that 
employ volunteers. This in turn has caused nonprofit organisations to wonder if the reach of 
the harmonised laws will be detrimental to volunteering efforts. This special issue article 
outlines the operation of the new Work Health and Safety law and examines its effects on 
volunteers. 
OBJECT OF THE ACT 
The starting point is to consider the object of the new legislation.  Firstly it imposes a primary 
duty of care on any ‘person conducting a business or undertaking’ to ensure, as far as is 
reasonably practicable, the health and safety of workers. In so doing the Act does not 
distinguish between operations that are conducted ‘for-profit’, and those that are ‘nonprofit’. 
The object of the new Work Health and Safety Act is set out in section 3: 
3 Object 
(1) The main object of this Act is to provide for a balanced and nationally consistent 
framework to secure the health and safety of workers and workplaces by— 
                                                          
119
 Safe Work Australia, 
http://www.safeworkaustralia.gov.au/Legislation/Pages/ModelWHSLegislation.aspx. Safe Work 
Australia also provides ‘Interpretive Guidelines’ and ‘Legislative Factsheets’. The fact sheets include four 
which are written particularly for volunteers and volunteer organisations.  
120
 Imre Salusinszky (2012), ‘Church volunteers face jail under tough new OHS laws’ The Australian, (18 
January 2012), http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/state-politics/church-volunteers-face-
jail-under-tough-new-ohs-laws/story-e6frgczx-1226246810395; Imre Salusinszky (2012), ‘Rough ride for 
volunteers under new national occupational health and safety laws’, The Australian (17 January 2012),    
http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/state-politics/rough-ride-for-volunteers-under-new-
national-occupational-health-and-safety-laws/story-e6frgczx-1226245912304. 
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(a) protecting workers and other persons against harm to their health, safety and 
welfare through the elimination or minimisation of risks arising from work or from 
particular types of substances or plant; ... 
By subsection 3(2), the objects are furthered by having regard to  
the principle that workers and other persons should be given the highest level of 
protection against harm to their health, safety and welfare from hazards and risks 
arising from work or from particular types of substances or plant as is reasonably 
practicable. 
Note that the object is to secure health and safety of workers and workplaces by eliminating or 
minimising risks ‘from work’, not from workplaces.  This means that the risk has to be 
addressed wherever the work is performed. While the Workplace Health and Safety Act 1995 
(Qld) included in its objects preventing or minimising risk from work activities, and covered 
volunteers (whether as a person in charge of a workplace, a worker121 or a person at a 
workplace), this was not the case in all jurisdictions.  For example, most referred to securing 
health and safety of persons ‘at work’,122 which did not necessarily impose obligations on 
employers to ensure a safe system of work and safe work environment extending beyond the 
confines of the office, workshop or factory, or extending to protect the health and safety of 
volunteers. Under the New South Wales Occupational Health and Safety Act 2000, section 6 
provided that ‘(a) an employee is at work throughout the time when the employee is at his or 
her place of work, but not otherwise’. While place of work meant premises where persons 
work, work meant ‘work as an employee or as a self-employed person’ and employee was 
limited to an ‘individual who works under a contract of employment or apprenticeship’.  
WHO IS A WORKER? IS A VOLUNTEER A WORKER? 
Section 7 of the new Act provides that both paid employees and volunteers can be ‘workers’, 
as long as the person is carrying out work for the business or undertaking: 
7 Meaning of worker 
(1) A person is a worker if the person carries out work in any capacity for a person 
conducting a business or undertaking, including work as— 
(a) an employee; or ... 
(h) a volunteer; ... 
Volunteer is defined in section 4 as ‘a person who is acting on a voluntary basis (irrespective of 
whether the person receives out-of-pocket expenses)’. ‘Out of pocket expenses’ is not defined, 
but would only extend to expenses actually incurred, such as parking, petrol, train fares – not, 
for example, fees or an honorarium which might be paid to a nonprofit organisation’s 
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 ‘Worker’ was defined in s 11 to include any worker whether paid or not. 
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 E.g. see Occupational Health and Safety Act 2000 (NSW) s 3; Occupational Health and Safety Act 2004 
(Vic) s 2; Occupational Health, Safety and Welfare Act 1986 (SA) s 3, Occupational Safety and Health Act 
1984 (WA) s 5; Work Safety Act 2008 (ACT) s 6; Occupational Health and Safety Act 1991 (Cth) s 3; 
Workplace Health and Safety Act 1992 (Tas) ‘An Act to provide for the health and safety of persons 
employed in, engaged in or affected by industry,...’. 
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treasurer or committee member. A board member would not usually be considered an 
employee, but board members who are paid to undertake the role would clearly not be 
volunteers either. They would at least be ‘other persons’ for the purposes of the Act.  
A business or undertaking does not have to be carried on for profit and includes an 
unincorporated association.  However if it is entirely voluntary it will not be subject to the Act. 
For example a children’s soccer club run by parents would probably be a volunteer association, 
which, by virtue of section 5(7), is not a business or undertaking:  
5 Meaning of person conducting a business or undertaking 
(1) For the purposes of this Act, a person conducts a business or undertaking: 
(a) whether the person conducts the business or undertaking alone or with 
others; and 
(b) whether or not the business or undertaking is conducted for profit or gain. 
(2) A business or undertaking conducted by a person includes a business or 
undertaking conducted by a partnership or an unincorporated association.  
.... 
(7) A volunteer association does not conduct a business or undertaking for the 
purposes of this Act. 
(8) In this section, volunteer association means a group of volunteers working 
together for one or more community purposes where none of the volunteers, whether 
alone or jointly with any other volunteers, employs any person to carry out work for 
the volunteer association.. 
However it is important to note that in situations where these laws do not apply the general 
law duties of volunteer organisations to volunteers recognise that volunteers are owed a 
general duty of care by the people and organisations they assist. 
WHAT IS A WORKPLACE? 
The new Act defines a workplace to include any place where a worker goes or is likely to be 
while at work.123  
8 Meaning of workplace 
(1) A workplace is a place where work is carried out for a business or undertaking and 
includes any place where a worker goes, or is likely to be, while at work. 
(2) In this section, place includes— 
(a) a vehicle,124 vessel, aircraft or other mobile structure; and 
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 Model Work Health and Safety Act s 8. 
124
 It is likely this would include a private vehicle used for work purposes. Anecdotal evidence is that 
many volunteers use their own vehicles.  According to Australian Bureau of Statistics data (Voluntary 
Work, Australia 2006, ABS Cat. no. 4441.0, p 3), many volunteers work as drivers, transporting people or 
goods. The duty to ensure no risk to health and safety of others from the work carried on by the 
business or undertaking may have added importance when it involves workers driving vehicles, whether 
with passengers or not, since vehicle accidents figure so largely in the statistics on workplace injury and 
death: SafeWork Australia (2011) Compendium of Workers’ Compensation Statistics Australia 2008–09.  
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(b) any waters and any installation on land, on the bed of any waters or 
floating on any waters. 
Risk can be associated with, or injury caused by a workplace even when no work is being 
performed there.  According to the Explanatory Memorandum, ‘because the main object of 
the Bill is to secure the health and safety of workers at work as well as others who are in the 
vicinity of a workplace, [a] place does not cease being a workplace simply because there is no 
work being carried out at a particular time’.125 The duties of a person conducting a business or 
undertaking that involves management or control of a workplace extend to ensuring that the 
workplace, the means of entering and exiting it and anything arising from the workplace are 
without risks to health and safety of any person.126  
NONPROFIT PERSONS CONDUCT BUSINESS OR UNDERTAKING 
A nonprofit organisation, whether incorporated or not, will be a person conducting a business 
or undertaking as long as it operates a workplace where workers, including volunteers, go to 
carry out work for the organisation. The exclusion of volunteer associations only extends to 
those carrying out a community purpose and not employing any person (i.e. presumably, not 
paying any person to work, apart from reimbursement of expenses incurred).  As soon as a 
volunteer association employs someone to ‘carry out work for the’ association, it would have a 
duty of care to that person; however if a volunteer association hires someone merely on an ad 
hoc basis, e.g. a bookkeeper to audit their accounts or a driver to take them on a bus trip, it 
would still enjoy the exclusion.127  
Although community purpose is not defined, according to the Explanatory Memorandum it is 
intended to cover:  
 philanthropic or benevolent purposes, including the promotion of art, culture, science, 
religion, education, medicine or charity, and 
 sporting or recreational purposes, including the benefiting of sporting or recreational 
clubs or associations.128 
These encompass a wide arc of the nonprofit sector’s areas of operation, with the result that 
most, if not all volunteer-run clubs and associations would be exempt from the Act. 
THE HEALTH AND SAFETY DUTY 
In some respects the new Act is less stringent than previous legislation, for example in 
Queensland.  Under the Workplace Health and Safety Act 1995 (Qld) the person who 
conducted a business or undertaking had an obligation to ensure workers and others were not 
affected by the operation, and the obligation was only discharged if the persons were not 
                                                          
125
 Explanatory Memorandum para 49. 
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 Model Work Health and Safety Act s 20.  
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 Explanatory Memorandum clauses 30 to 32. The examples are those given in the EM.  
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 Ibid, clause 32 
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exposed to risks to their health and safety from the conduct of the business or undertaking.129  
This appears to be a more onerous duty than that under the new Act.  
Under the new Act, a person can have more than one duty and more than one person can 
have the same duty (sections 15 and 16).  Consistent with the common law and previous 
statutory duties, the duty to ensure health and safety (section 17) involves a duty to manage 
the risk – to eliminate risks where reasonably practicable and to minimise risks where it’s not. 
The primary duty of care for a person conducting a business or undertaking is in section 19: as 
far as reasonably practicable to ensure the health and safety of:  
 workers engaged by the person in the business or undertaking; and  
 workers whose activities the person influences or directs. 
Therefore it is not just those directly employed.  
Guidance on what is reasonably practicable is provided in section 18.130 It means what is at the 
time ‘reasonably able to be done’ to ensure health and safety, taking into account relevant 
matters including the likelihood of a hazard or risk occurring; the degree of harm that might 
result; what the person knows or ought reasonably to know about the hazard or risk and ways 
to eliminate or minimise it; and the availability and suitability of ways to eliminate or minimise 
the risk.131 Cost is also a consideration in assessing ways to avoid or minimise the risk, but only 
after the other considerations are taken into account.132 Good sense knows that where likely 
risk and seriousness of harm are high, the high cost of taking precautions is less acceptable as 
an excuse for not doing so.  
What constitutes ‘reasonably practicable’ for an organisation to do depends on any given 
circumstances. It follows that if an organisation is run by volunteers then this will be a 
consideration in determining whether measures are reasonably practicable.133  
The duty attaches to the workers engaged in work, not to the workplace.134  The duty is met135 
by providing a work environment without risks to health and safety; safe systems of work; safe 
use and handling of plant etc; information, training, instruction and supervision; facilities for 
welfare of workers; monitoring of workers’ health and conditions. The risks to others must be 
taken into consideration when designing and implementing the system of work, including 
anticipating the carelessness or inadvertence of workers.  
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 Workplace Health and Safety Act 1995 (Qld) s 28. 
130
 See also Safe Work Australia’s interpretive guideline on the meaning of ‘reasonably practicable’, 
http://www.safeworkaustralia.gov.au/Legislation/ModelWHSAct/Pages/ModelWHSAct.aspx#1  
131
 These are considerations similar to those relevant to establishing breach of the common law duty of 
care. 
132
 Model Work Health and Safety Act, s 18(e). 
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 Safe Work Australia (2011) Volunteers and the Model Work Health and Safety Act (Legislative Fact 
Sheet Series), 
http://www.safeworkaustralia.gov.au/AboutSafeWorkAustralia/WhatWeDo/Publications/Pages/Volunt
eersModelWHSActFactSheet.aspx. 
134
 Explanatory Memorandum para 79. 
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 Model Work Health and Safety Act s 19. 
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OFFICERS’ DUTIES 
Under the new Act, section 27 extends duties to officers of the person conducting the business 
or undertaking.  Officer is defined in section 4 by reference to its meaning in the Corporations 
Act 2001.136  This includes a director or secretary; and a person who is involved in making 
decisions that affect the business of the corporation, or is capable of affecting the 
corporation’s financial standing.  Office holders of unincorporated associations are also officers 
under the Corporations Act. 
The duty is a positive duty to exercise due diligence to ensure that the person conducting the 
business or undertaking complies with the duties and obligations under the Act. To comply 
with section 27, due diligence requires taking reasonable steps: 
(a) to acquire and keep up-to-date knowledge of work health and safety matters; and 
(b) to gain an understanding of the nature of the operations of the business or 
undertaking of the person conducting the business or undertaking and generally of the 
hazards and risks associated with those operations; and 
(c) to ensure that the person conducting the business or undertaking has available for 
use, and uses, appropriate resources and processes to eliminate or minimise risks to 
health and safety from work carried out as part of the conduct of the business or 
undertaking; and 
(d) to ensure that the person conducting the business or undertaking has appropriate 
processes for receiving and considering information regarding incidents, hazards and 
risks and responding in a timely way to that information; and 
(e) to ensure that the person conducting the business or undertaking has, and 
implements, processes for complying with any duty or obligation of the person 
conducting the business or undertaking under this Act;137 and 
(f) to verify the provision and use of the resources and processes referred to in 
paragraphs (c) to (e). 
This list is conjunctive – all requirements must be met. It requires senior managers and other 
officers to gain and maintain current knowledge about the Act, associated regulations, codes 
and standards applicable to their operations. They must also take positive steps to understand 
the nature of the workplace health and safety risks and hazards arising in their organisation’s 
operations, and ensure that the person conducting the business or undertaking meets the 
duties under the Act, in terms of making resources available and implementing processes to 
eliminate or minimise the risks.  An officer can be convicted of breach under section 27 even if 
the organisation conducting the business or undertaking is not convicted. 
VOLUNTEER BOARD OR MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE OFFICERS – PROTECTIONS FROM 
PROSECUTION 
For a nonprofit board or management committee – usually made up of volunteers – this 
presents a significant level of duty, which appears particularly onerous. However, there are 
protections for volunteers: for example section 34 provides that a volunteer does not commit 
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an offence under the Division except where he or she has failed to comply with the duty, of a 
worker under section 28 or a person at the workplace under section 29, to take reasonable 
care for one’s own health and safety and not to do acts or omissions that affect the health and 
safety of others. So, as long as nonprofit board members are not remunerated, they are 
exempt from the, more onerous, ‘officers’ duty’. Unincorporated associations are also 
exempted from liability, but importantly (paid) officers can be liable under the ‘duty of officers’ 
provision (section 27), and members of unincorporated associations can be liable for not 
taking reasonable care for their own and others’ health and safety (sections 28 and 29): 
34 Exceptions 
(1) A volunteer does not commit an offence under this Division for a failure to comply 
with a health and safety duty, except a duty under section 28 or 29. 
(2) An unincorporated association does not commit an offence under this Act, and is 
not liable for a civil penalty under this Act, for a failure to comply with a duty or 
obligation imposed on the unincorporated association under this Act. 
(3) However: 
(a) an officer of an unincorporated association (other than a volunteer) may be 
liable for a failure to comply with a duty under section 27; and 
(b) a member of an unincorporated association may be liable for failure to 
comply with a duty under section 28 or 29. 
DUTIES OF WORKERS INCLUDING VOLUNTEERS 
A volunteer worker has the same duties under the Act as a paid worker, as long as they work 
for an organisation that is covered by the Act (generally, a business or undertaking unless it is a 
volunteer association). Under section 28 (similar to the previous statutory regimes) all workers 
must:  
(a) take reasonable care for their own health and safety; and 
(b) take reasonable care that their acts or omissions do not adversely affect the health 
and safety of other persons; and 
(c) comply, so far as the worker is reasonably able, with any reasonable instruction 
that is given by the person conducting the business or undertaking to allow the person 
to comply with this Act; and 
(d) co-operate with any reasonable policy or procedure of the person conducting the 
business or undertaking relating to health or safety at the workplace that has been 
notified to workers.138 
This means that volunteers must be just as careful as paid workers to ensure they take the 
time to familiarise themselves with workplace health and safety policies and procedures.  
A coordinator or manager of volunteers should ensure that policies and procedures are 
available to volunteers and that health and safety instructions are communicated to them 
clearly. 
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A NOTE ON BREACH OF STATUTORY DUTY CLAIMS 
Workplace health and safety laws create criminal offences; they do not provide for damages 
for injury. Workers’ compensation provides for injured workers, but in many cases a common 
law action is the only avenue for a plaintiff to seek redress for harm caused by a worker or 
work. A breach of statutory duty claim is in many ways easier to establish than a common law 
claim for breach of duty of care, because it simply requires a plaintiff to show the particular 
Act was breached and that the injury resulted. Most of the former WHS Acts did not allow an 
injured employee to bring a civil action for harm caused by breach of statutory duty.139  
Section 267 of the new Act precludes a civil action for breach of statutory duty under the Act, 
except under limited provisions.140 
Workers’ compensation is still the most accessible avenue for injured workers to recover lost 
earnings, medical expenses etc. However most volunteers are not covered by workers’ 
compensation, so an action in negligence may be the only avenue. 
FURTHER INFORMATION 
Information on the new Work Health and Safety Act, Regulations and Codes is available from 
Safe Work Australia, which also has a Volunteer Assistance Helpline: 
 phone: 02 6240 4990 (9am to 5pm weekdays or leave a message after hours).  
 email: Volunteers@SafeWorkAustralia.gov.au.   
 Website: http://www.safeworkaustralia.gov.au 
The following Fact Sheets for volunteers (the Legislative Fact Sheet Series) are available on the 
Safe Work Australia website: 
 Volunteers and the model Work Health and Safety Act;  
 Volunteer ‘officers’ and their duties under the model Work Health and Safety Act;  
 Volunteer organisations and the model Work Health and Safety Act;  
 How volunteer organisations can comply with the model Work Health and Safety Act.  
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 For example in Queensland, s 37A of the Workplace Health and Safety Act 1995. NSW, Victoria and 
the NT had equivalent provisions. Tasmania’s and South Australia’s Acts did not preclude an action for 
breach of statutory duty, so the presumption held, that a cause of action in damages would arise upon 
breach of health and safety law and injury: O’Connor v SP Bray Ltd (1936–1937) 56 CLR 464 at 478 
(Dixon J). 
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7.0 WHAT DOES 2012 HOLD? 
Myles McGregor-Lowndes, The Australian Centre for Philanthropy and Nonprofit Studies 
 
7.1 NATIONAL AUDIT OFFICE PERFORMANCE REPORT: 
‘ADMINISTRATION OF DEDUCTIBLE GIFT RECIPIENTS 
(NON-PROFIT SECTOR)’ 
There are 49 different categories of entities that are eligible for Deductible Gift Recipient 
(DGR) endorsement under Division 30 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (ITAA). The 
ATO’s Non-Profit Centre (NPC) within the Small and Medium Enterprise business line, has the 
task of administering tax legislation in relation to the nonprofit sector, and since 1 July 2000 
specifically for assessing the eligibility for DGR endorsement status.  
In its Performance Audit Report on the ATO’s administration of DGRs,141 the Australian 
National Audit Office (ANAO) noted that the 2011–12 Federal Budget announced that the 
proposed Australian Charities and Not-for-profits Commission (ACNC) would play a role in 
determining Public Benevolent Institution (PBI) status. It conducted an audit ‘to assess the 
effectiveness of the ATO’s administration of DGR endorsements and associated arrangements’. 
Particular emphasis was given to ATO governance arrangements; consistency of outcomes; 
minimisation of unnecessary administrative requirements for applicants; and compliance 
approach which ensures that fundraising entities comply with DGR endorsement 
requirements. The scope of the audit did not include compliance by taxpayers with 
requirements for claims of gifts and donations as income tax deductions.   
The ANOA’s overall conclusion included that:  
The ATO has implemented appropriate arrangements to effectively administer DGR 
endorsements and the associated tax concessions. The NPC’s business planning and 
internal reporting are well integrated into the ATO’s broader business approach. The NPC 
also undertakes internal monitoring of its operations and, within the constraints of its 
resourcing and capabilities, takes action to address required improvements. However, 
scope exists for the ATO to improve the consistency of its decision making on DGR 
endorsement applications and to more effectively monitor compliance by organisations 
that are endorsed as DGRs.142 [emphasis added] 
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 Auditor-General (2010) Administration of Deductible Gift Recipients (Non-profit Sector): Australian 
Taxation Office (Australian National Audit Office, Audit Report No 52, Performance Audit) 
http://www.anao.gov.au/~/media/Uploads/Audit%20Reports/2010%2011/201011%20Audit%20Report
%20No%2052.pdf. 
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 Ibid p 20. 
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Its key findings included: 
 Assessing DGR endorsement applications  
‘For applications where all the necessary information required for decision‐making has 
been provided, the timeliness standard for processing applications is 28 days elapsed time. 
On average, the elapsed time to process DGR applications in 2009–10 was 36.7 days.’143 
‘[O]f the eleven law firms involved in assisting DGR applicants that were interviewed by 
the ANAO, nine raised concerns regarding the consistency of decision‐making. The ANAO 
reviewed 55 selected DGR cases to assess whether decisions were consistent with the 
guidance material available at the time. This analysis identified inconsistencies in the 
decision‐making on DGR endorsement for the categories relating to: volunteer fire 
brigades; school building funds; and school library gift funds operated by school 
foundations or parents and citizens associations. In addition, over 12 per cent of 
disallowed decisions are subject to an objection with more than 40 per cent of these 
resulting in the original decision being overturned.’144 
‘Inconsistencies were also identified in the processing of similar cases in different 
locations, suggesting that the current processes for a national practice in application 
processing has not been fully effective.’145 In recent years pre-finalisation quality assurance 
processes have not identified inconsistent or incorrect decisions, whereas (independent) 
post-finalisation assessments have determined an error rate of five per cent of all DGR 
application decisions. ‘[T]the estimated error rate across all DGR endorsement decisions is 
up to 12 per cent at the 95 per cent confidence level.’146 
 Limitations to current approach to risk identification and assessment 
The initial endorsement process in 2000–01 had a disallowed or withdrawn rate of only 17 
per cent, compared to 34 per cent in 2009–10. Despite this there has been no systematic 
monitoring or review of endorsement processes – with the risk of a large number of non-
compliant DGRs on the register.147 
 Communicating and coordinating DGR application requirements 
‘Applications requiring assessment by Commonwealth agencies other than the ATO take 
up to two years to determine.’148 (e.g. overseas aid and cultural funds) 
 Managing DGR compliance 
‘The NPC’s work in this area has been limited by resource constraints. The ATO has 1.5 
FTEs assigned to the Risk and Intelligence team, and seven FTE staff to the NPC Active 
Compliance team. Allocation of additional general compliance staff is on an ad hoc basis. 
The NPC’s compliance work is further limited by a lack of quantitative data. The sources of 
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information held on fundraising organisations (including endorsed entities) within the ATO 
and by other government agencies are not collated and interrogated to identify 
organisations at risk of non‐compliance. The ATO advised that it is planning to develop a 
risk rating engine for the non‐profit sector in 2010–11, providing the potential to assist 
selection of cases for compliance activity.’149  
‘Limited resources and quantitative tools have resulted in risk and intelligence assessments 
being broadly based on qualitative information from media reports, individuals and other 
entities, and analysed on an ‘intuitive basis’. It has also limited the number of direct 
assessments able to be conducted by the Active Compliance teams. In particular, during 
2009–10, the ATO completed four audits and 38 other reviews involving 40 DGRs (from the 
population of some 24 000 DGRs). The outcome of this compliance activity was that 13 
DGRs (32 per cent) had their DGR endorsement revoked. The level of resources assigned to 
risk assessment and active compliance is not commensurate with the ATO’s determination 
that the risk of non‐compliance by DGRs is high.’150 
RECOMMENDATIONS151 
1. To improve consistent decision‐making in respect of deductible gift recipient endorsement 
applications, the ANAO recommends that the ATO strengthen its quality assurance processes 
by: 
(a) reviewing decisions prior to finalisation through robust, independent assessment; 
and 
(b) selecting cases for quality assurance on the basis of the assessed risk of 
inconsistencies across category types.  
Tax Office Response: Agreed. 
2. To improve the effectiveness of the risk assessments of deductible gift recipients (DGRs), the 
ANAO recommends that the ATO: 
(a) uses relevant information available internally and from other government bodies to 
identify risks and non‐compliant entities; 
(b) identifies DGRs whose applications for endorsement may not meet current 
endorsement requirements because of changes over time to the DGR endorsement 
processes and interpretation of legislation; and 
(c) strengthens its education and information activities to encourage DGRs to annually 
self assess their continued eligibility for DGR status. 
Tax Office Response: Agreed. 
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COMMENT 
This report deserves far greater attention by the sector than it was apparently given upon its 
release. It indicates that there may be substantial non-compliance with DGR status on the ATO 
register, particularly among pre-existing entities on the commencement of the endorsement 
process. This may be taken up in a review of the register process with the ACNC in the future. 
The processing times will also be an initial benchmark for the ACNC’s processing of such 
applications. With the ‘reduction of red tape’ mantra a constant refrain underlying the 
proposed reforms, those processes are set to be streamlined.  
Particularly disturbing in the ANAO’s findings is the low staffing level (1.5 FTEs) assigned to the 
Risk and Intelligence team, which is clearly an obstacle to detecting and dealing quickly with 
large scale tax abusive behaviour, which can seriously damage public trust in tax deductible 
gifts. 
 
7.2 SENATE ECONOMICS REFERENCES COMMITTEE 
INQUIRY INTO FINANCE FOR THE NONPROFIT SECTOR 
This Senate Economics References Committee has produced a report of over 250 pages on the 
barriers and options available to develop a market for capital to be used in social 
enterprises.152 This issue was identified by the Productivity Commission Research Report, 
Contribution of the Not-for-profit Sector in January 2010, and the Senate Committee’s report 
builds upon this foundation. The main recommendation is the formation of a Social Finance 
Taskforce which would have an advisory role to identify and champion opportunities for 
investment and collaboration to create a social capital market. Supporting this strategy would 
be capacity building of intermediaries – organisations which work to bring together social 
enterprise with potential investors. Such intermediaries and others should seek to broaden the 
awareness and acceptance of social investments among mainstream financial institutions, 
their intermediaries and philanthropic foundations. The report offers suggestions for building 
the resilience of social enterprises themselves through strategies such as providing seed 
capital social enterprises by intermediary organisations and government procurement 
programs extending opportunities to social enterprises. The Committee’s final 
recommendation concerns developing a measuring framework having the characteristics of 
being ‘applied consistently across governments’, but at the same time being flexible and 
allowing for a number of measurement methodologies. 
A selection of the Committee’s recommendations153 is outlined below. 
                                                          
152 Senate Economics References Committee (2011) Investing for Good: The Development of a Capital 
Market for the Not-for-profit Sector in Australia, 
http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate_Committees?url=economics_ctte
/capital_market_2011/index.htm. 
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Establishing a Social Finance Taskforce  
Recommendation 2.1  
2.56 The committee recommends that the government establish a Social Finance Taskforce to 
assess mechanisms and options in the progress and development of a robust capital market for 
social economy organisations in Australia. The taskforce should initially report to government 
by July 2012.  
Recommendation 4.3  
4.71 The committee recommends that the proposed Social Finance Taskforce consider the 
potential for philanthropic trusts and foundations to invest a percentage of their corpus in 
social investments options, particularly with regard to:  
 whether a requirement for philanthropic foundations to invest a percentage of their 
corpus in mission or program related investments is appropriate in the Australian 
context;  
 how to develop appropriate social investment vehicles for philanthropic 
intermediaries; and  
 any other mechanisms by which the corpus of philanthropic funds could be better 
utilised to invest in the social economy.  
Recommendation 4.4  
4.96 The committee recommends that the proposed Social Finance Taskforce consider the 
potential for superannuation funds and other institutional investors to invest in emerging social 
impact investment products, with particular regard to ascertaining:  
 what clarification, if any, is necessary regarding the fiduciary duties of superannuation 
funds and their ability to engage with social impact investment opportunities;  
 how social impact investment classes can be used as a portfolio diversification tool by 
superannuation funds;  
 whether incentives may be required in order to attract institutional investment to the 
sector;  
 how social investment funds can be developed to attract institutional investment; and  
 what possible mechanisms are available to lower the transaction costs for institutional 
investors seeking to engage with social investment opportunities.  
Recommendation 5.2  
5.98 The committee recommends that the proposed Social Finance Task Force consider 
possible options to develop Community Development Financial Institutions in Australia, taking 
into account:  
 the findings of the forthcoming study commissioned by the Department of Families, 
Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs into the current regulatory and 
legislative environment for Community Development Financial Institutions in Australia;  
 whether tax incentives should be established to encourage investment in CDFIs in 
Australia; and  
 any other initiatives that may benefit the development of CDFIs investing in social 
economy organisations.  
Education, awareness and capacity building  
Recommendation 4.5  
4.104 The committee recommends that professional organisations such as the Australian 
Institute of Company Directors and investment advisory services develop materials and 
professional development workshops to inform the corporate sector of investment 
opportunities in the social economy.  
Recommendation 5.1  
5.28 The committee recommends that philanthropic and financial advisory services promote 
and encourage opportunities for social investment and engagement with the sector.  
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Recommendation 6.1  
6.32 The committee recommends that programs and workshops relating to social impact 
investment be developed by investment organisations to encourage investors to engage in 
social investment projects and opportunities.  
Promoting social investment products  
Recommendation 4.1  
4.69 The committee recommends that the Australian Taxation Office, in consultation with the 
Australian Charities and Not-for-Profits Commission and other relevant stakeholders, issue 
explanatory material for Private Ancillary Fund trustees informing them of:  
 the ability of these funds to treat any discount to the market returns on social 
investments as benefit for the purpose of the minimum distribution requirements; and  
 the necessity of including a clause regarding social investment classes in their 
investment strategy documents in order to invest in social investment products.  
Recommendation 4.2  
4.70 The committee recommends that the Commissioner of Taxation, Treasury and the Office 
for the Not-For-Profit Sector work to create benchmarks and standards for financial returns on 
social investment classes such as debt products and social bonds, in order to help trustees and 
fund managers make informed investment decisions in this area.  
Recommendation 6.2  
6.96 The committee recommends that the Departments of Treasury and Finance and 
Deregulation to examine ways to create incentives to invest in a social bond market in Australia 
including the feasibility of tax exempt income returns, a government top up on coupons 
through cash or tax credits and the use of government guarantees.  
Recommendation 6.3  
6.97 The committee recommends that the Office for the Not-for-Profit Sector identify policy 
areas where social impact bonds could be applied, including intractable problems in indigenous 
communities. The plausibility of creating social impact bonds in partnership with state 
governments should also be examined.  
6.98 The Office for the Not-for-Profit Sector should work with relevant government 
departments and agencies and social organisations to implement a social impact bond trial. 
Strengthening Social Enterprise  
Recommendation 8.1  
8.75 The Office for the Not-for-Profit Sector identify relevant current and future government 
programs, such as Enterprise Connect and the New Enterprise Incentive Scheme, that could be 
extended to offer specialised support for social enterprises. The programs should be extended 
to include support for cooperatives, employee share ownership plans and employee buyouts.  
Recommendation 8.2  
8.76 The Department of Finance and Deregulation, Treasury and the Office for the Not-for-
Profit Sector should jointly conduct a review of the competitive tendering and contracting 
framework and examine the costs and benefits of:  
 social tendering to identify a social purpose business rather than a competitive 
tendering process; and  
 including a community/social benefit criterion in the call for and assessment of 
competitive tenders.  
Developing a measurement framework  
Recommendation 7.1  
7.38 The committee recommends that the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet 
identify policy areas where results based funding is already utilised and use any relevant 
programs as an evidence base towards the development of a robust measurement framework 
for social economy organisations in Australia.  
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Recommendation 7.2  
7.39 The committee recommends the Office for the Not-for-Profit Sector in the Department of 
the Prime Minister and Cabinet prepare a guide for social economy organisations to assist in 
evaluation of their performance. The guide should be based on the evaluation framework 
recommended by the Productivity Commission using inputs, outputs, outcomes and impacts 
and include Australian case studies and emerging international measurement tools.  
7.40 The guide should provide social economy organisations with a number of measurement 
techniques as options to measure their outcomes and impacts. The committee recommends 
that the guide be adopted by the Council of Australian Governments and distributed to all 
government departments and agencies. 
The government has yet to respond formally to the recommendations (a response is normally 
due three months after the report is published). 
 
7.3 FEDERAL BUDGET 2011–12 
BUDGET MEASURES – BUDGET PAPER NO. 2154  
In its 2011–12 budget, the federal government announced several matters that impact upon 
the regulation of the nonprofit sector. First, $53.6 million was committed over four years to 
establish the Australian Charities and Not-for-profits Commission (ACNC) which was scheduled 
to begin operation on 1 July 2012 (now extended to 1 October 2012155). (Further discussion of 
the ACNC appears below.) An implementation taskforce was set up in Treasury from 1 July 
2011 and the ATO is to provide corporate support to the ACNC. A public information portal is 
to be ready by 1 July 2013. The ATO will separate its role of determining charitable status from 
its role of administering tax concessions. An additional tax revenue of $41 million over four 
years is expected from increased compliance activity around tax concessions. 
Second, the government indicated that it would introduce a statutory definition of charity 
based on the 2001 Report of the Charities Definition Inquiry156 with no expected impact on 
revenue. (Further discussion of this issue appears below at 7.7.) The ACNC was allocated 
$2.9 million over four years to provide new education materials for the sector and review the 
status of entities, based on the new definition. 
Third, the government announced what, in other jurisdictions, is known as an ‘unrelated 
business income tax’ (UBIT) measure that commenced on 1 July 2011 and will affect new 
unrelated commercial activities that nonprofit entities commenced after 10 May 2011. Entities 
with existing unrelated commercial activities will be able to continue to access such tax 
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concessions, but it is intended to phase these out over time. There was no clear policy 
rationale disclosed for the measure. The budget paper stated that:157 
Under this measure, the NFP income tax concessions will only apply to profits 
generated by unrelated commercial activities that are directed back to a NFP entity to 
carry out its altruistic work. This means NFP entities will pay income tax on profits 
from their unrelated commercial activities that are not directed back to their altruistic 
purpose (that is, the earnings they retain in their commercial undertaking).  
This appears to be a cross between the USA’s unrelated business income tax (UBIT) and the UK 
model (which requires separation of a charitable organisation’s non-core business into another 
legal entity, with effectual income tax free repatriation of profits back to the parent charity 
under certain conditions). A significant impost under the Australian policy is that:158 
NFP entities, in respect of their unrelated commercial activities, will also not have 
access to the fringe benefits tax exemptions or rebate, goods and services tax 
concessions, or deductible gift recipient support in relation to those activities. 
Despite the proposal being placed under the ‘revenue measures’ part of the budget 
documents, the forward estimate of revenue to be collected for the next five years is merely 
reported as ‘–‘, i.e. ‘nil’ (the meaning given to a dash, in the general notes to the paper). There 
is no adequate explanation of how this result could be arrived at, given that it is not clear that 
all taxable entities will direct all income from their ‘unrelated commercial  activities’ to their 
core charitable purposes and why concessions other than income tax concessions (such as FBT, 
GST) will not be collected. A further discussion paper on nonprofit tax concessions was 
released in May 2011 and is discussed below. 
 
7.4 ESTABLISHING A NATIONAL REGULATOR FOR THE 
NONPROFIT SECTOR IN AUSTRALIA: THE AUSTRALIAN 
CHARITIES AND NOT-FOR-PROFITS COMMISSION 
SCOPING STUDY FOR A NATIONAL REGULATOR 
On 21 January 2011, Assistant Treasurer Bill Shorten and Minister for Social Inclusion Tanya 
Plibersek released a consultation paper, Scoping Study for a National Not-for-profit Regulator, 
as part of public consultation on the design of a new national regulator for the nonprofit 
sector.159  
The consultation paper was part of the government's 2010 election commitment to strengthen 
the sector and build upon the Productivity Commission’s research report, The Contribution of 
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the Not For Profit Sector and the Australia’s Future Tax System Report (Henry Report). The 
paper sought comment from stakeholders on the goals of national regulation, the scope of 
national regulation and the function and form of a national regulator. Submissions closed on 
25 February, 2011 and most debate surrounded the options to set up a national regulator as 
an independent body, or as part of the ATO or ASIC. There was also robust discussion about 
the scope and functions of a regulator, its educative role and services, fundraising regulation, 
governance codes, a statutory definition of ‘charity’, and how a new regulator would be 
funded. 
The Final Report on a Scoping Study for a National Not-for-profit Regulator160 was released in 
April 2011. The 80 page report is the blueprint for establishing a national regulator for the 
sector and has 44 recommendations. There were not many significant shifts from the 
discussion paper, as the recommendations set out below indicate. Some of the issues raised in 
response to the discussion paper, but dismissed or only partly accepted, were: 
1. The regulator’s role should extend to being a facilitator or advocate for the sector. 
2. There are advantages in having specialist sub-sector regulators such as those in 
housing or indigenous fields. 
3. The ATO has a potential conflict of interest between collecting revenue and advancing 
social and economic outcomes. 
4. The statutory definition of charity would result in politicisation and greater 
uncertainty. 
5. The education function should be a core function of the regulator. 
6. A national fundraising regime is critical to red tape reduction and should be 
implemented immediately. 
7. Grant acquittals should be rationalised and streamlined as a priority. 
8. The regulator be located within ASIC or fully independent, not under the influence of 
the ATO. 
9. The sector should contribute to the administrative costs of the national regulator. 
The Recommendations from the Scoping Study Report161 are copied below: 
Goals  
1. The goals of NFP reform, as outlined in the consultation paper, should be used to guide the 
NFP reform process.  
The consultation paper (discussed above)
162
 stated that: 
NFP regulation should promote a strong and sustainable NFP sector through good governance, 
transparency and accountability to underpin strong philanthropic engagement in the 
community. Regulation which achieves these goals is essential to underpin public confidence in 
the sector and to assist the public and government in the effective and efficient allocation of 
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resources to meet community needs. 
Regulation of the NFP sector should:  
• place minimal costs on NFPs in order to allow better direction of NFP resources to 
philanthropic objectives; 
• remove current regulatory duplication; 
• streamline requirements, including reporting, so as to provide consistency and minimise 
compliance costs; 
• provide a ‘one-stop shop’ for NFP entities, to assist all NFP entities to more easily access 
information that helps them understand and comply with their regulatory obligations;  
• be simple, transparent and flexible;  
• provide NFP entities with certainty as to their rights and responsibilities; and 
• be proportional to the size and complexity of NFP entities, and to the public monies and 
risks associated with NFP entities. 
Simplicity and transparency will provide a solid foundation, and sufficient flexibility for the 
sector to grow sustainably over time and tailor its services to meet those evolving community 
needs. Regulation should be flexible enough to allow opportunities for the sector to develop 
through expansion or consolidation. Regulation should also provide for the capacity 
development of NFP entities. 
Appropriate monitoring and compliance activities are essential to public confidence in the 
sector, particularly given the trend for increased government funding for service delivery. 
Regulation must ensure that donors and volunteers are confident that regulation protects the 
assets of charities and NFPs and monies donated by the public, and minimises the risks of 
malfeasance. 
A NFP regulator should work with the sector to provide support and education in order to 
improve understanding and compliance with regulatory requirements. A national NFP regulator 
can provide an interface for government and sector interaction, permitting a better exchange of 
information and allowing the government to better respond to emerging issues and to maintain 
a modern and adaptive framework. 
 
Scope of national regulation 
2. A single regulator should be established for the purposes of governance, accountability and 
transparency of NFPs.  
3. The NFP regulator should, as far as possible, be responsible for regulating all NFPs.  
4. Entities that are currently regulated by ASIC should be incorporated within the regulatory 
framework as soon as new reporting and governance frameworks are implemented. ASIC 
should still retain responsibility for incorporation.  
5. The regulator should administer a principles-based regulatory framework which would apply 
broadly across the NFP sector, although regulation should be proportional and tailored to 
address the specific needs and size of NFPs.  
6. The options for reform in areas which require the cooperation of the Commonwealth, states 
and territories should be progressed through the COAG agenda, including the areas of 
incorporated associations and charitable trusts.  
7. Further reviews should be undertaken in areas where there are opportunities for further 
reform. This may include reviews of existing regulators and the legal form of NFPs, including 
the company limited by guarantee structure. 
Registration 
8. The NFP regulator should determine the NFP status of entities, including charities and PBIs. 
Initially, the regulator’s determination should be accepted by every Commonwealth agency. 
The regulator should initially focus on determining the status of charities including PBIs, with 
this focus gradually extending to include all other NFP entities.  
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9. Through the COAG process, the Australian Government should work with state and territory 
authorities with the aim of ensuring that the regulator’s registration applies throughout 
Australia, and be accepted by every government agency.  
10. Entities should apply to have their status determined by the regulator on a voluntary basis. 
However, to access support provided by the Australian Government, and any state and 
territory governments that agree following conclusion of the COAG process, a NFP entity would 
need to be registered and regulated by the NFP regulator.  
11. Administrative decisions taken by the NFP regulator should be subject to internal review; 
independent review by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal; and a right to appeal to the federal 
courts. 
Definition of charity 
12. The definition should be based on the 2001 Charities Definition Inquiry, noting the 
recommendations of the recent 2010 Senate Inquiry, and taking into account the findings of 
recent judicial decisions, such as Aid/Watch Incorporated v Commissioner of Taxation. 
13. The definition of charity should be harmonised across Australian jurisdictions. 
14. The Government should undertake further consultation on the definition of charity. 
Education and compliance 
15. The regulator should produce educational materials for the sector, including a centralised 
portal of information for NFP entities, web based training, ‘how to’ guidance materials, phone 
assistance, referral services for organisations requiring external advice, and ongoing 
consultation with the sector.  
16. The regulator should also play a role in relation to educating the public about the sector, 
including through the oversight of complaints, concerns and surveys about its satisfaction with 
the sector.  
17. Where possible the regulator should leverage off the existing resources and expertise 
already provided to the sector by peak bodies and government agencies. 
Fundraising 
18. Issues common to both the national NFP regulator and NFP fundraising projects should be 
reviewed by the Government, with coordination between a national NFP regulator and the 
Ministerial Council for Consumer Affairs’ current consideration of fundraising issues. 
Reporting 
19. A ‘report once, use often’ approach should be adopted in relation to financial reporting 
from NFPs. Reporting should reflect ‘smarter regulation’ and the trade off between standard 
reporting and simple reporting should be carefully considered as part of the development of 
the standard report.  
20. The regulator should act as a central reporting coordinator of financial and other 
information and as such should: 
 be responsible for the SCOA; 
 harmonise reporting requirements between Commonwealth, state, territory and local 
governments; and 
 determine the form of the financial report in consultation with the NFP sector and 
government agencies. 
21. Each entity should provide information for reporting purposes but the content should be 
proportional to the size of entities, risk factors and level of sector and government assistance. 
Small entities should be required to provide no more than a post card of information.  
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22. The AASB should continue to ensure that Australian accounting standards take account of 
NFP issues and identify any gaps in this area.  
23. The regulator should work with the AASB to provide guidance on NFP accounting issues. 
24. Acquittal reporting should be outcomes based and should not include financial reporting or 
reporting related to organisational governance.  
25. Consideration should be given to bringing acquittals reporting within the regulator’s ‘report 
once, use often’ framework where possible. 
26. Consideration should be given to utilising SBR for NFP reporting. 
Information portal 
27. The Government should proceed with a public information portal for registered entities. 
28. The information portal should be established and maintained by the regulator.  
29. The portal should be operated in consultation with and link with the ABR. 
30. The information to be displayed on the portal could include information on issues such as 
sphere of operation, income and expenditure, financial history, contact details of persons 
managing the entity, governing documents, annual reports, trustees’ reports, and summary 
information returns.  
31. NFPs should be allowed to control some of the content on parts of the site. 
32. NFPs should be able to make qualitative statements about their activities and performance. 
33. The portal should provide NFPs with centralised government guidance and information. 
34. The portal should allow links to other websites, including those which provide information 
on other Government accreditation and licenses. 
Governance, disclosure and compliance 
35. Organisational governance rules should be proportional to the size of entities, risk factors 
and receipt of public and government assistance. 
36. The regulation of service provision should remain with existing entities. 
37. Governance contracts should no longer mandate organisational governance requirements 
for NFPs.  
38. Treasury should undertake a review to determine what, if any, should be the core 
organisational governance principles applying to registered NFPs.  
39. Over the long term, the regulator should be provided with powers regarding asset 
protection, the suspension and/or removal of responsible persons, registration and 
deregistration, the enforcement of governance rules, investigative processes; enforcement 
powers, including civil penalties and the imposition of fines, proportional compliance activities, 
and, dispute resolution processes. 
The form of the national regulator 
40. The Commonwealth should pursue the long term objective of a single national regulator 
and regulation for the NFP sector, noting that the Commonwealth does not have the 
constitutional power to implement this alone. 
41. The Australian Government should seek agreement with the states and territories on a 
single national regulator through COAG. 
42. As setting up a national regulator will take time, the Government should improve 
Commonwealth regulation for the sector in the interim, ensuring that regulatory overlap at a 
Commonwealth level is removed. 
Funding of a national regulator 
43. The Government should consider whether or not to collect a supervisory co-contribution, as 
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NFP entities are brought within the new regulatory framework and once it is possible to replace 
existing fees.  
44. If a supervisory co-contribution is adopted, it should be tiered to reflect the resourcing 
constraints of smaller NFP entities. 
COMMENT 
The most far reaching policy decisions made in this report are to locate the regulator close to 
the ATO rather than ASIC, even though it is to have a measure of independence. The 
environment is set for a continuing and perhaps energy sapping and diversionary tussle about 
how much of the culture of a tax regulator is retained and what new cultural behaviours are 
introduced.  The consequences of this policy direction will probably not be known for several 
years, if it does not escalate to being a deadlock in administrative relationships in the short 
term. The virtual sidelining of the immediate reform of fundraising regulation and grants 
acquittal compliance cost reduction is also a significant policy decision by default, in that the 
worst and most wicked of compliance cost problems are located in these two areas. 
AUSTRALIAN CHARITIES AND NOT-FOR-PROFITS COMMISSION REGULATION IMPACT 
STATEMENT163  
The Regulation Impact Statement (RIS) was prepared for government in deciding to establish a 
regulator for the sector, but it has been an unheralded document (and at the time of writing, 
still does not appear on the Treasury’s Not-for-profit reform web site164).  
‘A RIS is mandatory for all decisions made by the Australian Government and its agencies that 
are likely to have a regulatory impact on business or the not-for-profit sector, unless that 
impact is of a minor or machinery nature and does not substantially alter existing 
arrangements.’165 The primary role of the RIS is to improve government decision making 
processes by ensuring that all relevant information is presented to the decision maker when a 
policy decision is being made.  
The Department of Finance and Deregulation recommends the following seven elements in a 
RIS:166 
 the problem or issues which give rise to the need for action;  
 the desired objective(s);  
 the options (regulatory and/or non-regulatory) that may constitute viable means 
for achieving the desired objective(s);  
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 an assessment of the impact (costs, benefits and, where relevant, levels of risk) of 
each option on consumers, business, government and the community;  
 a consultation statement;  
 a recommended option; and  
 a strategy to implement and review the preferred option. 
And further: 
The emphasis of the RIS should be on analysis; it is not intended to be an advocacy 
document. Hence, supporting evidence (preferably quantified) should be used in the 
RIS wherever possible.167 
The RIS summarised the ‘problem’ as:168 
The NFP sector’s regulatory framework is not meeting the needs of the NFP sector, 
Australian governments and the Australian public more broadly. The regulatory 
framework under which NFP entities operate is: 
 fragmented and inconsistent;  
 uncoordinated with regulatory responsibilities spread across a range of government 
agencies;  
 producing complex reporting requirements which are, in certain situations, 
overlapping; and  
 not adequately addressing the informational needs of the Australian public.  
The RIS proposed five options to remedy this problem:169 
1. Retain the existing policy; 
2. Pursue the establishment of a national regulatory framework; 
3. Establish the Australian NFP Administrator within the ATO; 
4. Establish an independent statutory office regulator called the Australian Charities 
and NFP Commission; 
5. Establish an independent Financial Management and Accountability Act regulator 
called the Australian Charities and NFP Commission. 
It is notable that the option to establish the ACNC as an independent body within ASIC was not 
mentioned at all in the RIS, despite its having been considered in detail in previous 
consultations and reports. There is no explanation in the RIS for this omission. 
The impact analysis for each of the options is largely bereft of any meaningful, quantifiable, 
evidence-based impact measures. The tenor of the analysis is represented by statements such 
as:  
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Given informational gaps, it is impossible to estimate current compliance costs faced 
by the sector and changes in compliance costs that would arise due to the 
implementation of options considered in this RIS. The PC report reached a similar 
conclusion.170 
Some of the more interesting assumptions or guesstimates on which the RIS is based include 
that ‘half of one working day in staff time’ would be required to prepare annual reporting 
obligations for small organisations under option 3 and that professional accounting and 
auditing services ‘are generally provided free of charge or at highly subsidised rates’.171  
The recommended option is Option 4: to establish an independent statutory office regulator 
called the Australian Charities and Not-for-profits Commission:172 
... Option 4 would come at a lower cost than Option 3 and pose fewer implementation 
and legislative risks. Under this option, the ACNC could leverage off existing ATO 
resources, including staff, infrastructure and expertise. This option would deliver 
similar benefits as Option 5 including seamless regulation of the sector and education, 
transparency and compliance gains. 
COMMENT  
Ongoing review of the recommended policy initiative is limited to ongoing qualitative 
‘monitoring of stakeholders’ attitudes’.173 These stakeholder views are to come via the NFP 
Reform Council and the ATO’s Charities Consultative Committee.  A better approach to review 
is that of the UK and New Zealand charity commissions, which have used a general population 
quantitative survey about trust in the charitable sector. It is disappointing that the standards 
required of the sector in their reporting, with particular emphasis on impact measurement, are 
not to be embraced by the government in the administration of their regulatory efforts. 
 
7.5 ACNC IMPLEMENTATION TASKFORCE DISCUSSION 
PAPER 
This consultation paper,174 issued on 9 December 2011, outlines the Australian Charities and 
Not-for-profits Commission’s (ACNC’s) reporting framework for charities, the public 
information portal and the educational role of the ACNC. The register will initially cover those 
entities seeking recognition of charity or PBI status (not other DGR classifications), to be 
eligible for Australian government exemptions and concessions. It may be expanded to include 
other nonprofit entities at a later date. 
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REGULATORY APPROACH 
The paper outlines the regulatory approach of the proposed ACNC. This appears to accord with 
modern regulatory practice in the area, in contrast to that of the ATO which is constrained by 
being a tax regulator with a strong tax culture. Some elements of this approach are:175 
It is proposed that the ACNC will be guided by the well-accepted regulatory principles 
of proportionality, transparency, fairness, timeliness and consistency. It will provide 
information, guidance and general advice to charities and the public.  
The ACNC will begin from a presumption of honesty on [the part of] charities unless 
demonstrated otherwise. The ACNC will offer guidance and general advice to charities 
to assist them meet their obligations to their members, the regulator and the public. 
Where there is evidence of non-compliance, the ACNC will use graduated powers and 
provide opportunities for self-correction. Where there is evidence of deliberate wrong-
doing, it will take strong and decisive action. This could be described as a 
proportionate approach. The ACNC will adopt a helpful and supportive role with the 
great majority of charities which are compliant and operate with sound professional 
practice, and with those who need some help to get there. However it will take a 
tough approach where there is evidence of deliberate wrong-doing, and use its powers 
to protect the public, vulnerable beneficiaries, donors and members. 
It is proposed that the ATO will transfer basic information on all charities from its register to 
the ACNC, which will then publish the list on its portal and request those charities supply 
additional information in their first annual information statement from 2013. New charities 
will have a separate registration process from 1 July 2012. The level of information required in 
annual reports will depend on which tier an organisation falls into: tier 1 being those with less 
than $250,000 in annual revenue; tier 2, between $250,000 and $1 million; and tier 3, being 
those above $1 million. Draft registration and annual information return forms are included for 
comment.  
INFORMATION PORTAL 
The ACNC portal will be launched on 1 July 2012. It will provide information to the public as 
well as a ‘charity passport’ of essential information to other government departments. The 
intended purpose of the portal is to inform:176 
 the general public, who can see how support is used and can make a more 
informed decision about the charities they wish to support; 
 stakeholders of the individual charities, for their information and assurance; 
 philanthropists, to better inform their donor activity; and 
 researchers and government policy makers. 
EDUCATION ROLE 
The ACNC will also play a role in education and guidance of the public and the sector as to the 
roles and requirements of the regulator. Its guiding principles are expressed to be ‘accessibility 
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(including usefulness, relevance and readability, targeted and tailored), diversity and 
efficiency’.177 
COMMENT  
Some concerns with the matters raised in the discussion paper are: 
 It is not clear what financial reporting is required – general purpose reports or special 
purpose reports. 
 The annual information returns do not require financial information as defined in the 
Standard Chart of Accounts. 
 It appears that a financial year accounting period will be preferred and that only 
limited exemptions from a 30 June end date will be permitted. 
 It is unclear how the information portal disclosures will meet the objectives of better 
informed stakeholders without further development of common definitions of 
administrative and fundraising costs and acceptances of these by the public and 
media. 
 It is unclear how the ACNC will configure its education functions so it does not ‘crowd 
out’ other private market products in this area. 
An Exposure Draft of the Australian Charities and Not-for-profits Commission Bill was released 
on 9 December 2011.178 See further detail below. 
 
7.6 AUSTRALIAN CHARITIES AND NOT-FOR-PROFITS 
COMMISSION BILL – EXPOSURE DRAFT179 
The government released an incomplete draft Bill and Explanatory Memorandum for the 
establishment, objects and powers of the Australian Charities and Not-for-profits Commission 
(ACNC). The Bill also provides for the registration and reporting of charities and other bodies. It 
is accompanied by a set of fact sheets. The Bill has eight chapters but some content is yet to be 
drafted, e.g. appeals, reviews and penalties, consequential amendments, transitional 
provisions, whistleblower protection and proposed regulations. 
This Bill assumes the simultaneous passing of the Bill to introduce tax exempt body ‘in 
Australia’ requirements180 and the proposal to introduce a statutory definition of charity (both 
outlined below). 
Chapter 1 (the Introduction) of the exposure draft includes the preliminaries, objects of the Act 
and functions, and constitutional limits of the ACNC. The object of the act (section 2-5) is ‘to 
promote trust and confidence in not-for-profit entities that provide public benefits’. The 
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adoption of the ‘trust and confidence’ concept follows the path of the UK, New Zealand and 
Singaporean regulatory regimes. Given the political rhetoric to date, one could be forgiven for 
expecting the object to be ‘reducing red tape and duplication’. However this is expressed to 
merely be an aim along with promoting good governance, accountability and transparency. 
The Explanatory Memorandum forecasts that there will be a short term rise in compliance 
costs and in the medium to long term a reduction in compliance costs because of the new 
general reporting requirements. 
The other noteworthy phrase in the object is ‘accountability’: that is ‘to donors, to 
governments and to the public generally’. This term is used several times in the Bill. It does not 
specifically mention accountability to those who are the beneficiaries of the nonprofit’s 
objects or purpose (e.g. clients) or volunteers, members, founders or any number of other 
stakeholder groups which characterise the nature of most nonprofit enterprise.  
The final noteworthy phrase appears in the object’s reference to not-for-profit entities ‘that 
provide public benefits’. The term ‘public benefit’ is not defined in the Bill, so the extensive 
common law jurisprudence in relation to this concept may apply. 
The functions of the ACNC (section 2-10) will include registration, promotion of good 
governance, accountability and transparency, education, information to the public, co-
ordination of other government information needs, as well as investigation and enforcement 
of breaches. 
The constitutional limits are set out in section 2-15. The lack of a direct constitutional power in 
the federal government to regulate charitable and nonprofit organisations has hampered the 
creation of a national regulator. The section relies on the powers of the commonwealth in 
relation to constitutional corporations, administration of the taxation laws and some other 
incidental powers.  
Chapter 2 details the registration of nonprofit entities and the functions and powers of the 
ACNC with regard to registration (its role in maintaining a register of charities and nonprofit 
entities is in Chapter 4). Provisions for review and appeal of the Commissioner’s decisions have 
not yet been drafted.  
An entity seeking registration will have to meet ‘the governance requirements’, which has not 
previously been required under tax regulation (section 5-10(1A)); and registration can be 
revoked for failing to comply with the Act or Regulations or any direction given by the ACNC.  
Registration classification is multifaceted with entities able to have a primary and secondary 
classification (section 5-10(2)). It appears possible for a single entity to have multiple 
secondary classifications. For example, an entity may be typed as a ‘charitable purpose’ as well 
as a subtype of ‘public benevolent institution’ and ‘advancement of social and community 
welfare (including the prevention of poverty)’. Another combination might be the 
‘encouragement of community entertainment’ and ‘encouragement of games or sport’. 
Time periods will apply to registration and an applicant can treat its application as refused if 
the time expires without a decision, and move to the appeal process. 
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Chapter 3 describes the duties of registered entities, the regulatory framework, including 
reporting and governance requirements for registered entities. A registered entity is required 
to keep financial records for a period of five years, (similar to Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 
section 262A). There will be three levels of proportionate reporting, and financial reporting 
requirements follow current accounting and auditing standards via Corporations Act 2001. As 
well as financial reports, the Commissioner can seek information reports from an entity. The 
accounting period will be the financial year, but the Commissioner has discretion to approve a 
different accounting period. 
Chapter 4 sets out the regulatory powers of the ACNC. The Commissioner is given extensive 
powers in relation to a public register including issuing public ‘warnings’ to an entity, as well as 
investigatory powers, power to enter and search private premises, give wide ranging binding 
directions to entities, apply for injunctions, remove or suspend trustees and directors, and 
impose strict liability for some breaches. The Commissioner can also seek enforceable 
undertakings from entities, a practice commonly used by other regulatory agencies (e.g. ASIC 
and the ACCC) with great effect. 
Chapter 5 sets out the establishment, staffing, and reporting requirements of the ACNC.  The 
Commissioner will be appointed by the Governor-General for a maximum of five years. The 
Commissioner is to make an annual report to the Minister and include financial reports as well 
as ‘an evaluation of the ACNC’s overall performance’. 
Chapter 6 concerns the appointment and function of the ACNC Advisory Board. The board will 
have between two and eight members, with experience in nonprofit organisations and 
qualifications in law, taxation or accounting, appointed by the Minister. Advisory board 
appointments will be for three years. The board will advise the Commissioner, but will not be 
able to give binding directions. It will be required to meet four times a year. 
Chapter 7 covers miscellaneous matter such as secrecy and whistleblower protections (yet to 
be drafted), penalties, forms and service of process. Chapter 8 covers interpretation of core 
concepts used in the legislation and a general dictionary. 
COMMENT 
The exposure draft drew significant criticism which included: 
 It should include objects which reflect encouragement of the nonprofit sector;  
 Questions about the constitutional validity of the reach of the proposed legislation to 
‘trading corporations’; 
 It extends the unit of regulation to groups of associated entities rather than just a 
single tax entity; 
 There should be greater procedural fairness provisions; powers of search, seizure and 
investigation should be specified clearly; and strict liability provisions must be justified; 
 The Advisory Board should be given greater power to set its own agenda and 
procedures, and the Commissioner should be required to take greater heed of the 
advice given; 
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 The independence of the ACNC from other bodies such as the ATO and Treasury 
should be enhanced; 
 There should be greater clarity in several key provisions such as the definition of 
‘responsible person’, revocation of charity status, and the duty to keep records; 
 Several sections of the exposure draft had not been drafted. 
 
7.7 A STATUTORY DEFINITION OF CHARITY: CONSULTATION 
PAPER181 
The 2011–12 budget announcements included a plan to introduce a statutory definition of 
charity. This consultation paper takes up proposals in the report of the Charities Definition 
Inquiry182 of 2001, to reform and clarify certain aspects of the common law definition of 
charity. A previous draft Bill was prepared in 2003 for public discussion and review by the 
Board of Taxation.183 Due to a range of technical and policy184 issues the draft Bill was not 
pursued, except that three minor changes were enacted in the Extension of Charitable Purpose 
Act 2004.  These three changes recognised nonprofit child care, closed religious orders and self 
help groups as charitable.  
Since that time the Productivity Commission has recommended185 legislating a statutory 
definition of charity, based on the Charities Definition Inquiry; the Senate Economics 
Committee,186 the Henry Tax Review,187 and the Treasury Scoping Study188 have all 
recommended the introduction of a statutory definition of charity; and many other 
jurisdictions have reformed the common law definition of charity.  
The Treasury released this consultation paper in October 2011. The paper revisits the issues 
including: ‘dominant’ purpose/activities of charities and incidental/related activities; peak 
body qualification as charitable; ascertainment of public benefit (extent of a necessary public, 
as opposed to familial ties for example); reversal of the presumption of public benefit; political 
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advocacy; illegal activities; the ‘four heads’ of charity and adoption of a single definition with 
the co-operation of states and territories.  
The paper also examines Australian Disaster Relief Funds (ADRFs), a general category of DGR 
for assistance in disasters such as floods and bushfires. The issue with ARDFs is providing more 
flexibility in the disbursement of their funds and technical efficiency measures. 
COMMENT 
The Consultation Paper has generated significant technical and policy debate. Some of the key 
issues are: 
 Reversal of the presumption of public benefit; 
 Separation of ‘purposes’ from ‘activities’ for the determination of charitable status; 
and 
 Clarification of ‘political’ and ‘advocacy’ determinants. 
Unfortunately, it is a flawed document because it takes as its foundation the failed 2003 Bill, 
rather than the Charities Definition Inquiry Report. However it does take into account recent 
High Court decisions such as the Word Investments case and the Aid/Watch case. 
 
7.8 BETTER TARGETING OF NONPROFIT TAX CONCESSIONS 
On 27 May 2011, a consultation paper189 was released to seek the views of stakeholders and 
the public about the Budget announcement to withdraw tax concessions given to nonprofit 
entities, for income from unrelated business activities which were not repatriated to the core 
purpose of the entities. In his foreword to the discussion paper, the Assistant Treasurer stated 
that the policy reasons for the measure were to ensure a level playing field between for-profit 
and nonprofit organisations, and to protect community assets from unnecessary commercial 
risks. In various consultations, the Assistant Treasurer, ATO and Treasury have referred to a 
grave threat to the revenue that was being addressed by the measure, but on grounds of ATO 
confidentiality have refused to disclose the nature of the revenue threat or its magnitude. 
The main points from the paper’s ‘Summary’190 are extracted below: 
The Government announced in the 2011-12 Budget that it will reform the tax concessions 
provided to NFP entities to ensure they are targeted only at those activities that directly 
further an NFP’s altruistic purposes.
191
  
Income tax concessions will only apply to profits generated by the unrelated commercial 
activities of NFPs, if they are directed to the NFP’s altruistic purpose. This means an NFP 
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entity will pay income tax on those profits that are not directed back to its altruistic 
purpose (that is, the earnings it retains in its commercial undertaking). 
An NFP entity will also not have access to a fringe benefits tax (FBT) exemption or rebate, 
goods and services tax (GST) concessions or deductible gift recipient (DGR) support in 
relation to their unrelated commercial activities. 
Small-scale and low-risk unrelated commercial activities will not be affected by the 
reforms. The reforms will not disturb the taxing arrangements associated with mutual 
income and the principles of mutuality. The reforms will not affect the passive income of 
NFPs. 
The Government announced that the new arrangements will commence on 1 July 2011. 
Initially only new unrelated commercial activities that commence after 7:30 pm (AEST) on 
10 May 2011 will be subject to the new arrangements.  
The Government also announced that NFP entities with existing unrelated commercial 
activities will initially be able to continue to use their tax concessions to support these 
activities, with the intention of phasing these out over time. Further, NFP entities that 
have entered into government service delivery contracts as at 7:30pm (AEST) on 10 May 
2011 will be allowed to use their tax concessions in support of that contract. Likewise, the 
50,000 National Rental Affordability Scheme allocations will be unaffected by the tax 
changes.  
The Government’s reforms will ensure valuable government assistance is directed to 
supporting the altruistic activities of NFPs, the community assets of NFPs are protected 
from unnecessary commercial risks, and there is a level playing field for all small, large and 
NFP businesses in Australia. 
The Government remains committed to consulting widely on the NFP reform process and 
is interested in the views of the NFP sector, the business sector and state and territory 
governments. The Australian Government is committed to harmonising NFP arrangements 
with the states and territories where possible in order to minimise compliance costs for 
the NFP sector. However, all decisions relating to access to state and territory tax 
concessions are decisions for state and territory governments. Further, if there were any 
changes to the GST base it would require the unanimous support of state and territory 
governments. 
 
The paper proposed three options for taxing unrelated business income activities: 
1. Unrelated commercial activities could be undertaken through a separate entity 
which could be taxed equivalently to other commercial entities in Australia; 
2. Unrelated commercial activities could be undertaken in a separate entity, and 
profits retained in the entity at the end of the year would be taxed; or 
3. Nonprofit entities could undertake unrelated activities within the non-profit 
organisation. 
COMMENT  
The paper drew robust criticism, particularly from lawyers, accountants and other professional 
advisors to the sector who raised a number of policy, technical and implementation issues with 
what were seen as ‘sketchy’ proposals. Broadly some of these are: 
 The proposal creates an unnecessary compliance burden which will be regressive on 
smaller organisations; 
 The response is not proportionate to the mischief that has been identified; 
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 There are timing issues with accounting for income and its repatriation by the end of 
the tax year; 
 Provision of capital to the unrelated business located in a separate entity; 
 The proposal winds back principles set out in the High Court decision in Word 
Investments; 
 The policy is contrary to the direction and spirit of the recent Productivity Commission 
and Henry Tax Review findings and recommendations; and 
 The proposal appears to perpetuate ATO confusion about the distinction between the 
‘activities’ and ‘purposes’ of tax exempt organisations. 
Many were unclear about the impact of the measures and found this particularly concerning as 
some measures commenced on 10 May 2011, possibly with unknown tax implications. In 
December 2011, the Assistant Treasurer announced that further consultations would be held 
in 2012.192 
 
7.9 TAX LAWS AMENDMENT (2011 MISCELLANEOUS 
MEASURES) BILL (NO. 1) 2011: TAX EXEMPT BODY ‘IN 
AUSTRALIA’ REQUIREMENTS – EXPOSURE DRAFT193 
From 1 July 1997, an ‘in Australia’ special condition for income tax exempt entities has been 
applied to address tax avoidance arrangements which could use charitable trusts and certain 
other nonprofit organisations to shift untaxed funds overseas. Since that time, entities cannot 
be income tax exempt unless they are operated principally in Australia, are prescribed as 
exempt in the Income Tax Assessment Regulations 1997 or are deductible gift recipients. In 
determining whether a charity met the ‘in Australia’ condition, the ATO considered whether 
the ‘location’ of the charity – including the purpose of its activities, and its expenditure – was 
physically in Australia. 
The High Court’s Word Investments decision found in part that charities are still considered to 
be pursuing their objectives principally ‘in Australia’ even if they merely operate to pass funds 
within Australia to another charity that conducts its activities overseas. This proposed law 
alters the effect of the High Court’s declaration of the existing law and reinstates the previous 
ATO interpretation of the law. It also takes the opportunity to consolidate and standardise the 
‘in Australia’ provisions across the concession classifications for various entities.  Other policy 
justifications given in support of this measure are to prevent abuses of money laundering and 
terrorist financing. 
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COMMENT  
Again the exposure draft drew robust criticism, particularly from lawyers, accountants and 
other professional advisors to the sector who raised a number of technical, unintended 
consequence and implementation issues with the proposals. Broadly some of these are: 
 Creation of an unnecessary compliance burden which is contrary to the principles set 
out in the National Compact; 
 Technical issues with proposed section 995-(1) which defines ‘not-for-profit entity’ in 
its second limb which effectively prohibits ‘distribution of profits or assets to particular 
entities, including its owners or members’ which is a departure from present practice 
in relation to complex charity branch structures; 
 Section 30-18(3) which requires funds, institutions and authorities with DGR status to 
only donate to other DGRs; 
 Possible anomalous results from application of s 30-18(4) which deals with 
International Affairs DGRs and the status of the entity which operate International 
Affairs fund; and 
 The use of strict terms: ‘at all times’ and ‘solely’, which would not allow a 
proportionate response for trivial breaches. 
The Minister indicated in October that further consultations would be held in 2012 before the 
Bill was to be introduced to Parliament.194 
 
7.10 TAXATION RULING TR2011/4: INCOME TAX AND FRINGE 
BENEFITS TAX: CHARITIES195 
This new tax ruling (replacing TR2005/21) explains the ATO’s view of the meaning of 
'charitable' for the purposes of the terms 'charitable institution' and 'fund established for 
public charitable purposes' where they are used in income tax and fringe benefits tax 
legislation. It takes account of decisions of the High Court and Federal Court including: Federal 
Commissioner of Taxation v Word Investments Limited;196 Aid/Watch Incorporated v Federal 
Commissioner of Taxation;197 Central Bayside General Practice Association Ltd v Commissioner 
of State Revenue (Vic);198 and Victorian Women Lawyers’ Association Inc v Federal 
Commissioner of Taxation.199  
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The ruling applies to income years starting both before and after its date of issue. It finalises 
Draft Taxation Ruling TR 2011/D2.  
Some of the major changes are: 
 Para 5 – The term ‘charitable fund’ is now defined in paras 41ff and new terms of 
‘charitable purpose’, ‘sole purpose’, ‘purpose’, ‘objects’ and ‘tax law’ have been 
added. 
 Para 126 – The deemed charitable purposes of National Rental Affordability Scheme is 
added. 
 Paras 70–73 and 294–314 – Implications from the High Court decision in Aid/Watch 
are added. 
 Paras 60–63, 194–195, and 271–277 – Implications from the High Court decision in 
Word Investments are added. 
 Paras 24 and 163–164 - The Ruling maintains the position in TR 2005/21 but now 
specifies that in order for a trust to be considered an institution, it requires some 
additional quality or function that gives the trust, when regarded as a whole, the 
character of an establishment organisation or association instituted for the promotion 
of an object. 
 Para 33 – An institution can be charitable even if its activities are not intrinsically 
charitable (following the Word Investments decision). 
 Paras 39–40 and 220–223 – An institution with the power to accumulate funds can still 
be charitable. 
 Paras 47–48 and 219 – An institution that carries out its activities for the private profit 
or benefit of its owners cannot be charitable. However, where the objects of an 
institution are charitable, the fact that it can distribute surpluses to owners or 
members in furtherance of those objects does not preclude its being charitable as a 
matter of course, as long as certain conditions are met. 
 Paras 64–69 and 278–287 – Although government purposes are not charitable, where 
the sole purpose of an institution is charitable, neither the fact that its services may 
have the effect of helping to achieve government policy objectives, nor the fact that it 
may rely substantially on government funding, will detract from its characterisation 
(Central Bayside case). An institution that has a purpose which is the same as a 
government purpose can still be charitable, as long as it carries out its purpose 
independently. 
 Paras 27–28 and 180–184 – The meaning of incidental or ancillary is discussed by 
reference to the Federal Court's decisions in Navy Health Ltd v Federal Commissioner 
of Taxation200 and Commissioner of Taxation v Triton Foundation.201 
 Para 207 – The 'natural and probable' consequences of the objects and activities of an 
institution can help establish its purpose (Word Investments case).  
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For more discussion of TR 2011/4, see the article by Anne Robinson, above: 6.2 The New 
Meaning of Charitable According to the ATO. 
 
7.11 ADDENDUM TR 2005/22A2: COMPANIES CONTROLLED BY 
EXEMPT ENTITIES 
The addendum202 to TR 2005/22 Income Tax: companies controlled by exempt entities, was 
issued on 16 November 2011 to take account of the decision of the High Court in Federal 
Commissioner of Taxation v Word Investments.203 The ATO said of the addendum when it was 
released in draft form:204 
 The decision in Word Investments does not alter the ATO’s view taken in TR 2005/22 
(companies controlled by exempt entities) that it is not possible to merely attribute 
the characteristics and purposes of an exempt entity to a different company, or to 
simply 'look through' the company to the exempt entity, ignoring the characteristics 
and purposes of the company itself. In Word Investments the High Court held that 
Word Investments Limited was charitable because it had a sole charitable purpose 
itself, not because it had been established by and had links with a charitable entity or 
because its surplus funds were directed to another charitable institution. The company 
was a charitable institution because, having regard to factors such as the proper 
construction of its objects as set out in its memorandum of association, the 
circumstances of its foundation and the 'effectuation' of its objects in its activities, it 
was clear that its own purposes were charitable.  
 The status of the bodies to which the funds were directed by Word Investments 
Limited was relevant in the assessment of the company's status only in as much as it 
allowed for the conclusion that the funds would be applied to further Word 
Investment Limited's charitable purpose. 
 
7.12 DRAFT TAXATION RULING TR 2011/D5: INCOME TAX: 
SCHOOL OR COLLEGE BUILDING FUNDS205 
This draft ruling is to replace Taxation Ruling TR 96/8. The main change is removal of the 'more 
than 50 per cent rule' (an administrative rule of thumb in TR 96/8) as the ATO does not 
considered it to be correct in law. In determining the extent of other use acceptable under 
Item 2.1.10, TR 96/8 considered in some contexts that a building (or part of a building) was 
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used as a school, provided any other use of the building was less than 50 per cent on a time 
basis, compared to the time for which the building was used as a school. In general, the draft 
ruling provides greater guidance with expanded discussion and more practical examples on: 
 what is a ‘building’;  
 what is a ‘school’;  
 what is ‘use of a building as a school’? 
The discussion about administration costs has also been expanded to clarify that, in certain 
circumstances, reasonable expenditure incurred to administer the fund can be disbursed from 
the fund. 
The draft ruling explains specifically that community use of primary school facilities funded as 
part of the Australian government's Building the Education Revolution (BER) program is 
unlikely to be more than minor or occasional use (even if that use is regular).  The community's 
use of those facilities will not prevent a school or college building fund from being a fund that 
is established and maintained solely for providing money for the acquisition, construction or 
maintenance of a building used, or to be used, as a school or college. 
 
7.13 REVIEW OF NONPROFIT GOVERNANCE 
ARRANGEMENTS 
The consultation paper Review of Not-for-profit Governance Arrangements206 follows on from 
the Treasury Scoping Study recommendations: 
 Entities that are currently regulated by ASIC should be incorporated within the 
regulatory framework as soon as new reporting and governance frameworks are 
implemented. ASIC should still retain responsibility for incorporation; 
 Acquittal reporting should be outcomes based and should not include financial 
reporting or reporting related to organisational governance; 
 Organisational governance rules should be proportional to the size of entities, risk 
factors and receipt of public and government assistance; 
 The regulation of service provision should remain with existing entities;  
 Government contracts should no longer mandate organisational governance 
requirements for NFPs; and 
 Over the long term, the national regulator should be provided with powers regarding 
asset protection, the suspension and/or removal of responsible persons, registration 
and deregistration, the enforcement of governance rules, investigative processes, 
enforcement powers, including civil penalties and the imposition of fines, proportional 
compliance activities, and, dispute resolution processes. 
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In the short term it is envisaged that entities subject to commonwealth control, such as 
companies limited by guarantee and CATSI organisations, will have uniform governance rules 
which will be proportionate to size and risk and be administered by ACNC. It is expected that 
these rules will be in place for the commencement of the ACNC. It is proposed that after 
consultation with states and territories, bodies such as incorporated associations and co-
operatives will also be brought under the governance jurisdiction of the ACNC. 
The definition of ‘governance’ is contested and the discussion paper provides an introductory 
definition: 
Governance is concerned with the practices and procedures in place to ensure that an 
entity operates in such a way that it achieves its objectives in an effective and 
transparent manner.207 
and: 
Corporate governance can be defined as ‘a system of checks and balances between 
management and other interested parties’. It is a way for organisations to define 
themselves to all stakeholders in terms of compliance and accountability. It can also be 
viewed as the way in which an entity is steered or stewarded, and therefore relates to 
the functions and procedures of governing. Corporate governance can refer to the way 
in which trustees or directors provide oversight for companies and other entities, and 
to what objectives.208 
The discussion paper classifies governance issues for the purpose of its discussion in the 
following way: 
 duties and minimum standards of responsible individuals, including rules for proper 
organisational management and running of the entity; 
 disclosure requirements and managing conflicts of interest; 
 risk management procedures; 
 internal and external reviews and auditing requirements; 
 the coverage of the minimum requirements of governing rules; and 
 relationships with members. 
COMMENT  
Some of the issues which have raised comment on the discussion paper include: 
 There appears to be a confusion between ‘risk management’ and ‘legal compliance’ 
and it is important that the distinction is made because treating legal compliance as a 
risk management issue can lead to undesirable regulatory outcomes. Further, there is 
an apparent confusion about the role of insurance as a risk management strategy; 
 There is a lack of attention to the issue of internal disputes in nonprofit organisations 
which plagues current state and federal regulatory regimes; 
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 There is no mention of ‘whistleblower’ strategies which are particularly relevant to the 
sector in relation to volunteers, donors and other stakeholders; 
 There is little technical detail on how there will be a division between those agencies 
that incorporate federal entities and the ACNC which will administer governance 
regulation. 
 
7.14 UNIFORM NATIONAL LAW FOR COOPERATIVES 
In 1990, the report of the Brady Committee of Inquiry into Non-Bank Financial Institutions and 
Related Financial Processes209 noted that cooperatives had been arguing that existing 
legislation was antiquated and did not provide a suitable framework in the current commercial 
and social environment. The cooperatives submitted that their activities were hamstrung by 
the inadequacies of the legislation.  
Currently, all states and territories in Australia have legislation which enables a co-operative to 
register and to become incorporated as a legal entity. The legislation is very similar across 
jurisdictions and is based on a set of standard provisions developed in 1996 by the Standing 
Committee of Attorneys-General, which signed the Consistent Cooperatives Laws Agreement. 
Under the agreement each jurisdiction agrees to enact cooperatives legislation containing the 
agreed core consistent provisions. 
A Cooperatives National Law210 is now proposed for all states and territories. Fair Trading NSW 
has collected comments on behalf of the Ministerial Council on Consumer Affairs on the 
proposed Cooperatives National Law Bill and on a Consultation Regulatory Impact Statement 
for the proposed legislation. 
The proposed Cooperatives National Law will replace separate cooperatives legislation in each 
state and territory. The plan is that New South Wales will enact the national law in 2012. Other 
states and territories will then have 12 months to enact the national law or enact consistent 
legislation. 
A key change under the proposed national law is simplification of financial reporting by small 
cooperatives. The definition of a small cooperative and the nature of obligations for small 
cooperatives to report to members are to be set out in national regulations. The exposure 
draft Cooperatives National Law proposed a regime similar to that for small proprietary 
companies under the Corporations Act 2001. Under this proposal a small cooperative would 
not be required to lodge annual audited financial reports with the Registrar unless the 
Registrar specifically directed it to do so. It also proposed that a small cooperative would not 
be required to provide annual audited financial reports to its members, unless required to by 
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its rules or requested by members comprising 5 per cent of the votes. However, in the final 
draft this was amended to require all cooperatives, regardless of size, to provide annual 
financial reports to members. 
A small cooperative would be required to lodge an annual return with the Registrar and the 
return would contain certain basic information to indicate that the cooperative is still 
operating and is solvent. A discussion paper211 seeks submissions on the appropriate reporting 
threshold for a small cooperative and the basic minimum requirements for reporting to 
members. 
 
7.15 NATIONAL DISABILITY INSURANCE SCHEME: HISTORIC 
SOCIAL REFORM 
Linda Lavarch, The Australian Centre for Philanthropy and Nonprofit Studies 
In 2010, the federal government referred an inquiry into ‘a national disability long-term care 
and support scheme in Australia’ to the Productivity Commission212 for report by 31 July 2011.  
In its terms of reference, the Assistant Treasurer stated that the government was committed 
to developing a National Disability Strategy ‘to enhance the quality of life and increase 
economic and social participation for people with disability and their carers’, adding: 
The Commonwealth, along with the States and Territories, has a major investment in 
disability specific support. However, there remains a significant level of unmet demand 
for disability services which impacts upon the lives of people with disability, their 
families and carers. Demographic change and the anticipated decline in the availability 
of informal care are expected to place further pressure on the existing system over the 
coming decades. While Australia’s social security and universal health care systems 
provide an entitlement to services based on need, there is currently no equivalent 
entitlement to disability care and support services.213 
The scope of the review required the Productivity Commission to ‘assess the costs, cost 
effectiveness, benefits, and feasibility’ of a national strategy which: 
 provides long-term essential care and support for eligible people with a severe or 
profound disability, on an entitlement basis and taking account of the desired 
outcomes for each person over a lifetime; 
 is intended to cover people with disability not acquired as part of the natural process 
of ageing; 
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 calculates and manages the costs of long-term care and support for people with severe 
and profound disability; 
 replaces the existing system of funding for the eligible population; 
 ensures a range of support options is available, including individualised approaches; 
 includes a coordinated package of care services which could include accommodation 
support, aids and equipment, respite, transport and a range of community 
participation and day programs available for a person's lifetime; 
 assists the person with disability to make decisions about their support; 
 provides support for people to participate in employment where possible.214 
The Commission was asked ‘to include an examination of a social insurance model on a no 
fault basis, reflecting the shared risk of disability across the population ... [and] other options 
that provide incentives to focus investment on early intervention, as an adjunct to, or 
substitute for, an insurance model’.215 
KEY FINDINGS  
The Commission reported that Australian governments currently provide approximately 
$7 billion funding to the disability sector (around $2.3 billion by federal, around $4.7 billion by 
states and territories). The Commission estimated that the amount needed to provide people 
with the necessary supports would be about double current spending (an additional $6.5 
billion per annum). While it acknowledged some ‘pockets of success’ and that some 
governments performed better than others, the Commission found no genuine ‘system’ to 
provide disability support arrangements: 
Current disability support arrangements are inequitable, underfunded, fragmented, 
and inefficient and give people with a disability little choice. They provide no certainty 
that people will be able to access appropriate supports when needed. .... 
The central message of this report is that a coherent and certain system for people 
with a disability is required — with much more and better-directed resourcing, a 
national approach, and a shift in decision-making to people with a disability and their 
carers.216 
The Commission recommended establishing a new national scheme to be called the National 
Disability Insurance Scheme (NDIS), to be rolled out from mid-2014, with complete coverage 
by 2018–19.  The NDIS should provide insurance cover for all Australians in the event of 
significant disability and funding of the scheme should be a core function of government (as 
Medicare is). The Commission believed that the scheme would easily pass a cost benefit test: 
‘The NDIS would only have to produce an annual gain of $3800 per participant to meet a cost-
benefit test. Given the scope of the benefits, that test would be passed easily.’217 
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Everyone would be insured under the scheme, which would fund ‘long-term high quality care 
and support (but not income replacement) for people with significant disabilities’.218 It 
estimated that around 410,000 people would receive funding support from the scheme.   
The scheme would also use nonprofit organisations to help link the community and people 
with disabilities. And it would provide information, ‘help break down stereotypes, and ensure 
quality assurance and diffusion of best practice among providers’.219 
The proposed NDIS has three tiers of coverage:220  
All Australians would be potential beneficiaries of the first tier of services, while the 
second tier is targeted at all people with, or affected by disability. The third tier is 
targeted at people with support needs that would otherwise not be reasonably met 
without taxpayer funding, and that are not more appropriately met by other 
systems.221 
The three tiers are summarised as:222 
 Tier 1 would involve efforts to increase social participation by people with disabilities, 
and to minimise the impact of disability; this would be targeted at all Australians 
(22.5 million people).  
 Tier 2 would involve information, referral and web services, targeted at all people with 
disability (4 million) and their primary carers (800,000).  
 Tier 3 would involve providing funded support to all people up to the pension age with 
a permanent disability, where they had sufficient need for ongoing support and/or 
early intervention; it would mainly be made up of people with significantly reduced 
functioning in self-care, mobility, communication and self management who require 
significant ongoing support (330,000 people) people in an early intervention group 
(80,000 people).  
GOVERNMENT RESPONSE – ESTABLISHING THE NDIS 
The federal government and then COAG committed to support major reform of disability 
services in Australia through a NDIS.223  
COAG agreed at its meeting in October 2011 to lay the foundations to set the NDIS up by mid-
2013 (rather than mid-2014). A COAG Select Council of Commonwealth, state and territory 
Ministers was formed for this purpose. An Advisory Group to the Select Council, chaired by Dr 
Jeff Harmer AO, will help steer development and provide advice. Appointments to the advisory 
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group were announced in October 2011.224 The group was described as including ‘people with 
expertise in social insurance principles, disability policy, service provision, performance 
monitoring, training and curriculum development, academia and research, psychological and 
intellectual disability, indigenous disability services, young people and children with 
disability’.225 The Select Council is to report at the first 2012 meeting of COAG (scheduled for 
April 2012). 
The NDIS will operate on insurance principles and is intended to give people with disability 
greater control and choice over the services they receive, for example through individualised 
funding. This should mean that the services people get no longer depend on where they live, 
what disability they have and how they got that disability.226  
On 3 December 2011, the Minister and Prime Minister announced a new agency to lead the 
establishment of the NDIS. The government will provide $10 million ‘for projects that examine 
how to deliver individual, personalised care, ending the crisis-driven approach that is still 
sometimes applied’.227 The agency will also ‘oversee new projects that identify practical ways 
to prepare the disability sector and workforce, and people with disability, to move to a new 
ways of delivering disability services’.228  
The NDIS website is http://www.ndis.gov.au/. 
 
7.16 CONSOLIDATION OF COMMONWEALTH ANTI-
DISCRIMINATION LAWS 
Commonwealth anti-discrimination law is currently found chiefly in four separate Acts, each of 
which deals with different grounds of discrimination: Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (RDA); Sex 
Discrimination Act 1984 (SDA); Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (DDA); and Age 
Discrimination Act 2004 (ADA). In September 2011, the Commonwealth Attorney-General 
released a Discussion Paper as a step in consolidating existing Commonwealth anti-
discrimination Acts into a single, comprehensive law.229  
The consolidation is part of Australia’s Human Rights Framework230 and the Discussion Paper 
was released as part of a Better Regulation Ministerial Partnership between the Attorney-
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General and the Minister for Finance and Deregulation.231  As well as consolidation of current 
laws, the Discussion Paper canvasses introducing new prohibitions against discrimination on 
the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity as well as recommendations of the Senate 
Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs Inquiry in 2008, into the effectiveness 
of the Sex Discrimination Act232 (the SDA Report). 
The discussion paper touches on a number of matters of direct consequence to nonprofit 
organisations, including application to volunteers;233 member-based organisations such as 
clubs;234 sporting organisations; and religious organisations.235  
Volunteer workers receive inconsistent treatment in both federal and state jurisdictions as to 
their status as workers and whether anti-discrimination laws apply to them. The SDA Report 
recommended that the SDA be amended to explicitly protect voluntary workers from 
discrimination and sexual harassment.236 Recent state and territory government reviews have 
made similar recommendations.237  
In regard to application of discrimination law to clubs, the Discussion Paper points out that:238 
All clubs, voluntary bodies and incorporated or unincorporated associations are 
prohibited from discriminating against the general public in relation to provision of 
goods, services and facilities under the general provisions of each of the 
Commonwealth anti-discrimination laws. .... 
These provisions are particularly complex due to inconsistent coverage and exceptions 
between the Acts, as well as differing and overlapping terminology [in the different 
Acts]. 
The SDA report had recommended expanding the definition of clubs in the SDA to include all 
clubs, but to permit single sex clubs in the same way as other single sex organisations are 
permitted; it also recommended removing the exception for voluntary organisations.239 The 
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Discussion Paper puts forward options240 e.g. adopting the DDA approach, which covers most 
clubs and incorporated associations, excluding certain very small social clubs. Alternatively the 
SDA approach, consistent with most states and territories, would be to cover only licensed 
clubs with 30 or more members – this would narrow the range of current prohibitions on 
disability discrimination.  
In terms of applying discrimination laws to sport,241 the DDA expressly prohibits discrimination, 
but the ADA, RDA and SDA impliedly prohibit discrimination. The Discussion Paper gives the 
approach of Victoria’s Equal Opportunity Act 2010 as an option:242 
a person is prohibited from discriminating against another person by refusing or failing 
to select the other person in a sporting team or by excluding the other person from 
participating in a sporting activity.  This prohibition extends to all protected attributes 
covered by the Victorian Act. Specific exceptions are provided for sex and gender 
identity (where strength, stamina or physique of competitors is relevant) and to permit 
the restriction of competitive sporting activity to people who can effectively compete, 
to people of a specified age or age group or to people with a disability. 
In terms of religious organisations,243 the ADA and SDA are the only Acts which give 
exemptions on the basis of religious tenets or beliefs (state and territory Acts have similar 
exemptions). The paper refers to the Australian Human Rights Commission’s finding that there 
is a lack of community consensus on the issue, and does not propose removing the current 
religious exemptions, apart from considering how they may apply to discrimination on the 
grounds of sexual orientation or gender identity. 
Exposure draft legislation for the new consolidated law is expected to be released for public 
consultation in early 2012. 
The Discussion Paper is available at http://www.ag.gov.au/antidiscrimination 
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8.0 GLOSSARY 
 
Administrator 
Someone appointed to administer or direct the affairs of another, for example a business or 
company in voluntary administration, to determine whether it should go into administration, 
be wound up or can resume trading as normal. 
 
Appellant 
The party who has lodged the appeal in an appeal case 
 
Bequest 
A gift in a will. 
 
Charitable institution 
An organisation which carries out charitable purposes or holds property in trust for charitable 
purposes 
 
Charitable purpose 
A purpose recognised as ‘charitable’ under the general law must fall into one of the four 
categories of charitable purpose laid down in Pemsel’s case (see below): relief of poverty; 
advancement of education; advancement of religion; other purposes beneficial to the 
community; and the purpose must be for the public benefit. Subsequent court cases and 
specific legislation have affected the interpretation and application of those categories since 
the 19th century.  
 
Charitable trust 
A trust which is set up for a purpose – being a recognised charitable purpose (see above) – and 
for the public benefit, rather than for the benefit of a person (whether an individual or a legal 
entity). 
 
Cy près scheme 
A scheme devised by a court to give effect to a charitable purpose when the intended purpose 
cannot be fulfilled, because it is impossible, impracticable or illegal. For example, property left 
in a will to be used for a general charitable intention may be inadequate for the purpose, or an 
institution to receive the benefit of a charitable trust may no longer exist. As long as there was 
a general intention for a ‘charitable’ purpose, the court can direct the funds as near as possible 
(cy près) to the original intention. 
 
Ex parte 
Denotes an application brought and heard by a court in the absence of the opposing party, e.g. 
where a matter is urgent. 
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Incorporated association 
An association incorporated under state or territory incorporated associations legislation, e.g. 
the Incorporated Associations Act 1981 (Qld). An incorporated association is recognised as a 
legal person, like a company, and therefore can hold property, can sue and be sued. 
 
Injunctive relief 
A remedy in the form of an injunction. An injunction is an order by a court to prohibit someone 
from doing an act (prohibitory injunction) or to require someone to do an act (mandatory 
injunction). The order can be limited as to time (interim or interlocutory) or it can be 
permanent (perpetual).  
 
Insolvent  
Unable to pay debts as and when they fall due. An individual in this situation is bankrupt; a 
company or business, is in insolvency 
 
Intra vires 
Within power or authority – i.e. an act which is authorised, e.g. by Rules of a body, or 
legislation of a government, and therefore is valid. (The opposite is ultra vires – see below) 
 
Liquidator 
The person who assumes control of a company’s affairs in a winding up, in order to ascertain 
liabilities (debts), terminate contracts liquidate assets, distribute available funds to pay 
creditors, and dispose of the business leading to dissolution. 
 
Pemsel’s case 
Pemsel’s case (Commissioners for Special Purposes of Income Tax v Pemsel) was an 1891 
English case which brought together the law on what was a charitable purpose, classifying 
charitable objects into four categories (the four heads of charity): the relief of poverty, age and 
impotence; the advancement of education; the advancement of religion; other purposes 
beneficial to the community. 
 
Prima facie 
At first glance; on the face of it. 
 
Pro bono 
For free – often applied to legal services provided for free. 
 
Probate 
The granting of the right to administer a will. 
 
Respondent 
The party who has to answer to a case, e.g. in an appeal, the party who has to respond to the 
appellant’s case. In civil cases the person bringing the case (i.e. suing) may be called the 
plaintiff or the applicant while the other party may be called the defendant or the respondent. 
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Statute of Charitable Uses 1601 
The 1601 Statute setting out activities and uses of property which would be recognised under 
Queen Elizabeth I as charitable.  The Preamble to the statute lists a number of things (from the 
Releife of the aged impotent and poore people, and Mariages of poore Maides, to Repaire of 
Bridges Portes Havens Causwaies Churches Seabankes and Highwaies), which have guided the 
development of the law on what is a ‘charitable purpose’. The list was subsequently set into 
four categories of charitable purpose in Pemsel’s case (see above).  The Statute is sometimes 
referred to as the Statute of Elizabeth. 
 
Statute of Elizabeth – see Statute of Charitable Uses 
 
Trusts 
A trust is a device for ensuring property is held for the benefit of a particular person or 
persons, or for a charitable purpose. The trustee holds legal title to the trust property. The 
beneficiary has a beneficial (or equitable) interest in the property, and the trustee must 
administer the trust property for the benefit of the beneficiaries or the charitable purpose. 
Private trusts must be limited as to time (the perpetuity period; in some jurisdictions legislated 
as 80 years); charitable trusts are not limited as to time period. 
 
Ultra vires 
Outside of power or authority – i.e. an act which is beyond the power or authority of a person 
or institution to perform, and therefore invalid. Something in legislation can also be ultra vires, 
for example something in an Act which is not authorised by the Constitution or something in a 
Regulation which is not authorised by the governing Act. (The opposite is intra vires – see 
above.) 
 
Voluntary administration 
If a company is in financial difficulties but could be saved, an administrator may be appointed 
to investigate its affairs and recommend to its creditors whether it should enter a deed of 
company arrangement, be wound up or can resume normal trading. 
 
Wound up 
A form of administration where a liquidator assumes control and winds up a company’s affairs 
to dissolve the company as a legal entity. The liquidator investigates the finances to determine 
the debts, converts assets into cash for payment of creditors, terminates contracts and 
disposes of the business. A winding up can be voluntary (by members or creditors) or 
compulsory (by court order). 
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9.0 CONTRIBUTING ORGANISATIONS 
 
THE AUSTRALIAN CENTRE FOR PHILANTHROPY AND 
NONPROFIT STUDIES 
The Australian Centre for Philanthropy and Nonprofit Studies (ACPNS) is part of the QUT 
Business School which is internationally recognised for its high quality teaching and research.  
ACPNS brings together academics and research students from a wide variety of disciplines, 
however all have expertise in philanthropy, nonprofit organisations, and the social economy.  
The Centre’s research activities incorporate a wide range of issues of interest and concern to 
philanthropic and nonprofit organisations and government including: 
Accounting and Finance 
 QUT Standard Chart of Accounts 
 Reserves 
 Management ratios 
Nonprofit Governance 
 Governance and management research 
 Nonprofit board evaluation 
Nonprofit Regulation 
 Law reform  
 Taxation  
 Liability of nonprofit organisations and key personnel 
 Human services contracts and partnerships 
Philanthropy and Fundraising 
 High net worth giving 
 Professional advisers’ role in philanthropy 
 Philanthropy for Indigenous and Torres Strait Islanders’ causes 
 Planned giving 
Social Enterprise 
 Mapping and scoping the sector 
 Strategic management of social enterprises 
 Social enterprise and public policy 
 Legal issues affecting social enterprise 
Apart from the research activities of its members, staff associated with the Centre also teach 
programs designed for students interested in following careers in the management of 
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philanthropic and nonprofit organisations or in public administration associated with nonprofit 
organisations. The Graduate Certificate in Business (Philanthropy and Nonprofit Studies) 
comprises eight core units which provide the basis for articulation into the Master of Business 
(Philanthropy and Nonprofit Studies). The Graduate Certificate is available to students based 
outside of Brisbane via flexible delivery mode. 
The Centre has an active community service and continuing professional education program 
and has conducted public and specialist seminars for several years. The Centre also publishes 
working papers, manuals and monographs. 
Mission 
...to bring to the community the benefits of teaching, research, technology  and service 
relevant to philanthropic and nonprofit communities. 
History 
Established in 2001, the Centre builds on the former Program on Nonprofit Corporations 
(PONC), which commenced in the School of Accountancy, Faculty of Business in 1991. PONC 
involved various staff within the Faculty of Business in research, consultancy and community 
service in the areas of law, tax, management, marketing, fundraising and ethics for nonprofits 
organisations. 
The Program developed a strong reputation for research and community service in the legal, 
accounting, taxation and public policy aspects of philanthropic and nonprofit entities. 
In 2001, generous support was received from The Myer Foundation and the Reid Family 
Charitable Trusts. This support was matched by QUT. In 2007, the Centre became a fully 
accredited member of the Nonprofit Academic Centers Council. 
 
PILCHCONNECT 
WHAT IS PILCH? 
The Public Interest Law Clearing House (Vic) Inc (PILCH) is an independent, nonprofit 
community legal service. Based in Melbourne, PILCH was established in 1994. 
PILCH seeks to meet the legal needs of people from disadvantaged or marginalised 
backgrounds, and nonprofit organisations. PILCH works creatively to match clients with 
lawyers who are willing to give their services without charge and has also developed a 
reputation for well-targeted law reform and advocacy, drawing on experience from its case 
and referral work. 
Since its inception, PILCH has successfully established a range of innovative services including 
the Homeless Persons’ Legal Clinic – this award-winning outreach service turned 10 in 2011 
and has been replicated in several states. PILCH collaborates with its counterparts in other 
states: PILCH NSW; Q-PILCH; Justice Net SA; and ACT Pro Bono Clearing House. 
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PILCH's core funding comes from its members (private law firms, the Victorian Bar, Law 
Institute of Victoria, corporate legal departments, community legal centres, all Victorian 
university law faculties and others in ancillary fields) plus a growing number of individual 
supporters. 
PILCH has developed into a unique ‘one-stop shop’ for pro bono and access to justice. 
PILCHCONNECT – A SPECIALIST LEGAL SERVICE FOR NONPROFIT ORGANISATIONS 
PilchConnect is an independent, specialist community legal service that provides nonprofits 
with access to free or low cost, high quality, practical and plain language legal help 
(information, advice and training). PilchConnect helps those Victorian nonprofits that cannot 
afford (or otherwise access) private legal advice and prioritises those in rural and regional 
areas. It also matches eligible ‘public interest’ nonprofits, with more complex legal issues, to 
PILCH member law firms who act on a pro bono basis. PilchConnect has undertaken significant 
law reform and policy work at both state and federal levels.  
PilchConnect aims to develop a sector-based hub of nonprofit legal expertise. PilchConnect 
assists community organisations to be run better, as well-run groups are more likely to achieve 
their mission, and because public trust and confidence in the sector is likely to be improved. By 
supporting nonprofits in this way, PilchConnect aims to contribute to a better civil society and 
more connected communities. PilchConnect ‘helps the helpers’.  
In an evaluation of PilchConnect, Deloitte Access Economics found that for the 2010–11 
financial year PilchConnect made an economic contribution of approximately $4.3 million. 
They estimate approximately 3,500 additional client services will be provided over the next 3 
years as a result of efficiency gains in organisations assisted by PilchConnect in that year (to 
read a copy of the full report see http://www.pilch.org.au/pilchconnectevaluation/). 
PilchConnect works with peak bodies such as VCOSS, Volunteering Victoria and Volunteering 
Australia. In particular, we enjoy a formal partnership with the Australian Centre for 
Philanthropy and Nonprofit Studies and are grateful to the ACPNS team for tremendous 
support and encouragement. See http://www.pilch.org.au/community_org/ for more 
information about PilchConnect’s services.  
 
THE AUSTRALIAN CHARITY LAWYERS ASSOCIATION 
The Australian Charity Law Association (ACLA) was established in 2009 in response to the 
emerging need for accountable, charity-related legal services in Australia.  ACLA is a nonprofit 
public company association.  
ACLA aims to provide legal education that is legitimate, targeted and relevant to all those who 
work with the sector, including external advisors for charities, in-house lawyers employed by 
charities, charity workers, administrators and even interested members of the public. In the 
provision of this education, ACLA seeks to raise the standard of legal assistance provided to 
charities, and consequently, bolster the strength of the charitable sector as a whole.  
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ACLA’s educational programs include courses, seminars and publications. These are informed 
by ACLA’s members and are targeted to address the specific needs of charities in Australia. 
They also incorporate useful information on the current legal issues affecting the Australian 
charitable sector. 
ACLA held a number of events during 2011, the highlight being the two day conference held in 
September.  
The Board of ACLA was elected at the Annual General Meeting held at the conference. 
 Anne Robinson (Solicitor Director, Prolegis Lawyers) (Chair) 
 Murray Baird (Principal and Head of Not For Profit Group, Moores Legal) 
 Matthew Harding (Associate Professor, Melbourne University Law School) 
 Claire Jones (Senior Associate, Prolegis Lawyers) 
 Fiona McLeay (Executive Director, PILCH) 
 Dr Matthew Turnour (Partner, Neumann & Turnour Lawyers) 
The Patron of ACLA is the Honourable Sir Anthony Mason AC KBE (Former Chief Justice of the 
High Court of Australia and non-permanent Judge of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal).  
How you can get involved 
Become a member.  Membership forms are available on request from ACLA Company 
Secretary 
Jae Yang: 
p. 02 9466 5222 
e. jyang@prolegis.com.au 
Participate in meetings, where you can discuss charity law issues with colleagues – these are 
planned for Brisbane, Sydney and Melbourne throughout the year with some more informal 
practice groups meeting as needed.  We will provide members with information once details 
are available. 
Come to the next conference.  We will provide members with information once details are 
available. 

